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HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PROMOTED ITS
AGENDA IN THE COURTS
LOOKING BACK: WAR ON TERROR
"Executive Power in the War on Terror"
Policy Review
December 2007/January 2008
John 0. McGinnis
[Excerpt: Footnotes omitted.]
The
Bush
administration's
legal
performance in the war on terror is much
like its performance in the war in Iraq. In
both cases it had plausible objectives but
employed mistaken, often counterproductive
and occasionally foolish strategy. The Bush
administration itself has admitted mistakes
in Iraq. But it is also important to describe
the errors in its legal strategy to which it has
so
that
future
yet
admitted
not
administrations will not suffer similar
defeats in the courts of law and the courts of
public opinion.
The errors in the Bush administration's legal
strategy had common roots. One was an
ideological focus on bolstering executive
power and a consequent lack of pragmatic
flexibility in choosing tactics that would
maximize the chances of gaining public and
judicial acceptance of its framework for
detention, interrogation, and trial of
terrorists as well as surveillance of
individuals resident in America. The
administration repeatedly failed to recognize
that reliance on executive authority alone
entailed a high risk of defeat at the hands of
the Supreme Court.
radically
administration
the
Second,
of
the risk
magnitude
underestimated the
that the Court would curb the president's
discretion, because it misunderstood the

changed legal environment for litigation in
the twenty-first century. Every aspect of
American life has been increasingly subject
to court-made rules. As a result of this trend,
even discretion in the war on terror would
likely be seen through the prism of legalism
that applies to domestic criminal law.
foreign
elites,
particularly
Moreover,
European elites, would seek to influence our
judiciary so as to tie down what they regard
as a dangerous hegemon.
The third systematic error was a failure to
recognize that all administrations tend to
lose power as they age, and wars run a high
risk of exacerbating that loss as they become
progressively less popular. Of course, the
scandals at Abu Ghraib and the more
general lack of success in Iraq could not
have been predicted. But an administration's
legal high command-and here I speak
particularly of the White House counsel and
attorney general and not of mid-level
attorneys on their staffs or those simply
defending the policies in court-must
choose strategies that take account of the
worst possible outcomes.
As a result, the administration would have
been well advised to take every step to
bolster its legal position as early as
practicable. It could have secured from
Congress
framework
legislation
for
588

detention, military tribunals, surveillance,
and perhaps even interrogation. Because
citizens are generally most supportive of an
administration at the beginning of a conflict
(a phenomenon so well known among
political scientists that is has been given the
name "rally around the flag effect"), the
terms of trade between the administration
and Congress would likely have been
favorable, even when the Senate was
controlled briefly by the Democrats in late
2001 and 2002, not to mention in 2003 when
Republicans took over both chambers and
the United States was still savoring victory
in Iraq. To be sure, nothing is certain in the
legislative process, and deals would have
had to be struck, but it seems almost certain
the administration early on could have
obtained legislation that would have met its
strategic objectives. In this regard, the
introduction of the Patriot Act is the
paradigm the administration should have
followed. It received overwhelming support
in Congress for the new powers it sought. Its
provisions
have
withstood
judicial
challenge, and the consensus support of the
people's representatives has made its harsh
critics seem politically isolated.
The consequences of eschewing Congress
and relying on judicial vindication of
executive power in court have been grave.
Far from strengthening executive power, the
administration's policies generated a series
of Supreme Court defeats that have
weakened it. These losses have contributed
to a public perception that its policy for
dealing with captured terrorists is in disarray
and, still worse, that the United States is
trenching on liberties as never before, when
the reality is that the war in Iraq and the war
on terror reduced domestic liberties less than
earlier wars and even prisoners charged as
war criminals had greater protections at trial
than those charged previously. The
unnecessary reliance on executive power has

also permitted foreign critics to claim that
President Bush is a lone ranger, whereas
legislative endorsement of specific policies
would have underscored the reality that
these policies reflect the consensus of the
American people.
Of course, it may be argued that these
recommendations suffer from hindsight bias.
The administration was faced with a
dangerous new kind of enemy after 9/11,
one made all the more fearsome in an age of
weapons of mass destruction, and the
optimal tactics to use against such an enemy
were unclear. But recommendations offered
here do not depend on any argument that the
administration misunderstood the enemyrather, that it misunderstood both the
historical patterns of executive branch
strength and weaknesses and the modem
realities of the judiciary.
Let me stress at the outset that the
administration's errors were ones of
prudence and judgment, not morality or
ethics. The Bush administration's lawyers
had to confront novel kinds of questions
without a clear legal map. These errors do
not make their service any less patriotic and
admirable. Yet some critics have criticized
the work of these lawyers as incompetent
and unethical. Amnesty International has
even
called
for
investigation
of
administration lawyers as war criminals
without any showing that these lawyers'
arguments were made in bad faith or lacked
a basis in law. The translation of legitimate
disputes about law into matters of ethics and
criminal law threatens to cut off the
legitimate debate by which law is made in a
democratic and pluralist society.
Getting Some Big Things Right
Before analyzing the Bush administration's
legal strategy on the war on terror, it is
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important to reject some lines of criticism
made popular by its opponents. First, critics
are wrong to suggest that terrorism requires
only enhanced law enforcement rather than
the use of war powers. Second, critics are
also wrong to suggest that the United States
is bound by international law even if that
law is not incorporated into our domestic
law.
First, the 9/11 attack on the United States
was an act of war no less than Japan's attack
on Pearl Harbor. Al Qaeda was a military
organization that was attempting to harm
and disrupt the United States as nation-state
rather than simply harm individuals. As
such, the action against it cannot be
understood within a law enforcement
paradigm,
because
that
paradigm
presupposes that the actors are within the
bounds of civil society. Instead, al Qaeda
and other Islamic terrorists act in a world
that predates civil society, because between
such strangers there is no common
for
law
responsible
government
enforcement. Al Qaeda and its members are
not part of our social compact and thus do
not enjoy the rights that derive from it.
Moreover, domestic criminal law is simply
not adequate to deal with vast conspiracies
that enjoy resources equivalent to those
commanded by political entities rather than
by a band of criminals.
Second, the administration should generally
adhere to international law made binding
domestically through the ratification of a
treaty or incorporation into a statute. But
when the critics of the Bush administration
denounce it for violating international law,
they do not confine themselves to
complaints about international rules that
have become domestic obligations. They
complain, for instance, that Bush violated a
norm of customary international law in
invading Iraq or violated an interpretation of

the United Nations Charter proclaimed by
other nations or international bodies even if
the United States has a different
interpretation. They argue that the United
States should follow interpretations of
treaties made by international bodies and
committees in treatment of enemy
combatants.
The administration has no obligation to
follow such norms. First, the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution
makes only treaties and statutes the supreme
law of the land. But it is more than a formal
error for the United States to consider itself
bound by international law unratified by the
political branches. Such "raw" international
law has a large democratic deficit. It does
not emerge from any democratic process but
is instead shaped by unrepresentative elites
in the form of international law professors or
international jurists who sometimes hail
from authoritarian nations.
Indeed, American law is not only likely
better than unratified international law for
Americans, but in many areas is also likely
to aid foreigners. Because of the position of
the United States as the dominant economic
and military power in the international
system, it has strong incentives to provide
international public goods, such as
appropriate detention of international
terrorists, that benefit foreigners as well as
Americans. Thus, the administration not
only has been doing Americans a favor
when it does not allow unratified
international law to constrain the President's
otherwise lawful discretion, but also has
been doing a service for citizens around the
world.
Detention

The United States faced three issues in
adapting the war paradigm to hold prisoners
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of war captured in the war on terror. First,
unlike conventional wars, prisoners taken in
the war against al Qaeda and other
organizations are generally not in uniform
and sometimes do not in fact proclaim their
allegiance to their organizations. Their
uncertain and often opaque identity creates a
greater risk that individuals will be captured
in error. Second, the war against al Qaeda
does not have as clear a stopping point as
conventional wars, because conventional
wars generally can be ended by capturing
the enemy's territory or by peace
negotiations. In particular, because these
combatants are part of an irregular army and
cannot be forced by their own domestic law
to persist in or desist from fighting, their
detention may extend long after their
allegiance to the cause has dissipated.
The third difference affecting detention
between conventional war and the war on
terror is more general. The Bush
administration should have realized that it
would face a much more concerted legal
effort to release these prisoners than would
have been the case with respect to those
captured in previous conventional wars. The
precedents upon which the administration
relied were generally from the World War II
era. Yet since that time federal courts have
government discretion in
constrained
running schools and prisons and ordered
states to raise taxes. In 2000, they decided a
presidential election. It is a short step to
bringing more judicial regulation to war,
particularly when that war is not
conventional and may appear more closely
related to law enforcement. Moreover, since
that time the world has become smaller:
Some of the justices of the Court have
a transnational
adopted
increasingly
constitutional
on
perspective
jurisprudence-one that garners respect for
the United States around the world and
respect for themselves in their international
networks of peer jurists.

In light of these potential problems, the
Bush
administration
should
have
immediately acknowledged the differences
that unconventional wars introduced into the
legal framework for holding detainees and
tempered the anomalies through the
generous use of legal process, with military
tribunals providing the initial process.
Because of the legal climate and the
possibility that its war effort would become
unpopular and thus more liable to legal
attack, it should also have sought Congress's
endorsement of these legal structures
through framework legislation that would
have supplemented the military process with
review by Article III courts under a
deferential standard.
Unfortunately,
however,
the
Bush
administration took a grudging approach to
the granting of process and resorted to
unilateral strategies that were easily
portrayed as lawyers' tricks. For instance, at
first the administration argued that it could
rely on ex parte assessments by the
executive branch to determine whether those
caught on the battlefield were in fact enemy
combatants, even if they were United States
citizens. This was a mistake even as matter
of theory, not to mention prudence. The key
question determining whether the war or law
enforcement paradigm should apply is
whether the individual's action should be
judged inside or outside our social compact.
A citizen is within our social compact and
should be treated within the war paradigm
only if he has chosen to be an enemy
combatant. He thus certainly deserves a
more impartial and deliberate process to
challenge his status before being treated as
outside the pale.
Thus, there was a substantial risk that the
Court would hold, as it did in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, that an American citizen had a
right to a more impartial process to
challenge his designation as an enemy
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combatant. Indeed, in Hamdi only a single
justice, Justice Clarence Thomas, would
have automatically deferred to the
executive's determination on Hamdi's
combatant status.
While the Court directly resolved only the
question of a United States citizen's due
process rights, the Bush administration
should have extended this right at the outset
to noncitizens as well. By showing it was
scrupulous in taking care not to have
incorrectly detained noncombatants, the
administration could have forestalled
criticism and showed that its regime was not
lawless, but carefully considered. Even more
important, the more internal process it gave
on such key issues, the less likely the
Supreme Court would hold that individuals
had full rights to habeas corpus. Some swing
Justices, like Stephen Breyer, care about
preventing errors and are not much
concerned about the rubric under which that
error correction occurred. In Hamdi itself,
the Court indicated that the military
tribunals, at least in the first instance, might
provide sufficient process for a challenge to
enemy combatant status.
For similar reasons, the administration from
the outset should have publicly provided a
process for determining when individuals
were no longer substantial threats or could
provide substantial information. Because
members of al Qaeda are irregular enemy
combatants, not common criminals, the
United States cannot be put to the choice of
trying these detainees and releasing them to
the battlefield to fight again. But their
irregular nature makes it less clear that they
will fight again: No territorial power can
compel them. A process for reviewing their
dangerousness and information value might
even have given detainees incentives to
rethink their commitment to jihad and
consider how they could make concrete

commitments to show that they would not
go back to the fight.
Whatever the administration did, however,
lawyers in the United States were going to
file lawsuits on behalf of the prisoners
seeking more and better process and rights
indistinguishable from Americans accused
of crimes. The basic response of the
administration to this prospect was to keep
Because
Guantanamo.
at
detainees
Guantanamo is not part of the United States
and yet is controlled by it, these legal
strategists believed it was the perfect place
to hold the prisoners more easily than they
could in foreign territory and yet be immune
from the reach of United States courts. To
split metaphysical sovereignty from control
was extremely clever, but it was clearly
vulnerable to attack as a legal fiction.
Although the Supreme Court a half-century
ago refused jurisdiction over habeas claims
in a case that arose in allied-occupied
Germany, such precedent cannot be relied
on to hold up when translated to a new
context in a high-profile case like this one.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Rasul, in which it insisted on taking
jurisdiction of habeas cases at Guantanamo,
should have been seen as a substantial risk.
It is the Bush administration's legal strategy
that in large measure has made Guantanamo
a symbol
of lawlessness
in
the
administration's war on terror. Its creation at
least in part for strategic litigation advantage
suggests to the outside world that the United
States was playing legal games rather than
following principles of law. And because the
administration was making these decisions
without legislative input, it could be
portrayed as eccentric and malevolent rather
than a faithful agent of the American people.
Instead of resorting to a legal sleight of
hand, the administration should have gone to
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Congress to bolster its case. If Congress had
from the beginning endorsed the framework
for holding detainees outlined above, the
Court would have been unlikely to disturb
this settlement. The reasons for such
deference are both doctrinal and practical.
As a doctrinal matter the Court gives
substantial
deference
to
Congress's
weighing of the costs and benefits of various
procedures. In a recent book, Professor Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule suggest that
the Court should give this kind of deference
to the executive in cases concerning
terrorism because the Court's institutional
competence in devising responses to
terrorism is much less than that of the
executive. But the executive may not have
the appropriate incentives to make the tradeoff between liberty and security. It is more
likely to discount all liberty interests
because of its recognition that the greatest
risks to its political standing come from a
lapse in security, however improbable the
cause, rather than from complaints about
liberties foregone.
More important from a strategic perspective,
whatever degree of deference the Court
should give to the executive as a matter of
normative principle, as a matter of
realpolitik the Court is much more reluctant
to disturb the judgment endorsed by
Congress as well as the president. Such
action would fly much more clearly in the
face of the popular will.
Moreover, such a framework statute would
also have permitted the United States to hold
these prisoners, as they did German
prisoners and other previous captives, in the
United States, thus dispensing with the
negative symbolism of a place that can
easily be portrayed as a legal netherworld. It
may be argued that the administration still
needed a jurisdiction outside the territorial
United States to make prisoners' habeas

petitions less likely to succeed. The
construal of rights protected by habeas,
however, has been historically flexible and
context dependent. If the courts were
satisfied that the prisoners were getting the
amount of process that Congress judged
reasonable for enemy prisoners, it would be
unlikely to require substantive changes.
The ready availability of a congressional
solution raises the question of why it was
not sought. One explanation is that the
administration thought that using Congress
would detract from its project of using the
crisis to bolster executive authority. In
particular, Vice President Cheney, who had
seen the decline of executive authority
occasioned by Watergate and Vietnam, has
spoken out frequently of the need to restore
executive power. This strategy, however,
was imprudent.
First, it was not likely to succeed. The
Supreme Court had only two consistent
supporters of executive power-Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who had worked in the Office of
Legal Counsel, an office dedicated to
preserving executive power, had ruled
against the executive in such important cases
as that concerning the Independent Counsel
Act and had celebrated the Court's curbing
of executive overreaching in Youngstown.
Second, it is a mistake to risk substantial
harm to an important policy in order to build
up precedents for an undefined future
eventuality. The interpretation of executive
power has waxed and waned over the course
of American history, dependent largely on
justices' reaction to the felt necessities of the
time and the constellation of political power
in Congress and in the nation. Even had the
Bush administration won a victory for the
executive branch in the context of detention,
it would be distinguished away if future
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justices believe that circumstances warrant.
Interrogation Methods

Once again the administration had serious
issues to address in determining the
interrogation methods to be used on those
detained.
On the one hand, any
administration should have wanted to be
able to use interrogation methods that would
elicit information to stop attacks on the
order of 9/11. On the other hand, any
administration should have been eager to
show that the United States acted humanely
with respect to even egregious wrongdoers
and in particular followed the strictures of
the Torture Convention. Restraint and
adherence to our own laws underscores the
attractiveness of our civilization in the
global battle of ideas against radical Islam.
This American tradition goes back to the
Revolutionary
War
when
George
Washington insisted that the American army
take prisoners even after Hessians
slaughtered his soldiers without quarter at
Fort Washington.
That balance might have been best struck,
again, by going to Congress and seeking
framework legislation. Congress should and
would have authorized the administration to
use harsh interrogation methods short of
torture in the circumstances where such
methods were necessary to get information
to forestall attacks. A system requiring
personal and recorded authorization by a
Cabinet official in specific cases would
provide substantial safeguards that these
methods would be used only selectively and
where necessary. To be sure, such
congressional deliberation would have been
a messy process and would have publicized
the administration's methods when secrecy
could itself have value by making it harder
for the enemy to prepare for questioning.
But nothing on a matter so controversial is
kept secret long in Washington, and when

Congress set limits to the administration's
interrogation process as it did in 2006, it was
also a messy process. The debate that
Congress could have provided at the outset
would have helped educate the world to the
reasons that such interrogations were needed
in the interest of the safety not only of the
United States but of other nations that were
threatened by the mass slaughter of modem
terrorism.
But whether or not the administration chose
to go to Congress to reinforce the legality of
its interrogations methods, it could hardly
have chosen a worse strategy than it
pursued. In a memo written to Alberto
Gonzales on August 1, 2002, the Office of
Legal
Counsel
provided
a general
interpretation of the Torture Convention by
limiting the concept of torture to the
infliction of physical pain "equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury such as organ failure or
impairment of bodily function." According
to the memo, the only psychological harm
that amounted to torture would be that
"leading to significant duration, e.g. lasting
months or even years." Finally, the memo
concludes that the president has the
constitutional authority to set even those
strictures aside if they impair his ability to
order interrogations pursuant to his authority
as commander in chief.
It is not my purpose here to dispute these
conclusions as legal matters, but to show
that whatever its correctness, the memo was
utterly counterproductive and should have
been seen as such at the time. Indeed, my
strongest reaction as a former official at the
Office of Legal Counsel was not that of
other observers who attacked the legal
analysis or even the morality of the
memorandum. Instead I saw it as a
bureaucratic blunder committed not so much
by the attorneys at OLC but by the White
House counsel and others in the
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administration who asked for this kind of
analysis.
First, to anyone who has worked in the
collaborative process of the executive
branch, it was clear that this memo would be
leaked, and leaked at the most inconvenient
time to the administration. One rule I had at
the Office of Legal Counsel was to consider
how the phrasing and framing of a memo I
wrote would look on the first page of the
Washington Post. From this persective, it

should have been clear that the abstract
analysis and sweeping language in both its
statutory and its constitutional analysis
would allow opponents of the administration
to paint the memo as radical and unbounded,
undermining support for harsh interrogation
tactics as well as the administration's
general legal credibility.
Assuming that the administration chose not
to obtain a framework authorization statute
from Congress, a far better way to achieve
the administration's objectives would have
been to catalogue the kind of interrogation
methods the administration actually wanted
to use and explain in some detail why those
methods would not amount to torture. This
memo would have been a far more limited
and less controversial opinion, although
some would still have disagreed with its
analysis. It should also have omitted the
unnecessary claim that the president could in
the
disregard
circumstances
some
convention. This sweeping claim seems to
have been motivated by an interest in
restoring general executive branch authority.
But it is fanciful to believe that unilateral
declarations by the executive branch can
accomplish this goal. And by putting that
expansion of executive power in the context
of what seemed to be an almost limitless
power to torture detainees, the memo set
back the cause it was trying to promote.

War Crimes Trials
The administration once again had
legitimate objectives in establishing military
tribunals to prosecute some of the detainees
for war crimes. It wanted to bring those who
violated the laws of war to justice and deter
subsequent violations. But it did not want to
use the Article III court system and all its
protection. To do so would in some cases
have exposed national security information.
More fundamentally, our trial system would
have taken a very long time and provided a
panoply of rights which, however important
to protect individual liberties within civil
society, should not be extended to irregular
combatants outside the social compact.
Swift military justice is part of the necessary
shock and awe against war criminals.
So far, however, the administration has
succeeded in conducting only one war
crimes trial. One reason for the delay was
that the administration's first set of rules for
conducting the trials faced such vigorous
criticism that they were sent for revisions.
Even after revision, many military lawyers
within the administration objected to some
of the provisions, creating a kind of
bureaucratic
inertia
that
delayed
indictments. But the most important reason
for delay was the war criminal defendants'
successes in the lengthy constitutional
litigation over the procedures. In Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld the Court held that some of the
administration's procedures violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as
Article III of the Geneva Convention which,
according to the Court, Congress had made
applicable to military tribunals.
This signal defeat was quite possibly related
to previous mistakes in legal strategy.
Strikingly, the Court gave no deference to
the administration's interpretation of either
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice or
Article III of the Geneva Convention,
despite precedent for deferring to the
executive's interpretations of treaties and
statutes governing the military. Whatever
the doctrinal categories of deference, the
general credibility of executive branch
positions will hugely influence the actual
degree of deference the Court applies. This
credibility was damaged by previous
administration legal analysis, like that
contained in the memo on interrogations,
which the administration itself later
repudiated.
In Hamdan itself, Justice Breyer noted that
the president could "return to Congress to
seek the authorization he believes
necessary." Of course, the president would
not have had to return to Congress and
would
not
have
faced
substantial
bureaucratic foot-dragging had he sought
congressional authorization for the military
tribunals in the first place. The
administration almost certainly would have
been successful, because even after the
Supreme Court defeat in Hamdan, it got
previously
most of the procedures
some
with
proclaimed
unilaterally
exceptions, including restrictions on use of
hearsay and classified information. But the
president was in a stronger political position
in 2003 and probably even in 2001 than at
the end of 2006.
It could be argued that the administration's
ability to get most of what it wanted by
Congress vindicated its strategy to try first
to avoid congressional action. But the
administration would probably have gotten a
better deal if it had gone to Congress before
its Supreme Court defeat. It could have
sought authority for trials of war criminals
while holding out the prospect of going it
alone if Congress refused. And it would
have avoided the delay in trials caused by
the Supreme Court defeat. The legal strategy

with respect to war crimes was not the worst
aspect of the administration's performance,
but it still cannot be counted a success.
Surveillance

The Bush administration also had a choice
express
obtain
to
whether
about
of
surveillance
authorization to undertake
individuals in the United States who were in
contact with those in or near the battlefields
of terrorism. It decided to rely instead on the
president's authority as commander in chief
and the general authority of the statute that
authorized the administration to undertake
military actions against the terrorist
organizations.
It was a mistake not to obtain express
congressional authorization for surveillance
when it could easily have been obtained.
Indeed, it may have run more substantial
risks to rely on executive authority in this
regard than in the area of detentions and
interrogations. First, Congress here had
already passed framework legislation in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), which regulated the authority of the
executive to wiretap individuals resident in
the United States. That legislation by its
terms appears inconsistent with the authority
exercised by the administration because it
requires warrants, which the administration
has not sought. It appears to contemplate its
applicability in time of war, because it
provided additional time to obtain such
warrants in wartime. Second, because the
surveillance being undertaken was of
residents in the United States, there was an
even greater risk that courts would not
extend precedent to protect executive
discretion in this new kind of war.
Wasting Assets

The Bush administration's legal strategy in
the war on terror has been deeply flawed.
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Because of its interest in establishing
powerful precedent in favor of executive
powers, it took bold positions that carried
substantial risks of judicial repudiation and
failed to obtain legislative endorsement at
times of political opportunity. As a result,
the Supreme Court said on two occasions
that the president was acting illegally,
confirming an impression that he was a
rogue operator outside established law and
popular opinion. The lesson for future
administrations seems clear. First, recognize
that we live in a time of much more activist
courts even in the era of foreign affairs. That
fact may be bemoaned, but it cannot be
ignored, and the reality of their possible
interventions must be factored into strategy
from the outset. Second, rely more on
Congress than on courts, particularly when

the president enjoys support in the initial
states of conflict or his party controls
Congress.
It is the executive power to persuade from a
position of strength rather than formal legal
powers that is the president's greatest asset.
But it is generally a wasting asset, and the
president should therefore translate it into
more lasting legislative tools before its
dissipation. The president has suffered
reverses in the war in Iraq because he did
not call in enough troops after the fall of
Baghdad. He has had substantial losses in
his legal wars because he did not call on
citizens through their representatives to rally
around a new, but carefully circumscribed,
system
of wartime
detention
and
surveillance.
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"Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release"
Washington Post

June 13, 2008
Robert Barnes
A deeply divided Supreme Court yesterday
ruled that terrorism suspects held at
Guantanamo Bay have a right to seek their
release in federal court, delivering a historic
rebuke to the Bush administration and
Congress for policies that the majority said
compromised, in the name of national
security, the Constitution's guarantee of
liberty.

the four conservative justices, with Justice
Antonin Scalia taking the unusual step of
summarizing his opposition from the bench.
"America is at war with radical Islamists,"
he wrote, adding that the decision "will
almost certainly cause more Americans to be
killed." He went on to say: "The Nation will
live to regret what the court has done
today."

"The laws and Constitution are designed to
survive, and remain in force, in
extraordinary times," Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy wrote for a five-member majority
clearly impatient that some prisoners have
been held for six years without a hearing.

A disappointed President Bush was not as
dramatic. "We'll abide by the court's
position," he said in Rome, in the midst of a
European tour. "That doesn't mean I have to
agree with it."

The much-anticipated decision was the
fourth time the court has ruled against the
administration's ambitious attempt to create
a framework for detaining and prosecuting
terrorism suspects outside the protections
the U.S. legal system generally provides.
As a result of the ruling, the approximately
270 detainees remaining at Guantanamo and
their lawyers will be able to challenge their
detentions before civilian judges, potentially
forcing the government to present evidence
against them and giving them the chance to
call their own witnesses.
Government
officials
said
military
commission cases against 20 detainees who
have already been charged with specific
crimes could go forward, but defense
lawyers said the ruling could open the door
to court challenges of that process as well.
The decision brought biting dissents from

He also said the administration will consider
new legislation "so that we can safely
say . . . to the American people, 'We're

doing everything we can to protect you.'
The cases decided yesterday were brought
on behalf of 37 foreigners at Guantanamo
Bay. All were captured on foreign soil and
have been designated enemy combatants.
They have proclaimed their innocencesome say they were turned over to coalition
forces for money-and for years have asked
federal courts for a chance to challenge their
captivity.
Their claim is to the writ of habeas corpus,
the right with roots in English law and
enshrined in the Constitution that gives a
prisoner the ability to protest his
confinement before an independent judge.
The Bush administration chose Guantanamo
Bay as the place to house those captured in
other countries and suspected of terrorism
because it thought such a right did not
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extend to the base in Cuba.
The administration has sought to restrict
access to federal courts by those captured in
the fight against terrorism since the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks. Those efforts have led to
clashes between the courts, the president and
Congress.
Each time, the Supreme Court has ruled
against the administration, but the majority
noted yesterday that losing the battles has
not kept the administration from winning the
war: After six years, none of the detainees
has succeeded in getting his complaint
reviewed by a judge.
"The costs of delay can no longer be borne
by those who are held in custody," wrote
Kennedy, who, in a return to the pivotal role
he played last term, joined the court's liberal
justices-John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer. "The detainees in these cases are
entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing."
Kennedy made it clear that the ruling does
not mean the detainees could prevail in such
hearings. He also said the decision does not
address whether the president holds the
authority to detain those thought to be
enemy soldiers in the battle against
terronsm.

administration, it passed the Military
Commissions Act in 2006. The legislation
endorsed a military system for designating
detainees as enemy combatants and for
trying those charged with crimes. It also
strictly limited judicial oversight.
The court yesterday first had to decide again
whether those held in Guantanamo have a
right to habeas under the Constitution, since
Congress changed the law. It ruled that they
do, again because of the government's
control of the land.
The court acknowledged it was the first time
it had ruled that "noncitizens detained by
our Government in territory over which
de jure
country maintains
another
sovereignty have any rights under our
Constitution."
Such a constitutional right can be suspended
by Congress only in times of "rebellion or
invasion," and the government did not argue
that situation faced Congress at the time it
changed the law.
Then, the court had to decide whether the
method devised for determining whether a
detainee could be classified as an enemy
combatant-and thus indefinitely held-is
an adequate substitute for a habeas hearing
before a judge.

administration losing streak with regard to
the Guantanamo detainees issue. The court
ruled in 2004 in Rasul v. Bush that federal
law provided the detainees the habeas
privilege because of the unique control the
U.S. government has over the land at the
Cuban base.

Those hearings, called Combatant Status
Review Tribunals, are held before military
authorities. The majority noted that the
prisoners are not represented by lawyers and
have limited ability to present evidence on
their behalf, and that there is no mechanism
for their release by a federal court reviewing
the decision if the court feels there is
inadequate reason to hold them.

The Republican-led Congress responded by
changing the law, and after another adverse
court ruling and at the urging of the

The risk of error, Kennedy wrote, is too
great, especially when a person is detained
because of an executive order. "We hold that

Yesterday's decision in Boumediene v. Bush
and Al Odah v. United States continued an

599

those procedures are not an adequate and
effective substitute for habeas corpus," he
wrote.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., joined by
Scalia and Justices Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr., wrote a stinging rebuttal
defending what he called "the most generous
set of procedural protections ever afforded
aliens detained by this country as enemy
combatants."
He assailed the majority for rebuffing the
system "crafted" by the political branches
before it had been fully reviewed and
implemented by the lower courts. The
decision, he said, "is not really about the
detainees at all, but about control of federal
policy regarding enemy combatants."
Scalia, in the dissent he wrote, accused the
majority of ignoring a precedent that

declined to extend habeas protection to
foreign aliens, and noted it had suggested in
earlier rulings that the president and
Congress work together to come up with a
substitute for such hearings.
"Turns out they were just kidding," he wrote
sarcastically.
Even some members of Congress who voted
for the Military Commissions Act, such as
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), had predicted
that the court would find provisions of the
law unconstitutional.
But Sen. Lindsey 0. Graham (R-S.C.), a key
figure in the passage of the act, denounced
"what I think is a tremendously dangerous
and irresponsible ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The court has conferred
upon civilian judges the right to make
military decisions."
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"For Justices, Another Day on Detainees"
The New York Times

December 3, 2007
Linda Greenhouse*
Observers at the Supreme Court on
Wednesday should probably be excused in
advance for concluding that they have
wandered into a time warp.
The question before the court will be
whether federal judges have jurisdiction to
hear cases brought by detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A lawyer for a
group of detainees will argue that they do;
the Bush administration's solicitor general
will argue that they do not.
But did not the court already decide that
question? Did not the justices rule in Rasul
v. Bush in 2004 that federal judges could
review the legality of the Guantanamo
detentions, rejecting the administration's
position that the detainees' fate was a
question for the executive branch alone?
No, history will not just be repeating itself at
the court Wednesday. It has moved on, and
the four years since the court shocked the
administration by agreeing to hear the Rasul
case have been busy ones.
Each of the three branches of government
has made a series of judgments on how to
strike the balance between individual liberty
and national security in the post-9/11 era.
This latest Supreme Court confrontation,
round three of the justices' encounter with
reflects
an
question,
the
detainee
extraordinary interbranch drama, played out
as a series of actions and reactions that has
now cycled back to where it began: the role
of the federal courts.
This third round is potentially the most
momentous, because at stake is whether the

Supreme Court itself will continue to have a
role in defining the balance or whether, as
the administration first argued four years
ago, the executive branch is to have the final
word.
The roots of the new case, Boumediene v.
Bush, No. 06-1195, lie in the court's secondround detainee case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,

decided in 2006. The court ruled that the
military commission system the Bush
administration had set up to try enemy
combatants for war crimes was fatally
flawed because the president had acted
without Congressional authorization.
That decision came in an appeal brought by
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a former driver for
Osama bin Laden. Mr. Hamdan's route to
court had been by means of a petition for
habeas corpus, the traditional route for
prisoners to get before a judge to challenge
the validity of their confinement.
In its waning weeks under Republican
control, Congress responded swiftly to the
Hamdan decision by passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006. This new law not
only authorized the military commissionsa commission at Guantanamo will begin
taking evidence against Mr. Hamdan on
Wednesday-but also provided that "no
court, justice or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider" further habeas corpus
petitions from foreigners held as enemy
combatants, at Guantanamo or anywhere
else.
Now the question before the Supreme Court
is whether that court-stripping action was
valid in light of the Constitution's injunction
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to Congress not to suspend "the privilege"
of habeas corpus "unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it."

No one disputes that those conditions have
not been met. But resolving the challenge to
the Military Commissions Act is not as
simple as stating that obvious fact.
Modem Supreme Court decisions have put a
gloss on the "suspension clause," as the
constitutional provision is known, holding
that habeas corpus need not be available in a
formal sense as long as prisoners have an
"adequate and effective" substitute for
challenging the validity of their detention.
The government offers a substitute:
"combatant status review tribunals," which
are panels of military officers who review
the initial determination that an individual
detainee has been properly labeled an enemy
combatant.
As substitutes for habeas corpus, the
tribunals are "structurally and incurably
inadequate," Seth P. Waxman, a lawyer for
six Algerian detainees, asserts in his brief
By sharply limiting access to evidence and
witnesses and by forbidding defense lawyers
from participating in the hearings, he says,
the alternative procedure fails to offer "even
the most elemental aspects of an
independent adversarial proceeding."
Mr. Waxman, who served as solicitor
general in the Clinton administration, will
argue on behalf of the four groups of
detainees whose separate cases have been
consolidated for a single argument. The
current solicitor general, Paul D. Clement,
will argue for the government. It will be Mr.
Clement's fourth argument in a detainee
case; he argued the Hamdan case last year
and, as principal deputy solicitor general,
also argued a pair of cases that the court
heard along with the Rasul case in 2004.

The government's position is that the
detainees' complaints about the alternative
procedure are irrelevant. Mr. Clement
argues that the Military Commissions Act
has rendered moot the court's 2004 decision
that federal judges had jurisdiction over
cases from Guantanamo. That ruling, in the
Rasul case, simply interpreted the federal
habeas corpus statute as it then existed, he
says, before the Military Commissions Act
amended
the
statute
to
withdraw
jurisdiction.
Without a statutory basis for jurisdiction, the
government's argument continues, there is
no jurisdiction because as "aliens with no
connection to this country who were
captured abroad in the course of an ongoing
military conflict," the detainees can claim no
constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus.
In any event, the alternative procedure is
more than adequate, Mr. Clement asserts in
the government's brief, enabling the
detainees to "enjoy more procedural
protections than any other captured enemy
combatants in the history of warfare."
The govermment's argument persuaded the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which ruled in
February that the Military Commissions Act
had succeeded in removing the federal
courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction. In April,
the Supreme Court initially turned down the
detainees' appeal of that ruling, before
reversing itself in a startling about-face on
the final day of its term in June.
The Algerians whom Mr. Waxman
represents are among 34 detainees in the
current case. The others include a Libyan, a
Palestinian, 4 Kuwaitis and 22 Yemenis,
who represent the biggest national group
among the 300 or so men being held at
Guantanamo. Most of those before the court
were captured in Afghanistan or Pakistan by
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bounty hunters or local tribes who turned
them over to United States forces.
The Algerians are an exception. Lakhdar
Boumediene and the other five immigrated
to Bosnia during the 1990s and were legal
residents there. They were arrested by
Bosnian police in October 2001 on suspicion
of plotting to attack the United States
embassy in Sarajevo.
The Supreme Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina ordered them released three
months later for lack of evidence. The
Bosnian police seized them immediately and
turned them over to the United States
military, which transported them to
Guantanamo.
Mr. Waxman is arguing that because these
six do not fit any authorized definition of
enemy combatant, the Supreme Court
should order their release.
If the court rules for the detainees, a more
likely result is an order to the appeals court
to consider for the first time the merits of the
men's habeas corpus petitions. The
government would then almost certainly
renew the argument it made in the
immediate aftermath of the Rasul decision:
that even assuming the existence of the
federal courts' jurisdiction, the detainees had
no constitutional rights that they could
assert. That question, which the justices
have not directly confronted in any of the
cases so far, would then almost certainly

come back to the Supreme Court.
The vote in the Hamdan case last year was 5
to 3. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. did
not participate, because he had voted in the
case, on the government's side, when he was
a judge on the appeals court. The dissenting
justices were Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr., voting in
his first detainee case.
The conventional wisdom that the outcome
of the new case will depend on the vote of
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is almost
certainly correct.
Justice Kennedy has been in the majority in
the other detainee cases and, quite likely,
gave a signal in June that gave the more
liberal justices the confidence to add the
case to the court's docket with some
assurance of the likely outcome.
Some of the many briefs filed for the
detainees address arguments to Justice
Kennedy.
Limiting access to lawyers presents a danger
to individual rights and a "severe
impairment of the judicial function," the
New York City Bar Association says in a
brief addressed to the prohibition on lawyers
participating in the review tribunals. The
quotation is from a 1991 Supreme Court
decision that struck limitations placed on
Legal Services Corporation lawyers. Justice
Kennedy was the decision's author.
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"Due Process for Jihadists?"
The Weekly Standard

December 17, 2007
Andrew McCarthy
"Isn't the main issue," Justice John Paul
Stevens plaintively asked, "the fact that it
has taken six years" to resolve the question
whether alien enemy combatants "have been
unlawfully detained" at Guantinamo Bay?

American people: that the judiciary is not a
governmental component of a nation at war
but rather an impartial supra-tribunal whose
only allegiance is to "the law." So the
combatants' side resisted couching their
claim as an entitlement of the enemy.

For the Supreme Court hearing arguments
last week in Boumediene v'. Bush, that

should not even be a relevant issue. (Lakmar
Boumediene is an Algerian who emigrated
to Bosnia in the 1990s. He was arrested for
plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in
Sarajevo and turned over to the U.S
military.) If it is lawful to imprison captured
enemy operatives without trial until the end
of hostilities, as it has been for centuries
under the laws of war, then it should not
matter how long they've been held. Thus did
Solicitor General Paul Clement gamely
counter that emphasizing the six-year delay
serves only to "cloud the basic constitutional
question before this Court."
Yet, for most of the morning it was difficult
to remember what that issue was. Not for
want of skilled lawyering; Clement and his
adversary, former (Clinton administration)
Solicitor General Seth Waxman, gifted
advocates, were at the top of their very
considerable games. No, the problem is that
the basic question is too bracing: Does the
Constitution of the United States afford any
due process for alien jihadists even as they
conduct a terror war against Americans?
Waxman is far too clever to claim that the
Framers somehow designed a Constitution
which entitles enemies of the American
people to use the courts of the American
people as a weapon of their war against the

We were instead serenaded with a song of
our constitutional commitment to that
holiest of rhetorical holies, the rule of law.
Even in the midst of hostilities, Waxman
maintained, there can be no "law-free
zones." Not at Gitmo, and not, as Chief
Justice John Roberts's piercing questions
teased out of Waxman's euphonious soundbite, in any place on the globe where the
United States fights war and takes prisoners.
To the contrary, there must always and
everywhere be a judicial process for
reviewing military detention: a process that
is both meaningful and, Waxman stressed,
swift-deftly pouncing on Justice Stevens's
''main issue."
Even if one agreed, for argument's sake, that
there should be such a process, however
swift, that would not necessarily mean it
needed to be a constitutional process.
Congress has designed an adequate statutory
procedure for testing the fundamental
fairness of detention, so there should be no
need to confront the more vexing issue of
whether the Constitution imposes any limits
on the harshness with which government
may treat the enemy during hostilities. This,
not surprisingly, was the tack that Clement
took. Having had all manner of
Constitution-shredding calumny laid at its
feet since 9/11, the administration clearly
preferred to gear its oral argument toward
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how much, in reality, has been done for the
combatants. How much, in theory, could be
done to them is better left for the brief to
explain.
The solicitor general had a very good case.
Let's leave aside that in Johnson v.
Eisentrager(1950) the Supreme Court flatly
held that the Constitution does not vest
foreign enemies with the right to habeas
corpus-i.e., to challenge their military
detention before the civilian courts. Let's
instead compare what Congress has wrought
(with the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act and
the 2006 Military Commissions Act) and
"the base line" of 1789, when the
Constitution enshrined habeas rights for
Americans.
Clement recounted that in the late 18th
century, alien combatants faced three
insuperable hurdles in front of the
courthouse door: (a) the jurisdiction of the
federal courts did not extend outside U.S.
territory; (b) the judicial writ was simply
unavailable to belligerents because taking
prisoners of war was deemed a political act
of the sovereign, not a legal question for the
courts; and (c) judges were required by
separation-of-powers principles to accept the
executive branch's
determination
of
combatant status.
Now, by contrast, combatants are given
systematic judicial reviews in the civilian
courts despite being held in a location,
Guantinamo Bay, that the political branches
have reaffirmed is not part of sovereign U.S.
territory. That civilian review comes after a
combatant status review tribunal modeled on
Army regulations for the treatment of
honorable combatants (not terrorists)except to the extent the tribunal is more
solicitous of the welfare of Gitmo detainees,
affording them rights to a personal
representative and an unclassified summary

of the factual basis for detention. In a close
case, the executive is entitled to the benefit
of the doubt, but the court may invalidate
combatant status if it is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. That,
moreover, is in addition to its review of the
military's fidelity to its own tribunal
regulations and of whether those regulations
pass muster under the Constitution and other
federal law.
The permissible scope of this review
provided the day's most intriguing
exchanges. Court watchers widely assume
that the conservative and liberal blocs are
split four on each side, and that Justice
Anthony Kennedy's vote will be decisive, as
it was when the justices held, in the 2004
Rasul case, that combatants had statutory
habeas rights-rights Congress subsequently
narrowed. In the course of Clement's
argument, Justice Stephen Breyer adduced
the solicitor general's admission that, broad
as it may be, the judicial review prescribed
by the Detainee Treatment Act does not
permit
combatants
to lodge
every
conceivable claim against their detention;
they are limited to challenging the validity
of the combatant status tribunal procedures.
So, Justice David Souter surmised, that must
mean they are foreclosed from arguing that
the concept of "unlawful enemy combatant,"
the gravamen of any detention finding, is too
broad? No, Clement responded, they most
certainly can "raise a constitutional claim
that the definition is broader than
constitutionally
could
be
enforced."
Kennedy, pleasantly surprised, interjected:
He had not realized, during the solicitor
general's joust with Breyer, that Clement
had made this concession.
It is a weighty point. In the Military
Act, Congress defined
Commissions
unlawful enemy combatant expansively. The
term includes not only al Qaeda, the
605

Taliban, and "any international terrorist
organization, or associated forces" engaged
in hostilities against the United States and its
allies, but also any person the executive
determines has "supported" those hostilities.
While obviously justifiable in cases where
support involves a knowing, material
contribution to jihadist warfare, this
definition could potentially stretch indefinite
detention in a worrisome way-especially
for judges wedded to traditional notions of
"combatant" and "battlefield" that terrorist
savagery has rendered pass6. Clement,
however, was emphatic: The D.C. Circuit
"absolutely" has jurisdiction to consider
whether Congress has too loosely defined
the enemy.
Whether that will satisfy Kennedy remains
to be seen. Plainly, six years have changed a

lot of perspectives, even though that doesn't
(or, at least, shouldn't) change the
Constitution. Getting down to originalist
basics, Justice Antonin Scalia pressed
Waxman, "Do you have a single case in the
220 years of our country or, for that matter
in the 500-the five centuries of the English
empire in which habeas was granted to an
alien in a territory that was not under the
sovereign control of either the United States
or England?" The issue might have been that
simple on September 11, 2001. It no longer
is.
Andrew C. McCarthy runs the Center for
Law & Counterterrorismat the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, which filed an
amicus brief supporting the government in

Boumediene v. Bush
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"Shifting Power to a President"
The New York Times

September 30, 2006
Adam Liptak
WASHINGTON-With the final passage
through Congress of the detainee treatment
bill, President Bush on Friday achieved a
signal victory, shoring up with legislation
his determined conduct of the campaign
against terrorism in the face of challenges
from critics and the courts.
Rather than reining in the formidable
presidential powers Mr. Bush and Vice
President Dick Cheney have asserted since
Sept. 11, 2001, the law gives some of those
powers a solid statutory foundation. In effect
it allows the president to identify enemies,
imprison them indefinitely and interrogate
them-albeit with a ban on the harshest
treatment-beyond the reach of the full
court reviews traditionally afforded criminal
defendants and ordinary prisoners.
Taken as a whole, the law will give the
president more power over terrorism
suspects than he had before the Supreme
Court decision this summer in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld that undercut more than four years
of White House policy. It does, however,
grant detainees brought before military
commissions limited protections initially
opposed by the White House. The bill,
which cleared a final procedural hurdle in
the House on Friday and is likely to be
signed into law next week by Mr. Bush,
does not just allow the president to
determine the meaning and application of
the Geneva Conventions; it also strips the
courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to
his interpretation.
And it broadens the definition of "unlawful
enemy combatant" to include not only those

who fight the United States but also those
who have "purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United
States." The latter group could include those
accused of providing financial or other
indirect support to terrorists, human rights
groups say. The designation can be made by
any "competent tribunal" created by the
president or secretary of defense.
In very specific ways, the bill is a rejoinder
to the Hamdan ruling, in which several
justices said the absence of Congressional
authorization was a central flaw in the
administration's approach. The new bill
solves that problem, legal experts said.
"The president should feel he has better
authority and direction now," said Douglas
W. Kmiec, a conservative legal scholar at
the Pepperdine University School of Law. "I
think he can reasonably be confident that
this statute answers the Supreme Court and
puts him back in a position to prevent
another attack, which is the goal of
interrogation."
But lawsuits challenging the bill are
inevitable, and critics say substantial parts of
it may well be rejected by the Supreme
Court.
Over all, the legislation reallocates power
among the three branches of government,
taking authority away from the judiciary and
handing it to the president.
Bruce Ackerman, a critic of the
administration and a professor of law and
political science at Yale University, sharply
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criticized the bill but agreed that it
strengthened the White House position.
"The president walked away with a lot more
than most people thought," Mr. Ackerman
said. He said the bill "further entrenches
presidential power" and allows the
administration to declare even an American
citizen an unlawful combatant subject to
indefinite detention.
"And it's not only about these prisoners,"
Mr. Ackerman said. "If Congress can strip
courts of jurisdiction over cases because it
fears their outcome, judicial independence is
threatened."
Even if the Supreme Court decides it has the
power to hear challenges to the bill, the
Bush administration has gained a crucial
advantage. In adding a Congressional
imprimatur to a comprehensive set of
procedures and tactics, lawmakers explicitly
endorsed measures that in other eras were
achieved by executive fiat. Earlier Supreme
Court decisions have suggested that the
president and Congress acting together in
the national security arena can be an all-butunstoppable force.
Public commentary on the bill, called the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been
fast-shifting and often contradictory, partly
because its 96 pages cover so much ground
and because the impact of some provisions
is open to debate.
"This bill is about so many things, and it's a
mixed bag," said Elisa Massimino, the
Washington director of Human Rights First,
a civil liberties group.
Ms. Massimino's group and others criticized
the bill as a whole, but she agreed with the
Republican senators who negotiated for
weeks with the White House that it would
ban the most extreme interrogation methods

used by the Central Intelligence Agency and
the military.
"The senators made clear that waterboarding
is criminal," Ms. Massimino said, referring
to a technique used to simulate drowning.
"That's a human rights enforcement upside."
The debate over the limits of torture and the
rules for military commission dominated
discussion of the bill until this week. Only in
the last few days has broad attention turned
to its redefinition of "unlawful enemy
combatant" and its ban on habeas corpus
petitions, which suspects have traditionally
used to challenge their incarceration.
Law professors will stay busy for months
debating the implications. The most
outspoken critics have likened the law's
sweeping provisions to dark chapters in
history, comparable to the passage of the
Alien and Sedition Acts in the fragile years
after the nation's founding and the
internment of Japanese-Americans in the
midst of World War II.
Conservative legal experts, by contrast, said
critics could no longer say the Bush
administration was guilty of unilateral
executive
overreaching.
Congressional
approval can cure many ills, Justice Robert
H. Jackson wrote in his seminal concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v.

Sawyer, the 1952 case that struck down
President Harry S. Truman's unilateral
seizure of the nation's steel mills during the
Korean War.
Supporters of the law, in fact, say its critics
will never be satisfied. "For years they've
been saying that we don't like Bush doing
things unilaterally, that we don't like Bush
doing things piecemeal," said David B.
Rivkin, a Justice Department official in the
administrations of Ronald Reagan and
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George H. W. Bush.
How the measure will look decades hence
may depend not just on how it is used but on
how the terrorist threat evolves. If a major
terrorist plot in the United States is
uncovered-and surely if one succeeds-it
may vindicate the Congressional decision to
give the government more leeway to seize
and question those who might know about
the next attack.
If the attacks of 2001 recede as a devastating
but unique tragedy, the decision to create a
new legal framework may seem like
overkill. "If there is never another terrorist

attack and we never obtain actionable
intelligence, this will look like a huge
overreaction," said Gary J. Bass, a professor
of politics and international affairs at
Princeton.
Long before that judgment arrives, legal
challenges are likely to bring the new law
before the Supreme Court. Assuming the
justices rule that they retain the power to
hear the case at all, they will then decide
whether Congress has resolved the flaws it
found in June or must make another effort to
balance the rights of accused terrorists and
the desire for security.
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"The Guantanamo Decision: High Court Rejects Bush's Claim
that He Alone Sets Detainee Rules"
The Los Angeles Times
June 30, 2006
David G. Savage*
The Supreme Court declared Thursday that
President Bush had overstepped his
authority in the war against terrorism, ruling
he does not have the power to set up special
military trials at Guantanamo Bay without
the approval of Congress.

The opinion was delivered by Justice John
Paul Stevens, 86, the court's last veteran of
World War II. He set forth a view of the
Constitution in wartime that stood in sharp
contrast to that of the president and his
lawyers.

In a 5-3 decision, the high court said the
planned military tribunals lacked the basic
standards of fairness required by the nation's
Uniform Code of Military Justice and by the
Geneva Convention.

The Constitution gives Congress the power
to make the laws and set the rules for
handling wartime captives, Stevens said. It
says Congress shall "make rules concerning
captures on land and water," and also says
Congress shall define the "offenses against
the law of nations."

The ruling is the most sweeping legal defeat
for the administration in the 5-year-old war
on terrorism, and it rejects the president's
broad claim that the commander in chief can
make the rules during an unconventional
war.
Since 1929, the Geneva Convention has
rules for the conduct of wars and
treatment of prisoners, but Bush and his
advisors have maintained that it does
apply to suspected terrorists.

set
the
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Still, the practical impact of Thursday's
decision may be limited. The court said
terrorism suspects could be tried under the
rules for courts-martial used by the
American military or under new rules that
could be passed by Congress.
The decision does not free any terrorism
suspects, as the president noted, nor does it
change the status of the approximately 450
detainees at the U.S. military detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Only 10
of them have been charged with war crimes.

the president
Despite those words,
contended that as commander in chief of the
armed forces, he had the power to decide
how suspected terrorists would be held, how
they were to be treated, how they would be
tried and what offenses amounted to war
crimes.
But Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in a
concurring opinion, said: "The court's
conclusion ultimately rests upon a single
ground: Congress has not issued the
executive a 'blank check."'
Guantanamo Bay has become the focal point
of international
criticism
of Bush's
willingness to set aside established U.S. and
international laws in the war against
terrorism.
Civil libertarians hailed the ruling as a
repudiation of that approach.
"The Supreme Court's decision reaffirms
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the importance of one of this country's
founding principles: Trials conducted in the
name of the United States must be full, fair
and according to law," said Deborah
Pearlstein, a lawyer for Human Rights First.
The case decided Thursday began two
months after the Sept. 11 attacks. In
November 2001, the White House issued an
executive order announcing the Pentagon
would set up special military commissions
to try Al Qaeda suspects. The president said
that he did not need the approval of
Congress and that the federal courts had no
jurisdiction over the cases.
Moreover, the White House said the Geneva
Convention did not apply to terrorists
because this was not a conflict between
nations and their armies.
It took four years for a challenge to that
order to make its way to the Supreme Court.
No one has been tried and convicted under
the Bush administration's rules, which were
challenged by Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a
onetime driver for Osama bin Laden who
was charged with conspiring with Al Qaeda
to kill Americans.
Hamdan, who was captured in Afghanistan
in November 2001 and has been held at
Guantanamo since June 2002, has admitted
he was Bin Laden's driver, but said he was a
$200-a-month hired hand, not a terrorist.
In the sweeping decision, the justices
rejected all of the key assertions made by the
president and struck down the military
commissions set up by the Pentagon. The
court also cast doubt on whether the general
charge of conspiracy that Hamdan faced was
a war crime.
As Stevens noted, the Bush administration's
rules would have allowed the use of

evidence obtained through coercion, and
could have resulted in a defendant and his
lawyer being excluded from the trial.
Bush said he planned to work with
lawmakers to develop a process to deal with
terrorism suspects.
"To the extent that there is latitude to work
with the Congress to determine whether or
not the military tribunals will be an avenue
in which to give people their day in court,
we will do so," he said.
Two key Senate Republicans, Lindsey
Graham of South Carolina and Arizona's
Jon Kyl, said they were disappointed with
Thursday's court decision. "However, we
believe the problems cited by the court can
and should be fixed," they said in a joint
statement. "We intend to pursue legislation
. . . granting the executive branch the
authority to ensure that terrorists can be tried
by competent military commissions."
Some legal authorities suggested
applying traditional rules of evidence
due process in proceedings against
detainees could pose problems
prosecutors.
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"They can come up with a viable system that
would pass judicial scrutiny. But I am not
sure that it is going to result in convictions,"
said retired Rear Adm. John Hutson, a
former judge advocate of the Navy and now
dean of Franklin Pierce Law Center.
"It is going to be real hard to prosecute these
guys," Hutson said.
One part of the court's decision suggests
that the Geneva Convention protects
captured terrorism suspects. Stevens said
that Article 3 covered all people caught up
in a conflict, even if they were not regular
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soldiers and not entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war. Quoting that section,
Stevens said these people must be tried "by
a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."
The Geneva Convention does not define a
''regularly constituted court," but five
justices agreed Thursday that such a tribunal
must meet "the standards of our military
justice system." Besides Stevens and Breyer,
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H.
Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed on
this holding in Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld.

Some legal experts said the ruling could
extend the protections of the Geneva
Convention to all people held in the war on
terrorism, including Al Qaeda members
being detained abroad in secret prisons.
But the court stopped well short of saying
that suspected terrorists were entitled to be
treated as prisoners of war.
Four justices-Stevens, Breyer, Souter and
Ginsburg-said that they would have
thrown out the charge against Hamdan
because conspiracy was not a war crime.
Stevens said a war crime required some
evidence that the defendant took some
"overt act," beyond joining an organization.
Kennedy did not join in that opinion, leaving
the court short of a majority on that issue.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. did not
take part in the decision because he was on
the U.S. Court of Appeals last year that
considered Hamdan's case and voted to
uphold the president's special military trials.
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented Thursday.

Scalia and Thomas took the rare step of
reading their dissents in the courtroom.
Scalia said the court had no authority to
decide the case. In late December, Congress
passed the Detainee Treatment Act and
stripped federal judges of their power to
hear claims from the Guantanamo Bay
detainees.
Stevens and the majority said this provision
applied only to new claims, not to pending
cases like Hamdan's.
In his dissent, Thomas said the court's
opinion "flouts our well-established duty to
respect the executive's judgment in matters
of military operations and foreign affairs."
Alito, who joined the court just before the
case was heard, said he believed that the
Pentagon's rules were fair and that they
complied with the standards set by military
law and the Geneva Convention.
The court's ruling was the second defeat for
the administration in its handling of the
prison at Guantanamo Bay.
Two years ago, the justices said the
detainees were entitled to hearings to argue
that they were being wrongly held. The
Constitution says no one held by the United
States "shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."
Although the foreign detainees are not
entitled to full trials, they are entitled to
basic hearings, the court said in a 6-3 ruling
in Rasul vs. Bush.

Like that ruling, Thursday's decision does
not require that these detainees be given the
same trials due civilians, but only that they
be tried under the military's system of
justice.

612

The
Geneva
Convention
"obviously
tolerates a great deal of flexibility in trying
individuals captured during armed conflict;
its requirements are general ones, crafted to
accommodate a wide variety of legal
systems," Stevens said. "But requirements
they are nonetheless. The commission that
the president has convened to try Hamdan
does not meet those requirements."

Courts-martial: Rules prohibit the use of
evidence obtained through unlawful search
or seizure.

Defendant Rights

Federal courts: The 6th
provides for trial by jury.

Although the Supreme Court ruled that
Guantanamo Bay detainees may not be tried
by military commissions, the justices said
the suspected terrorists could be subject to
the rules used in military courts-martial.
Here is a comparison of defendant rights in
those two systems and in federal court:
Presumption

of

innocence:

Military commissions: Not provided. Private
conversations between detainees
and
lawyers cannot be used.
Jury

Amendment

Courts-martial: Rules prohibit the use of
evidence obtained through unlawful search
or seizure.
Military commissions: No jury. Trial is by a
commission picked by the military.
Detainees have challenged panel members.

Presumed

innocent.

Presence at trial

Courts-martial: Presumed innocent.

Federal courts: Defendants have the right to
be present at every stage of the trial.

Military commissions: Presumed innocent.
Right to remain silent

Federal courts: The 5th Amendment
provides the right against self-incrimination.
Courts-martial: Members of the military
can't be compelled to confess; coerced
confessions are not admissible.
Military commissions: Not provided; a rule
against using coerced statements was
adopted in March.
Freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure

Federal courts: The 4th Amendment
prohibits unreasonable search and seizure.

Courts-martial: The presence of the accused
is required, unless the accused waives the
right or engages in conduct justifying
removal.
Military
present
need to
national

commissions: The accused shall be
to "the extent consistent with the
protect classified information" and
security.

Right to counsel
Federal

courts:

Gideon

vs.

Wainright

established the right to counsel under the 6th
Amendment.
Courts-martial: Defendants have a right to
military counsel at government expense and
can also hire a civilian lawyer.
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Military commissions: Defendants are
provided a military lawyer. May hire a
civilian attorney but the lawyer is not
guaranteed access to classified evidence.
Right of Appeal

Federal courts: Federal convictions can be
appealed to the Court of Appeals and then to
the Supreme Court.

Courts-martial: Defendants may pursue
military appeals. After military appeals, they
may go to civilian court.
Military commissions: No right to appeal
sentences shorter than 10 years. A review
panel makes recommendations to the
Defense secretary.
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"Because I Say so"
Slate
March 28, 2006
Dahlia Lithwick
One of the most dramatic moments in
today's oral argument in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld

comes

when

extent that we have changed the law to limit
their rights.

an

uncharacteristically agitated Justice David
Souter presses Solicitor General Paul
Clement about whether Congress last
December effectively stripped the Supreme
Court of the right to hear habeas corpus
claims from any of the hundreds of
detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay.
Clement says it's not necessary for Congress
to have "consciously thought it was
suspending the Writ." Perhaps the
lawmakers just "stumbled on the suspension
of the Writ," which would also be fine,
Clement suggests.
Souter stops him, amazed. "The suspension
of the Writ," the justice sputters, is the most
"stupendously significant act" Congress can
undertake. "Are you really saying Congress
may validly suspend it inadvertently?" he
asks. It's the morning's best example of the
degree to which, for Souter as well as for
Justice Stephen Breyer, today's argument is
an
agonizing
exercise
in
Bush
administration
doublespeak.
Clement's
arguments are frequently drawn from the
well of "because the president says so," or
"because the president is the president," or
"because it's wartime." They start to sound
like Alberto Gonzales or the president: legal
analysis by assertion and justification by
double standard. This war is like every other
war except to the extent that it differs from
those other wars. We follow the laws of war
except to the extent that they do not apply to
us. These prisoners have all the rights to
which they are entitled by law, except to the

In other words, there is almost no question
for which the government cannot find a
circular answer.
The issue before the court is the legality of
President Bush's military tribunals. The two
key war-on-terror cases of 2004-Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush-established

that the administration could detain enemy
combatants. But these combatants would
nevertheless be entitled to some neutral
adjudicatory process, the contours of which
the justices left to be determined. The
question for the court is whether the military
tribunals established by the president by
military order in 2001 meet the justices'
standard for neutral and adjudicatory. The
tribunals rely neither on the Geneva
Convention nor the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. They allow for the
admission of unsworn testimony; may
preclude a detainee from appearing at his
own trial; and do away with the presumption
of innocence. Punishment may include
death.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, alleged to be Osama
Bin Laden's chauffeur, faces trial before
such a tribunal on charges of conspiracy to
help terrorists. His appeal encompasses a
host of statutory and constitutional
challenges to the tribunals. Hamdan won in
the district court and lost in the D.C. Circuit
federal court of appeals. Chief Justice John
Roberts joined in the D.C. Circuit decision
before his promotion and has thus recused
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himself today.
As if the court didn't have enough weighty
matters on its collective mind, it also must
grapple with the Detainee Treatment Act,
which Congress passed last December to
amend the federal habeas corpus statute. The
idea was to prevent the Guantanamo
detainees from getting a full habeas
review-which often includes a chance for
the accused to present evidence-in the
federal courts. The government argues that
the DTA strips the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to hear Hamdan's case. So, the
court has to start there: Can it even reach the
merits of the legality of the commissions?
The press corps begins the day with a
different question: What the hell has gotten
into Justice Antonin Scalia? Between his
extracurricular pronouncements on the
arguments in this case (and I urge you to
listen to the whole speech yourself) and his
extracurricular hand signals last weekend,
nobody is quite sure what has come over the
man. He is ever more the Bill O'Reilly of
the High Court.
Neal Katyal represents Hamdan this
morning in a special 90-minute session that
is sufficiently important to merit audio
broadcast, according to the unknowable
metric used by the chief justice. Katyal
launches into his argument about why the
DTA doesn't apply to cases like Hamdan's
that were pending in the courts when the law
passed. Rookie Justice Samuel Alito-who
speaks very little again today-asks why
Hamdan can't just raise these claims later,
after the military tribunal has issued its final
decision, the way he would in an ordinary
criminal proceeding.
"This is not an ordinary criminal
proceeding," replies Katyal. "If it was we
wouldn't be here. This is a military
commission unbounded by laws, the

constitution, or treatises. It replicates the
blank check this court rejected in Hamdi."
Katyal says that the Framers had a "deep
distrust of military tribunals" and that the
only thing that assuages this distrust is that
Congress is charged with setting clear rules.
Katyal then turns to the conspiracy charge
Hamdan faces. He explains that the laws of
war reject the charge of conspiracy as a
substantive crime. "Even if this tribunal is
authorized," he claims, "allowing this
charge of conspiracy would open the
floodgates to the president to charge
whatever he wants."
Alito asks whether the conspiracy charge
can't simply be amended. To which Katyal
responds, with some frustration, that the
"government has had four years to get their
charges together against Hamdan."
Katyal argues that the Uniform Code of
Military Justice sets out the bare baseline
rules for military commissions. But Scalia
counters that there is no point in creating
military commissions if they have to adhere
to the same standards as the UCMJ.
Solicitor General Paul Clement has 45
minutes
to
represent
the
Bush
administration, and here is where the smoke
and mirrors kick in. He cites the executive's
longstanding authority to try enemies by
military tribunal. When Justice John Paul
Stevens asks for the source of the laws that
such tribunals would enforce, Clement
replies that the source is the "laws of war."
When Stevens asks whether conspiracy is
encompassed within the laws of war,
Clement says that the president views
conspiracy as within the laws of war.
Neat trick, no?
Souter takes a slightly different tack: If you
accept that the military commissions apply
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the laws of war, don't you have to accept the
Geneva Conventions? he asks. Clement
responds that the commissions can
"adjudicate that the Geneva Conventions
don't apply."
"You can't have it both ways," Souter
retorts. The government can't say the
president is operating under the laws of war,
as recognized by Congress, and then for
purposes of defining those laws, say the
Geneva Conventions don't apply.
Sure it can. Clement replies that if a detainee
has such a claim, he should bring it before
the military courts. Even Kennedy seems
alarmed now. He confesses that he's
troubled by the notion of bringing
challenges about the structure of the tribunal
to the tribunal itself. "If a group is going to
try some people, do you first have the trial
and then challenge the legitimacy of the
tribunal?" he asks incredulously.
Clement objects to his word choice. "This
isn't just some group of people," he says.
This is the president invoking his authority
to try terrorists.
Breyer goes back to the DTA and whether it
stripped the court of jurisdiction to rule on
Hamdan's claims. He asks how the court can
avoid "the most terribly difficult question of
whether Congress can constitutionally
deprive this court of jurisdiction in habeas
cases."
And Stevens serves up another can't-haveit-both-ways query: When Congress takes
away the courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction,
"Do you say it's a permissible suspension of
the writ or that it's not a suspension of the
writ?" he asks.

"Both," replies Clement.
"You can't say both," chides Stevens. So
this is where Clement claims that Congress
could have accidentally suspended the writ,
the way you might accidentally drop your
eyeglasses into a punchbowl. "Wait a
minute," replies Souter, and I think he's
angrier than I have ever seen him. "The writ
is the writ. You're saying the writ was
suspended by inadvertence!"
Later Breyer will add: "You want to say that
these are war crimes. But this is not a war.
These are not war crimes. And this is not a
war crimes tribunal. If the president can do
this, he can set up a commission and go to
Toledo and arrest an immigrant and try
him." To which Clement's answer is the
fail-safe: "This is a war."
And even as it starts to be clear that he is
whether
asks
losing Kennedy-who
Hamdan isn't "uniquely vulnerable" and
thus entitled to the theoretical protection of
the Geneva Conventions-Clement stands
firm in his claim that the Guantanamo
detainees are different from regular POWs
because, well, they are.
At some point, it must begin to insult the
collective intelligence of the court, these
tautological arguments that end where they
begin: The existing laws do not apply
because this is a different kind of war. It's a
different kind of war because the president
says so. The president gets to say so because
he is president.
For today at least, it appeared that the Bush
administration would not readily marshal
five votes for its core legal proposition: that
if you just refuse to offer answers, the
questions will go away.
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"Detention Cases Before Supreme Court Will Test
Limits of Presidential Power"
The New York Times

April 18, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
Three Supreme Court cases generated by the
Bush administration's detention of those it
deems "enemy combatants" will be argued
over the next 10 days, framing a debate of
historic dimension not only about the rights
of citizens and noncitizens alike, but alsothe
perhaps
principally-about
or
boundaries of presidential power.
It was always evident that these cases would
invite the justices to re-examine the balance
between individual liberty and national
security, and perhaps to recalibrate that
always delicate balance for the modern age
of terrorism. But the full extent to which the
arguments turn on competing visions of
presidential authority became clear only
after the dozens of briefs filed in the three
cases began to arrive at the court after the
first of the year.
In each of its three main briefs, the
administration's lawyers argue for a
muscular view of executive authority that
leaves no room for "second-guessing" or
"micromanaging" by the federal courts.
For example, in its brief arguing that the
courts have no jurisdiction even to hear
challenges to the open-ended detention of
hundreds of men taken from Afghanistan
and Pakistan to the United States naval base
at
Guantanamo
Bay,
Cuba,
the
administration says judicial review "would
place the federal courts in the unprecedented
position of micromanaging the executive's
handling of captured enemy combatants
from a distant combat zone" and of

"superintending the executive's conduct of
an armed conflict."
That would "raise grave constitutional
concerns" under the separation of powers,
the brief says.
The Guantanamo case will be argued
Tuesday. Appeals in two lawsuits filed on
behalf of separate groups of detainees, Rasul
v. Bush, No. 03-334, and Al Odah v. United

States, No. 03-343, are consolidated for a
single argument.
In its brief appealing a lower court's ruling
that President Bush lacked authority to order
the military detention of an American
citizen, Jose Padilla, the administration
argues that the decision to transfer Mr.
Padilla from the civilian courts to a military
prison was made under the president's
inherent authority as commander in chief.
"The authority of the commander in chief to
engage and defeat the enemy encompasses
the capture and detention of enemy
combatants wherever found, including
within the nation's borders," the brief
asserts.
Mr. Padilla was apprehended two years ago
at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago
on suspicion of participating in a plot by Al
Qaeda to detonate a radioactive device, but
he has never been charged with a crime.
This case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,No. 03-1027,

will be argued April 28 along with an appeal
by a second citizen detainee, Yaser Esam
Hamdi.
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Mr. Hamdi, born in Louisiana to Saudi
parents, was taken into custody more than
two years ago in Afghanistan, where
government lawyers say he was fighting
with the Taliban. He and Mr. Padilla are
being held in the same Navy brig in
Charleston, S.C. For two years, neither man
was permitted to see a lawyer. The
government recently permitted them limited
access to their lawyers while maintaining
that this was a matter of "discretion" rather
than entitlement.

describes the government's argument that
the courts cannot meaningfully review a
determination of enemy combatant status as
a "shocking assertion" that "strikes at the
heart of habeas corpus."

The federal appeals court in Richmond, Va.,
ruled last year that a nine-paragraph
description by a Pentagon official of the
circumstances of Mr. Hamdi's seizure was
sufficient to validate his continued
detention. Dismissing Mr. Hamdi's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus that sought to
challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant, the appeals court said that once
the government explained itself, there was
no further role for the federal courts.

Global Rights, an international human rights
legal group, maintains in its brief that
''enemy combatant" is an "invented
classification" that is not recognized in
international law. Its use has the effect of
"stripping Mr. Hamdi of any recognized
status under international law," the brief
says, adding that "the government is
engaging in the very practice of arbitrary
detention that it has condemned worldwide
for decades."

In its brief in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-

6696, urging the justices to uphold that
decision, the administration asserts that the
determination of enemy combatant status is
"a quintessentially military judgment,
representing a core exercise of the
commander-in-chief authority" and "entitled
to the utmost deference by a court."

In the Guantanamo case, which has received
great attention in England because British
subjects are among the detainees, 175
members of the British Parliament have filed
a brief arguing that "the exercise of
executive power without possibility of
judicial review jeopardizes the keystone of
our existence as nations-namely, the rule
of law."

These arguments in turn have galvanized a
broad swath of the legal community to
express alarm about the sweep and
implications of the administration's claims
of executive authority. Liberal and civil
rights organizations are not the only groups
to have filed briefs on the detainees' behalf.
One of the most pointed is from the Cato
Institute, a libertarian research organization
here that is influential in conservative
circles.

Like a number of other briefs in all three
cases, the Parliament members' brief argues
that the administration's actions violate both
the binding obligations and the norms of
international law. "Indefinite executive
detention without judicial review is inimical
to the United States' commitment to the rule
of law and its international obligations," the
brief says.

The institute's brief in the Hamdi case

Tracing the habeas corpus procedure to its
roots in ancient English law, the brief
continues, "The right to habeas corpus is, in
essence, a right to judicial protection against
lawless
incarceration
by
executive
authorities."

While the intemational-law arguments will
undoubtedly appeal to some justices, they
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may well alienate others. In cases on
subjects ranging from gay rights to the death
penalty to the legal liabilities of
multinational businesses, the Supreme Court
is engaged in a vigorous debate over the
extent to which United States courts should
take account of foreign legal developments.
In some respects, this debate represents the
latest front in the legal culture wars that
have been raging, sometimes beneath the
public radar, since the battle over Robert H.
Bork's nomination to the court in 1987.
Mr. Bork and 23 other conservative lawyers
and legal scholars, including several recent
veterans of the White House counsel's office
and the Justice Department, have filed a
brief in the Guantanamo case that is likely to
draw more than passing attention within the
court.
Organized as Citizens for the Common
Defence, this group, which includes a
number of the current justices' former law
clerks, focuses sharply on the internationallaw arguments in maintaining that the
detainees and their lawyers "rely upon and
seek to have this court endorse an essentially
political position that is adverse to the
interests of this nation as asserted by the
executive."
Referring to Article II of the Constitution,
which defines the office of the president, the
brief says that "this case can be viewed as
one battle between those who invoke
'international norms' and multilateralism to
constrain the United States and those who
believe that Article II empowers the
executive to defend the nation subject only
to legal constraints applicable and deemed
relevant by U.S. law, including the
Constitution and those international legal
obligations that U.S. law incorporates."
In the courtroom itself, the arguments may

well proceed as rhetorical duels over the
relevance and proper interpretation of
formerly obscure Supreme Court precedents,
dusted off for the first time since they were
issued during or soon after World War II. In
the Guantanamo case, for example, the
v.
Johnson
invokes
administration
Eisentrager, a 1950 decision rejecting a
right of habeas corpus on behalf of 21
German civilians caught spying for Japan in
wartime China.
The lesson, the administration says, is that
noncitizens held outside the United States do
not have access to federal court. The
Guantanamo detainees' lawyers say the
precedent does not apply-either because
the Guantanamo Bay Navy base is
effectively, even if not formally, United
States territory or because the Germans, in
contrast to the current detainees, had already
had lawyers and trials before a military
commission and were thus "adjudicated"
rather than simply labeled enemy aliens.
One precedent of which the justices need no
reminder is Korematsu v. United States, the

1944 Supreme Court decision that upheld, to
the country's lasting regret and eventual
formal apology, the wartime detention of
110,000 Americans of Japanese descent,
most of them citizens.
Fred Korematsu, the plaintiff in that case, is
now 84. He received the Presidential Medal
of Freedom in 1998. His brief on behalf of
the Guantanamo detainees is a catalog of
government overreactions to foreign and
domestic threats, from the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 through the McCarthy
period of the 1950's.
"Our history merits attention,"
Mr.
Korematsu's
brief says.
"Only
by
understanding the errors of the past can we
do better in the present."
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"Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a
More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S."
New York Times

June 4, 2006
Scott Shane
a wave of
WASHINGTON-Facing
litigation challenging its eavesdropping at
home and its handling of terror suspects
abroad, the Bush administration is
increasingly turning to a legal tactic that
swiftly torpedoes most lawsuits: the state
secrets privilege.
In recent weeks alone, officials have used
the privilege to win the dismissal of a
lawsuit filed by a German man who was
abducted and held in Afghanistan for five
months and to ask the courts to throw out
three legal challenges to the National
Security Agency's domestic surveillance
program.
But civil liberties groups and some scholars
say the privilege claim, in which the
government says any discussion of a
lawsuit's accusations would endanger
national security, has short-circuited judicial
scrutiny and public debate of some central
controversies of the post-9/11 era.
The privilege has been asserted by the
Justice Department more frequently under
President Bush than under any of his
predecessors-in 19 cases, the same number
as during the entire eight-year presidency of
Ronald Reagan, the previous record holder,
according to a count by William G. Weaver,
a political scientist at the University of
Texas at El Paso.
While the privilege, defined by a 1953
Supreme Court ruling, was once used to
shield sensitive documents or witnesses
from disclosure, it is now often used to try to

snuff out lawsuits at their inception, Mr.
Weaver and other legal specialists say.
"This is a very powerful weapon for the
executive branch," said Mr. Weaver, who
has a law degree and is a co-author of one of
the few scholarly articles examining the
privilege. "Once it's asserted, in almost
every instance it stops the case cold."
Robert M. Chesney, a law professor at Wake
Forest University who is studying the recent
the
said
privilege,
of the
use
administration's legal strategy "raises
profound legal and policy questions that will
be the subject of intense debate for the
foreseeable future."
Some members of Congress also have
doubts about the way the privilege has been
used. A bill approved by the House
Government Reform Committee would limit
its use in blocking whistle-blowers'
lawsuits.
"If the very people you're suing are the ones
who get to use the state secrets privilege, it's
a stacked deck," said Representative
Christopher
Shays,
Republican
of
Connecticut, who proposed the measure and
has
campaigned
against
excessive
government secrecy.
Yet courts have almost always deferred to
the secrecy claims; Mr. Weaver said he
believed that the last unsuccessful assertion
of the privilege was in 1993. Steven
Aftergood, an expert on government secrecy
at the Federation of American Scientists,
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said, "It's a sign of how potent the national
security mantra has become."

detection." Mr. Negroponte said he was
providing more detail in classified filings.

Under Mr. Bush, the secrets privilege has
been used to block a lawsuit by a translator
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sibel
Edmonds, who was fired after accusing
colleagues of security breaches; to stop a
discrimination lawsuit filed by Jeffrey
Sterling,
a
Farsi-speaking,
AfricanAmerican officer at the Central Intelligence
Agency; and to derail a patent claim
involving a coupler for fiber-optic cable,
evidently to guard technical details of
government eavesdropping.

Those cases are still pending. Two lawsuits
challenging the government's practice of
rendition, in which terror suspects are seized
and delivered to detention centers overseas,
were dismissed after the government raised
the secrets privilege.

Such cases can make for oddities. Mark S.
Zaid, who has represented Ms. Edmonds,
Mr. Sterling and other clients in privilege
cases, said he had seen his legal briefs
classified by the government and had been
barred from contacting a client because his
phone line was not secure.
"In most state secrets cases, the plaintiffs'
lawyers don't know what the alleged secrets
are," Mr. Zaid said.
More recently the privilege has been
wielded against lawsuits challenging broader
policies, including the three lawsuits
attacking the National Security Agency's
eavesdropping program-one against AT&T
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San
Francisco and two against the federal
government by the American Civil Liberties
Union in Michigan and the Center for
Constitutional Rights in New York.
In a filing in the New York case, John D.
Negroponte, the director of national
intelligence, wrote that allowing the case to
proceed would "cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security of the
United States" because it "would enable
adversaries of the United States to avoid

One plaintiff, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born
Canadian, was detained while changing
planes in New York and was taken to Syria,
where he has said he was held in a tiny cell
and beaten with electrical cables. The other,
Khaled el-Masri, a German of Kuwaiti
origin, was seized in Macedonia and taken
to Afghanistan, where he has said he was
beaten and injected with drugs before being
released in Albania.
The United States never made public any
evidence linking either man to terrorism,
and both cases are widely viewed as
mistakes. Mr. Arar's lawsuit was dismissed
in February on separate but similar grounds
from the secrets privilege, a decision he is
appealing. A federal judge in Virginia
dismissed Mr. Masri's lawsuit on May 18,
accepting the government's secrets claim.
One frustration of the plaintiffs in such cases
is that so much information about the
ostensible state secrets is already public. Mr.
Arar's case has been examined in months of
public hearings by a Canadian government
commission, and Mr. Masri's story has been
confirmed by American and German
officials and blamed on a mix-up of similar
names. The N.S.A. program has been
described and defended in numerous public
statements by Mr. Bush and other top
officials and in a 42-page Justice
Department legal analysis.
In the A.C.L.U. lawsuit charging that the
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security agency's eavesdropping is illegal,
Ann Beeson, the group's associate legal
director, acknowledged that some facts
might need to remain secret. "But you don't
need those facts to hear this case," she said.
"All the facts needed to try this case are
already public."

the executive branch in deciding
secrets must be protected.

what

But critics of the use of the privilege point
out that officials sometimes exaggerate the
sensitivities at risk. In fact, documents from
the 1953 case that defined the modem
privilege, United States v. Reynolds, have

Brian Roehrkasse, a Justice Department
spokesman, said he could not discuss any
specific case. But he said the state secrets
privilege "is well-established in federal law
and has been asserted many times in our
nation's history to protect our nation's
secrets."
Other defenders of the administration's
increasing use of the privilege say it merely
reflects proliferating lawsuits.
In all of the N.S.A. cases, for instance, "it's
the same secret they're trying to protect,"
said H. Bryan Cunningham, a Denver
lawyer who served as a legal adviser to the
National Security Council under Mr. Bush.
Mr. Cunningham said that under wellestablished precedent, judges must defer to

been declassified in recent years and suggest
that Air Force officials misled the court.
An accident report on a B-29 bomber crash
in 1948 was withheld because the Air Force
said it included technical details about
and
equipment
sensitive intelligence
missions, but it turned out to contain no such
information, said Wilson M. Brown III, a
lawyer in Philadelphia who represented
survivors of those who died in the crash in
recent litigation.
"The facts the Supreme Court was relying
on in Reynolds were false," Mr. Brown said
in an interview. "It shows that if the
government is not truthful, plaintiffs will
lose and there's very little chance to
straighten it out."
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LOOKING BACK: PRO-BUSINESS COURT?
"Bush's Approval Rating Remains High with Court"
The Record (Bergen County, N.J.)
July 1, 2007
Michael Doyle
WASHINGTON-The
Supreme
Court
smiled on President Bush and big business
during its 2006-07 term, which just ended,
gratifying a White House beset by problems
nearly everywhere else.

Friday, in an even more surprising twist, at
least five justices agreed to reverse a prior
court ruling and hear an appeal from
prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. That hearing will take place next fall.

Reinforced by two conservative Bush
appointees, the court sided with the
administration's position more than 80
percent of the time. Even one of the
administration's
highest-profile
losses
reflected the White House's innermost
political sympathies.

Every Supreme Court term combines
theatrics with technicalities. The decisions
with the longest reach can take years to
unfold or require a doctorate to comprehend.
The cases with the most vivid facts may drift
to the legal backwaters, or turn up elsewhere
in surprising ways.

"A lot of people have been observing that
the administration has kind of had its way
with this court," said Washington attorney
Maureen Mahoney, a Republican frequently
identified as a potential Supreme Court
nominee.

Even glittering win-loss records can conceal
more complicated undercurrents. Over the
last term, the court's conservatives have
clashed among themselves, and its dissenters
have revealed some hard feelings.

The White House won big policy victories,
as when justices upheld a late-term abortion
ban, and scored key procedural wins, with
the court blocking taxpayers
from
challenging Bush's faith-based initiative.
White House allies prevailed when the court
sided with parents who oppose race-based
school decisions.
The administration's record was far from
perfect, however.
In the year's highest-profile environmental
case, the court ruled 5-4 that the
Environmental Protection Agency has the
authority to regulate greenhouse gases. On

"The majority is wrong," fumed Justice
Stephen Breyer, taking nearly 30 minutes to
read a recent dissent from the bench. "It's
not often in law that so few have changed so
much so quickly."
The administration weighed in on some 46
cases this past term, all handled by Solicitor
General Paul Clement. Some cases involved
the government itself. Many others involved
private cases on which the administration
had a point of view. Thirty eight times, the
administration's view prevailed.
Former President Bill Clinton, by contrast,
sometimes lost as many as half of the
Supreme Court cases on which he or his
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aides expressed an opinion.
"The current administration may be more in
tune with a majority of the Supreme Court
than was the case during the previous
administration," said Washington legal aid
attorney Barbara McDowell, who served
eight years in the Solicitor General's Office.
In truth, McDowell added, solicitors general
frequently have good batting averages with
the court. They have
considerable
experience, pick their fights carefully and
generally enjoy the court's respect.
Still, the White House wasn't the only big
winner as Chief Justice John Roberts led a
conservative if at times tenuous majority.
Business interests likewise count the newly
finished term a success. The Chamber of
Commerce prevailed in 13 out of 16 cases
on which it weighed in.
Big Year for Business

"We've been representing the business
community before the Supreme Court for 30
years, and this is our strongest showing
[ever]," crowed Robin Conrad, executive
vice president of the National Chamber
Litigation Center.
In some respects, the 2006-07 term was a
modest one for a court in its second year
under Roberts' leadership. Unlike the
previous term, justices didn't render big
terrorism or national security decisions. The
court also issued fewer decisions, 72, than it
had in previous years.
Roberts, moreover, fell far short of his
ambitious goal of unifying the court.
During his September 2005 confirmation
hearing, Roberts told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that "the chief justice has a

particular obligation to try to achieve
consensus" and declared that that would
"certainly be a priority for me."
Nonetheless, 24 out of the 72 cases this term
were decided on 5-4 votes.
"There's been more division in this court,
[although] not on the business side," said
Washington attorney Beth Brinkman, a
Democrat who has argued 21 cases before
the high court.
More cases were decided by 5-4 votes than
in any term over at least the last decade,
according to figures compiled by the law
firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.
There also were notably fewer unanimous
decisions than there were in previous years.
Consistently, Roberts joined with Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito Jr. and Anthony Kennedy to form the
majority. It was Kennedy, though, who
really flexed his muscles.
With the departure of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Kennedy fully claimed the role
of crucial swing vote this year. He was on
the winning side in every one of the 24 cases
decided by 5-4 votes.
Kennedy, moreover, periodically restrained
what the Roberts' majority otherwise would
have accomplished. On Thursday, for
instance, Kennedy joined with the slim
conservative majority to strike down racebased student assignment policies in
Louisville and Seattle.
The court sided with white families in ruling
that the schools' race-based decisions
violated constitutional guarantees of equal
protection.
But in a concurring opinion, Kennedy
stressed that he wouldn't go as far as
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Roberts in eliminating race in school
policies. Kennedy's contention that Roberts
shows "an all-too unyielding insistence that
race cannot be a factor" effectively limits
the reach of the majority's decision.
"Within the five-person conservative
majority, there were fascinating internal
splits," said Stanford Law School professor
Kathleen Sullivan.
It's a tug-of-war: Kennedy pulling in one
direction and Scalia and Thomas pulling in
another.
Roberts, for instance, wrote the majority
opinion concluding that a campaign finance
law limiting certain preelection ads violated
the free-speech rights of Wisconsin Right to

Life. The law blocks unions and
corporations from directly financing certain
ads within 60 days of a general election and
30 days of a primary.
The Roberts opinion will make it much
easier for unions and corporations to run
ads. He didn't, however, strike down the
campaign finance law itself.
Scalia and Thomas joined the majority, but
insisted separately that Roberts was being
disingenuous. It would be more honest, they
said, for the court to overturn the law it
otherwise was gutting.
"This faux judicial restraint is judicial
obfuscation," Scalia wrote, speaking of one
of his ostensible ideological allies.
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"Trumping the States: Business Is Finding Success
in Federal Pre-Emption Cases"
ABA Journal

May 2008
David G. Savage
In a stream-of-consciousness question
during U.S. Supreme Court arguments,
Justice Stephen G. Breyer framed-and
seemingly decided-key issues in a suit
involving federal pre-emption over state tort
law.
"It's a terrible thing if the drugs hurt
people," Breyer said during February
arguments in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent,

128 S. Ct. 1168. But, he added, "there's a
risk on the other side if new drugs are not
available for people who are sick or dying."
So, who should decide "whether this drug is,
on balance, going to save people or, on
balance, going to hurt people? An expert
[federal] agency, on the one hand, or 12
people pulled randomly for a jury role?
Now, it seems to me ... Congress has opted
for the agency."
There was an awkward pause. The case
before the court involved drugs, but it turned
on a Michigan law. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg came to the rescue. "We are going
to hear that case next term," she said.
Indeed, those issues will be raised in next
term's Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, in

which Vermont musician Diana Levine
claims she lost a hand and forearm to
complications from an "IV push" of a
popular anti-nausea drug. But if this term is
any indication, the court has signaled the
direction in which it likely will go.
HIGH COURT SUCCESS

While corporations and business lawyers

in
mostly unsuccessful
have been
persuading Congress or state legislatures to
shield them from lawsuits and jury verdicts,
they have found success before the Supreme
Court. And they have done so by arguing
that the federal regulatory laws already on
the books pre-empt lawsuits under state
common law.
Georgetown University law professor David
C. Vladeck says the trend toward preempting the right to sue in state courts is one
of the most important developments in
recent years.
"We are talking about a dramatic, wholesale
shift in the common law. This is definitely
the year of pre-emption," says Viadeck,
former director of the Washington, D.C.based Public Citizen Litigation Group, a
public interest law firm.
But while Vladeck says the court has been
overreaching, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
lawyer Robin S. Conrad welcomes the
rulings for recognizing the conflict faced by
businesses that operate nationally. "They
want one set of national regulations, not a
patchwork of inconsistent state and local
requirements," says Conrad, executive vice
president of the National Chamber
Litigation Center.
This is particularly so for products such as
medical devices or prescription drugs, she
says. "These are federally regulated
products. An expert agency says a drug or a
medical device is safe and effective to be on
the market," Conrad says. But in a lawsuit, a
jury may conclude the same product is not
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safe and should not be on the market, she
says.

laws if they set extra requirements for
device makers.

The court adopted the pro-business and pro-

But did lawmakers also intend to pre-empt
lawsuits and jury trials? Beginning in 1992,
the Supreme Court has answered yes. In

pre-emption view in Riegel v. Medtronic

Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, handed down Feb. 20.
The plaintiff, Charles Riegel, had a balloon
catheter inserted into a heart artery in 1996
but it burst, causing serious injuries. He sued
in a New York state court, contending the
catheter was defectively designed. (Riegel
died in December 2004, but the U.S.
Supreme Court allowed the case to
continue.)
In an 8-1 vote, the high court threw out
Riegel's suit, as well as most other claims
against medical devices that the Food and
Drug Administration approved for sale.
Tort suits may offer "solicitude for those
injured by FDA-approved devices," wrote
Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. But
Congress also had "solicitude for those who
would suffer without new medical devices if
juries were allowed to apply the tort law of
50 states to all innovations."
The outcome turned on the meaning of the
words any requirement in the 1976 Medical
Device Amendments Act, passed in the
wake of the Dalkon Shield disaster. The
intrauterine device, introduced in 1970, led
to serious infections in thousands of women,
as well as several deaths. As a result, many
states required makers of medical devices to
obtain the state's approval before they could
be sold.
SCOPE OF INTENT AT ISSUE
The new federal law said no state "may
establish or continue in effect with respect to
a device intended for human use any
requirement" that differs from those of the
FDA. Congress intended to pre-empt state

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504,

the justices shielded cigarette makers from
lawsuits from smokers who claimed they
were not truly warned of the dangers. The
federal cigarette warning label act required
tobacco companies to put warnings on each
pack of cigarettes, but it also said "no
requirement or prohibition" may be added
by the states. A jury's verdict saying the
warning label did not go far enough would,
in effect, constitute an extra state
requirement, the justices said.
Now nearly all the justices have adopted this
view of what Congress said-even if it may
come as a surprise to members of Congress
who passed the 1976 law. "Absent other
indication,
reference
to
a
state's
'requirements' includes its common-law
duties." Scalia said.
In her dissent, Ginsburg said there was no
"sign of a legislative design to pre-empt
state common-law tort actions." Congress
sought to give consumers extra protection
through federal oversight, not take away the
protection of lawsuits and jury verdicts, she
concluded.
Nevertheless, Alan Untereiner, a D.C.
lawyer who represents business, predicted
Scalia's opinion will have a wide impact.
"The Riegel decision is a resounding victory
for the pre-emption defense and for the
business community," he says.
The pre-emption defense has proven to be a
winner for business on other fronts this year.
In Rowe v. New HampshireMotor Transport
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Association, 128 S. Ct. 989, also decided
Feb. 20, the court shielded delivery services,
such as FedEx and UPS, from state laws
requiring they check with an adult before
dropping off cigarettes at a residence.
In the era of Internet commerce, all manner
of products can be bought online and
shipped home. The states said the carriers
must check before delivering goods such as
cigarettes, alcohol or pornography, but the
court said these state laws are pre-empted by
the federal law deregulating the trucking
industry.
Even TV's Judge Alex was handed the same
message. Alex Ferrer, a former Florida state
judge, arbitrates disputes on TV and hands
down a binding decision in minutes. But he
refused to arbitrate a fee dispute with his
manager, Arnold Preston, even though he
signed a contract calling for arbitration. He
won in the California courts by citing a state
law that entrusted a state agency to review
contract disputes between actors and talent
agents.
It took more than a few minutes, but less
than five weeks, for the Supreme Court to
reject his claim. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.

Ct. 978. The Federal Arbitration Act preempts conflicting state laws, the justices
said, and those who sign contracts calling
for binding arbitration must go to
arbitration.
RECUSAL LEADS TO TIE

The other case this term, Warner-Lambert,
ended in a 4-4 split, upholding an appellate
court ruling that allowed a tort claim over
the drug Rezulin to proceed. Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. stepped aside because he

owned stock in Pfizer, the parent company
of Warner-Lambert.
The next major test will come in the fall
when the court hears cases testing whether
makers of prescription drugs and "light"
cigarettes should be shielded from lawsuits.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the court will reconsider
a $ 6.8 million jury award to Levine for the
loss of her right hand and forearm after an
injection of Wyeth's anti-nausea drug,
Phenergan. Levine had gone to a medical
clinic where they injected the drug deep in
her arm. As a result of the so-called IV push
an artery was punctured, resulting in
gangrene and amputation. She sued,
contending the drug maker failed to warn
against a deep injection of the drug.
In its defense, Wyeth said the warning label
included cautions against puncturing an
artery. "Prescription drug labeling is
precisely the type of complex and technical
regulatory regime that warrants deference to
the expertise" of the FDA, said Washington
attorney Bert W. Rein for Wyeth. There are
"tens of thousands of cases in our nation's
courts" where the same conflict is at issue,
he noted.
Also next term, in Altria Group Inc. v.

Good, No. 07-562, the court will decide
whether the tobacco companies should be
shielded from suits that contend they
deceived smokers by advertising "light" or
"low tar" cigarettes. These claims ask a jury
to decide whether the warning label was
adequate, and that is a new state law
requirement, says former U.S. Solicitor
General Ted Olson, representing Philip
Morris.
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"Big Business's Big Term"
Slate

March 5, 2008
Doug Kendall
With the Supreme Court term moving past
the halfway mark, corporate America's
long-term investments in the federal
judiciary are yielding impressive returns.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Robin
Conrad gushed about a "hat trick" of
Supreme Court victories one day in
February, telling the Legal Times, "I don't
think I've ever experienced a day at the
Supreme Court like that."
Thirty-seven years ago, future Justice Lewis
Powell, then a lawyer in private practice,
penned a now-famous memorandum alerting
the Chamber of Commerce to a "neglected
opportunity in the courts." Powell explained
that "the judiciary may be the most
important instrument for social, economic
and political change," and he urged the
chamber and its corporate benefactors to
invest heavily in this "vast area of
opportunity." In the wake of Powell's
memo, the business community seeded a
vast body of scholarship and created a
nationwide network of pro-business legal
organizations. This investment has quietly
borne fruit for decades-and, this term in
particular, landed corporate America the
wins that thrilled Conrad, and more besides.
On that hat-trick day in February, the court
issued three pro-business decisions: striking
down state rules designed to prevent
children from receiving cigarettes via the
Internet, Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
TransportAssociation; blocking state courts

from holding manufacturers liable for the
harms caused by defective medical devices,
Riegel v. Medtronic; and using a federal

arbitration statute to protect corporations

against state jury trials in contract disputes.
Preston v. Ferrer. These were all "pre-

emption" decisions, which means that the
court found a conflict between a federal law
and a state statute or decisions reached by
state courts. In such a conflict, federal law
trumps, and this led the court in these three
cases to free corporations from state limits
on their conduct.
Earlier this term, the court gave the chamber
another win when it ruled broadly against
"scheme liability" lawsuits, which hold
accountable everyone involved in an effort
to defraud securities investors. As a direct
result of that case, Stoneridge v. Scientific-

Atlanta, the financial institutions that
enabled Enron to perpetrate the largest
corporate fraud in U.S. history won the
dismissal of a $40 billion lawsuit brought by
the investors in Enron whose retirement
security was decimated by this fraud.
It's not just particular cases that the chamber
is winning, but also foundational issues that
set the course of the law. Stoneridge is what
lawyers call a "cause of action" case; it was
about whether the plaintiffs could get into
the courthouse to ensure the enforcement of
the obligations that the federal Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 imposes on
corporations. Decades ago, the court ruled
that the Exchange Act necessarily implied
that victims of corporate misconduct could
sue corporations for flouting the clear legal
obligations that this law imposes. But
starting in 1975, the court began a steady
retreat from the idea that judges could
"imply" a cause of action, forcing Congress
to state clearly that it wants people to be
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able to sue. In Stoneridge, the court took this
a big step further, saying in effect that
people cannot sue companies to enforce an
obligation under the Exchange Act that the
court has not approved in a prior case. This
ruling essentially freezes the enforceability
of the Exchange Act.
Another cause-of-action case in which a
decision is still pending is the biggest civilrights case this term, a suit by a black
employee fired by Cracker Barrel. The law
at issue here is the historic, if long underenforced, Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
gave freed slaves equal rights in making and
enforcing contracts. The question before the
court is whether this Reconstruction-era
statute bars employers from retaliating
against workers who complain of racial bias
on the job. At oral argument last week, a
number of justices, perhaps a majority,
seemed poised to rule that even if the law
covered retaliation, the court would not
allow a victim of discrimination to go to
court and enforce this mandate, even though
he or she could sue to enforce other
violations of the law. Without the ability to
sue, any protection provided by the Civil
Rights Act against retaliation becomes
essentially useless.
It is extremely hard to reconcile what the
court has done in cause-of-action cases like
Stoneridge with its approach to pre-emption
cases like Rowe, Riegel, and Preston. In the

cause-of-action cases, the court says
Congress must unmistakably express its
intention to allow people to go to court to
enforce federal mandates. If Congress isn't
crystal-clear, potential plaintiffs are out of
luck. But in the pre-emption cases, the court
seems untroubled by a lack of clarity on
Congress' part, ruling that federal law
pushes aside state actions or remedies when
it's not at all certain that's what Congress so
thing these
one
There's
intended.
They both
in
common:
approaches do have

favor business interests.
The Chamber of Commerce also appears to
have won the day in disputes over the role of
the jury in deciding contract and liability
disputes that might be costly for businesses.
The Preston decision this term caps a long
line of rulings, dating from 1984, in which
the court has interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act effectively to displace state
juries in a vast number of contractual
disputes. And in a suit against Exxon argued
at the end of February, the court seemed
poised to substitute for the jury's view its
own idea of the appropriate level of punitive
damages for the worst oil spill in U.S.
history, as the justices have repeatedly done
in punitive damage cases over the past
decade.
The court's disdain for jury trials was
especially evident at oral argument in
Riegel, the case about manufacturer liability
for medical devices. Justice
Scalia
responded to Riegel's argument about the
importance of preserving the judgment of
the state jury by declaring "extraordinary"
the very notion that a "single jury" could
find a company liable for a defective
product when the "scientists at the FDA
have said [the product] is OK." This is a
remarkable statement for a justice who
professes to be bound by the Constitution's
original meaning. Many things are obscure
about the framing era, but this we know for
certain: The framers of our Constitution
loved juries. In siding with the chamber and
viewing the jury more as a threat to the
modem economy and less as a bulwark of
our system of justice, the court is departing
sharply from what our framers would have
wanted.
There will surely be other cases this term
that the Chamber of Commerce loses. The
game is not rigged. Rather, by investing
heavily in legal strategy and working
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patiently in case after case, the chamber has
won victories that have gradually shifted the
ground rules in its favor. For that, the
chamber can thank Justice Powell's advice
and deep corporate pockets. For ordinary
Americans and the victims of corporate
misconduct, there is much less to celebrate.

Legal
Washington
the
Foundation,
Foundation, and the Chamber's own
National Chamber Litigation Center. In
addition, established power centers like the
Federalist Society and the Heritage
Foundation were founded to organize and
orchestrate pro-business litigation efforts.

Sidebar

These groups include the Pacific Legal
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"Is the Supreme Court Biased in Favor of Business?"
Slate.com
March 17, 2008
Eric Posner
Jeffrey Rosen argued that it is, in a Sunday
NYT magazine article, but he supplies little
evidence:
"Of the 30 business cases last term, 22 were
decided unanimously, or with only one or
two dissenting voices."

(2006); Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. (2007); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007); Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc. (2007); Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd.

v. Billing (2007)-are mostly business
versus business cases. Only one caseTwombly-pitted

-But how many of them were decided in
favor of businesses? Weirdly, we're not
told. What if businesses won only half the
time? Or less? Even if businesses won
more often than other parties, we wouldn't
be able to establish bias without knowing
whether their cases were strong or weak.
"Forty percent of the cases the court heard
last term involved business interests, up
from around 30 percent in recent years."
-Another meaningless statistic. Suppose
that the additional cases involve disputes
between businesses and workers and that the
workers always win. We can't tell whether
bias exists unless we know whether the
Court rules in favor or against those
business interests. (For one case where the
employee wins, go here.)
"While the Rehnquist Court heard less than
one antitrust decision a year, on average,
between 1988 and 2003, the Roberts Court
has heard seven in its first two terms-and
all of them were decided in favor of the
corporate defendants."
-These seven cases-Volvo Trucks North
America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco, GMC, Inc.
(2006); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher (2006);
Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc.

consumers

against

Credit Suisse ambiguously
businesses.
corporate
pitted investors (including
investors) against a business. So in five or
six of the seven cases in which a corporate
defendant won, a corporate plaintiff lost.
"Exactly how successful has the Chamber of
Commerce been at the Supreme Court?
Although the court is currently accepting
less than 2 percent of the 10,000 petitions it
receives each year, the Chamber of
Commerce's petitions between 2004 and
2007 were granted at a rate of 26 percent,
according to Scotusblog."
-Those
10,000 petitions include lots of
hopeless cases. The Chamber of Commerce
will obviously pick and choose on the basis
of the quality of the case, and put resources
only behind those cases that have a chance
of prevailing. Hence its high win rate.
"And persuading the Supreme Court to hear
a case is more than half the battle: Richard
Lazarus, a law professor at Georgetown who
also represents environmental clients before
the court, recently ran the numbers and
found that the court reverses the lower court
in 65 percent of the cases it agrees to hear;
and when the petitioner is represented by the
elite Supreme Court advocates routinely
hired by the chamber, the success rate rises
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to 75 percent."
-The overall success rate of petitions does
not tell us the success rate of the Chamber of
Commerce. The pertinent statistic is that
last term the Chamber of Commerce won 13
of 15 cases for which it wrote an amicus
brief. But, again, without knowing whether
these cases were strong or weak, we have no
way of telling whether this win record
reflects bias or simply the Chamber's ability
to sniff out cases where lower courts erred.
-I looked at the 23 cases listed on the
Court's website for this term. I counted nine
business cases: of these, businesses lost in 5
cases, more than half. But this doesn't tell
us anything either. If the court has become
more pro-business, most parties will settle in
line with the changing jurisprudence, and
there is no particular reason to think that
win/loss data will tell us anything (the
"selection effect" problem that dogs
empirical research).
Aside from these ambiguous statistics,
Rosen cites four decided cases to support his
These four cases are less
argument.
straightforward than they appear at first
sight. To see why, consider the question,
what does it mean to be pro-business?

shareholders made (or did not lose) money.
Is the case anti-business because Charter's
shareholders lost or pro-business because
the vendors' shareholders won?
2. Pro-Management?
Maybe the claim is that the decision in
Charter Communications favored that
company's managers in some way.
Henceforth, manages will more easily be
able to conspire with third parties to violate
security laws, at the expense of investors.
This is also a puzzling claim. Suppose the
Supreme Court held that managers of
businesses could loot the treasuries of their
businesses without facing any liability at all.
Would that be a victory for business or
would it mean that business as we know it
has become impossible?
3. Anti-Consumer?
Businesses exploit consumers, don't they?
In the Philip Morris case, the court threw
out punitive damages awarded to a smoker
who had been deceived by cigarette
advertising. Punitive damages deter firms
from wrongdoing but they also raise their
costs and hence the price of goods. Whether
consumers are benefited from or harmed by
punitive damages is unclear.

1. Pro-Shareholder?
Businesses are owned by shareholders, so
one might think that a pro-business Court
would hold in favor of shareholders.
However, in the Charter Communications
case, the Court ruled against investors, who
had sued Charter's vendors for conspiring to
commit securities fraud.
Alternatively, one might argue that this case
Charter
because
pro-business
is
Communications' vendors won. But that is
just a way of saying that the vendors'

The antitrust cases Rosen mentions reflect
some skepticism with traditional antitrust
law notions that disapprove of various
cooperative arrangements among business.
But the intellectual foundation of this trend
reflects a pro-consumer attitude, in contrast
with the older antitrust law, which was antibig business but not anti-business.
4. Anti-State?
In Riegel, the Court held that victims of a
faulty medical device cannot bring a state634

law products liability claim if that device
had been approved by the FDA. This case
was a victory for a business, but its real
effect is to ensure that FDA regulations of
medical devices prevail over state common
law regulation. This weakens the power of
states relative to the federal government in
this area, but does it help or hurt consumers?
It depends on whether state common law
judges and juries do a better job evaluating
medical products than the FDA does. Do
they?
No one knows.
Does it help
businesses-shareholders and managers-in
general? It depends on whether state judges
(often criticized for being in the pocket of
business lobbies) are more or less probusiness than the federal government. Some
are, no doubt; others are not. There is no
reason to think that recent cases that find
preemption of state law are pro-business:
they are pro-federal government, not probusiness.
5. Anti-Prosecution?
In Arthur Andersen, the Court reversed a

conviction against the defunct accounting
firm for shredding documents during the
Enron investigation, holding that the
government had failed to prove that the
shredding was anything other than routineas opposed to an effort to conceal guilt. In
what sense can such a decision be
considered "pro-business"? Compared to
what? Is the idea that the Supreme Court
would have affirmed the conviction if the
defendant had not been a business? Or is
the idea that any ruling that allows
businesses to dispose of documents must be
pro-business-as if the only "unbiased"
view would be that businesses must keep all
their records forever?
6. Anti-lawsuit?

back on much earlier cases that found
private rights of action in general regulatory
statutes that vested the government with the
power to enforce a law. In the past few
decades, the Court has increasingly insisted
that private rights of action should not be
"implied" (that is, invented by courts) but
should be recognized only when a statute
Many of these statutes
creates them.
regulate businesses, so finding private rights
of action may harm businesses, or some
business. But these rights are also taken
advantage of by businesses that seek to sue
other businesses, so in aggregate, it is not
clear whether the trend helps business or
hurts it.
7. Pro-Market?
What's really going on is that Rosen is
conflating two separate ideas: "probusiness" (really: pro-rich-people; after all
businesses are just legal abstractions that
bring
together
investors,
managers,
employees, consumers, so that any victory
for a "business" will help/hurt all sorts of
people, rich and poor) and "pro-market."
The whole idea of being pro-business is, I
suspect, incoherent (read Jack Balkin's post
and then ask yourself, what would an "antibusiness" Supreme Court jurisprudence look
like? Would businesses have to lose every
case?). But one can coherently argue about
the extent to which the govermnent should,
or should not, depart from enforcing
ordinary property and contract rights that
underlie the free market. Rosen's piece is
probably best read as arguing that the
Supreme Court has, over the years, become
less sympathetic to the view that
government intervention in the market
serves the public interest, a view that he
calls "economic populism." If so, only the
antitrust cases are really on point; the Arthur
Andersen case, the Charter Communications

The Charterhouse Communications case is

the latest of a long line of cases that pull

case, and the preemption cases have little to
do with market ideology.
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So the Supreme Court is not increasingly
pro-business, but maybe it is increasingly
pro-market, finally catching up to a change
in the public mood that began in the Carter
administration. To preserve the idea that its
jurisprudence is "biased" in favor of
business, rather than just sensible or
reasonable or within the range of colorable
legal argument or for that matter a long
overdue reaction to its previous antibusiness "bias," Rosen argues that maybe
there are people out there who really are
populist; he seems to think that the Supreme
Court and elite, bipartisan opinion that (he
acknowledges) it reflects are "biased" in
favor of business because this populist
sentiment no longer plays a role in its
opinions.
"Unbiased," in this view, is

populist. But Rosen does not show that
populism is on the rise; the fates of the two
most populist presidential candidates,
Huckabee and Edwards, suggest otherwise.
Even if it were, it would be puzzling to
argue that the Supreme Court should hold its
finger to the wind and start ruling against
businesses-indeed, should have started
years ago, when this "pro-business" trend
Rosen decries began-and if it doesn't, that
must be because of "bias." The article boils
down to the claim that the Supreme Court is
biased in favor of business (that is, is
excessively pro-market) because it failed to
anticipate, and today shows no inclination to
heed, marginal populist sentiment that has
made no inroad on electoral politics.
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LOOKING BACK: LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER
COMPANY, INC.
"Justices Restrict Pay Bias Lawsuits"
Chicago Tribune

May 30, 2007
Robert Manor
A deeply divided Supreme Court ruling

employment discrimination law on its head."

Tuesday[, Ledbetter v. Goodyear,] sharply

limited the ability of workers to sue
employers for gender pay discrimination
linked to actions taken years earlier.

The legal decision involved Lilly Ledbetter,
who worked for 19 years at the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. plant in Gadsden, Ala.

Employer groups praised the 5-4 decision,
saying it protects employers from unfair
liability and requires workers to act
promptly to protect their rights. Civil-rights
advocates criticized the ruling, saying it will
prevent workers who are discriminated
against from recovering all the money they
are due from employers.

Shortly before her retirement in 1998, she
filed an EEOC complaint alleging she was
paid significantly less than men doing the
same work, and that she had been
discriminated against for many years.

In its simplest terms, the court said alleged
victims of pay discrimination must file a
complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission within 180 days of
the discriminatory act. They cannot seek
redress for discrimination prior to that time.
A public policy law firm associated with the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce praised the
decision.
"What the court is doing is reading the
statute the way Congress wanted it to read,"
said Robin Conrad, executive vice president
of the National Chamber Litigation Center.
"It was to resolve disputes as quickly as
possible."
But Kim Gandy, president of the National
Organization for Women, described the
ruling as "a terrible, terrible decision" that
of
our understanding
"has
turned

Ledbetter argued that over the years her
male counterparts received larger pay raises
than she did, and as a result they eventually
earned much more money.
For example, court documents say that she
started out in 1979 earning the same as male
co-workers. By 1997 she was earning
$3,727 per month, the lowest of 15 male coworkers and significantly less than the
$5,236 a month earned by the highest paid
male co-worker.
Goodyear argued in court that Ledbetter got
smaller pay raises because her work was not
as good as that of other employees.
Under an anti-discrimination provision of
the Civil Rights Act, which requires review
by the EEOC, Ledbetter prevailed in court
and eventually won a $360,000 award.
But the award was thrown out by a federal
appeals court, which determined that jurors
should have looked only at Ledbetter's most
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recent pay increases, not pay increases
dating back for years.
The Supreme Court agreed.
"Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC
charge within 180 days after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and
communicated to her," wrote Justice Samuel
Alito for the majority. Joining him were
Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas, the conservative majority
on the court.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the
minority, said pay disparity between
employees can occur over time, as was the
case with Ledbetter, and discrimination
might not become apparent immediately.
She also said the court's decision would
offer a perverse incentive to encourage
discrimination lawsuits against employers.
"Today's decision counsels: Sue early on,
when it is uncertain whether discrimination
accounts for the pay disparity you are
experiencing," said Ginsburg, the only
woman on the court. Joining her were
Justices Stephen Breyer, David Souter and
John Paul Stevens, the liberal wing of the
court.
The National Organization for Women said
the decision especially affects victims of job
discrimination and harassment based on
gender. Other civil rights laws often are used
on behalf of people arguing they are
discriminated against because of a disability

or other reasons.
Quentin Riegel, vice president of litigation
at
the
National
Association
of
Manufacturers, said the decision "has
important ramifications for all companies.
"It is fair to the employer to have these cases
resolved promptly," Riegel said. "It is fair to
the employee to get it resolved promptly
too."
John Russo, co-director of the Center for
Working-Class Studies at Youngstown State
University in Ohio, said limits on how far
back a discrimination victim can go in
claiming compensation are common in
arbitration. Unionized workplaces often use
arbitration rather than litigation to settle
discrimination claims.
"Frequently, arbitrators put some sort of
limitation on time," Russo said. "There is
some precedent in arbitration law for
limiting the amount of back pay."
But Bob Bruno, associate professor of labor
and industrial relations at the University of
Illinois at Chicago, described himself as
"stunned" by the court's decision, which he
said puts an unfair burden on women in the
workplace.
"A female in a male-dominated workplace,
she now has to be fully aware of her
discrimination, and she has to be able to
ferret it out as it is happening in real time,"
Bruno said.
That is often be difficult to do, Bruno said.
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"Court Explores Complexities in Employment
Discrimination Case"
The New York Times

November 28, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
Federal law prohibits discrimination on the
job, requiring employers to pay their
employees without regard to race, sex,
Many
origin.
or national
religion
complexities lie behind that simple
statement, as a Supreme Court argument on
Monday made abundantly clear.
The question for the court was how to treat a
discriminatory action that happened long
ago, beyond the statute of limitations for the
federal Civil Rights Act, but that has effects
that continue to the present day. Is each new
paycheck, reflecting a salary lower than it
would have been without the initial
discrimination, a recurring violation that sets
the clock running again? Or does the
passage of time, without fresh acts of
intentional discrimination, render the initial
injury a nonevent in the eyes of the law?
The case was brought to the court by a
woman, Lilly M. Ledbetter, who worked for
19 years as a manager at a Goodyear Tire
and Rubber plant in Gadsden, Ala. For
years, Ms. Ledbetter was paid less than men
at the same level, and by 1997, as the only
female manager, she was earning less than
the lowest-paid man in the department. In
1998, after an undesired transfer, she retired
and filed a discrimination charge against the
company with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
She took her case to federal court and won a
jury award of more than $3 million in back
pay and compensatory and punitive
damages. Because of caps imposed by the
law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the judge reduced the award, to
$360,000. But the United States Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta,
overturned the verdict entirely. It ruled that
Ms. Ledbetter had no case because she could
not show any intentional discrimination in
the 180 days before she complained to the
employment commission.
Other federal appeals courts, including those
here and in New York, disagree with that
analysis, as does the E.E.O.C. The agency
has long applied what is known as the
"paycheck accrual rule," under which each
pay period of uncorrected discrimination is
seen as a fresh incident of discrimination. So
although the 180-day limit applies to
discrete actions like a discriminatory refusal
to hire or failure to promote, it does not, in
the view of the federal agency charged with
administering the statute, prevent lawsuits
for the continuing effects of past
discrimination in pay.
But the Bush administration has disavowed
the commission's position. After the court
agreed in June to hear Ms. Ledbetter's
appeal, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company Inc., No. 05-1074, the

administration entered the case on the
company's behalf.
Irving L. Gornstein, an assistant to the
solicitor general, argued that "employees
who allow the 180-day period to pass may
not years later, and even at the end of their
careers, challenge their current paychecks on
the grounds that they are the result of a
number
of
discrete,
individually
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discriminatory pay decisions that occurred
long ago."

thing." It could take "even a year for her to
find out," he said.

When Justice Antonin Scalia asked, "Why
should we listen to the solicitor general
rather than the E.E.O.C.?" Mr. Gomstein
acknowledged that the commission "has
taken a different position," one that he said
was based on a misunderstanding of a
Supreme Court precedent.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. appeared
the most skeptical, several times raising the
question of how employers could shoulder
the burden of defending long-ago pay
decisions.

Ms. Ledbetter's lawyer, Kevin K. Russell,
said it was often difficult for employees to
learn that their pay was discriminatory.
Employees who receive regular raises, Mr.
Russell said, may well not realize that the
raises were smaller than they should have
been.
"It's only when the disparity persists," he
said, "when the different treatment accrues
again and again and the overall disparity in
the wages increases, that the employee has
some reasonable basis to think that it's not
natural variation in the pay decisions but
actually intentional discrimination."
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer appeared most sympathetic to Mr.
Breyer
Justice
argument.
Russell's
commented at one point that "there will be
of
significant
number
a
probably
circumstances where a woman is being paid
less, and all she does is for the last six
months get her paychecks and she doesn't
really know it because pay is a complicated

"It could be 40 years, right?" Chief Justice
Roberts asked Mr. Russell, adding, "I mean,
if it happened once 20 years ago, you have a
case that you can bring" under the plaintiff s
analysis.
The Goodyear lawyer, Glen D. Nager,
noting that the statute required proof of
intentional discrimination, said the basic
point was that "no one at Goodyear took
Miss Ledbetter's sex into account" in the
salary she was paid in the 180 days before
she filed her complaint.
The law does not permit the accusation "that
there is discrimination today merely because
there was discrimination yesterday," Mr.
Nager said, adding that when the "filing
period passes and no charge is brought, the
employer is entitled to treat that past act as if
it was a lawful act."
Justice David H. Souter asked, "Is that so
even if they know it was in fact originally an
unlawful act?"
"Yes," Mr. Nager replied.
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LOOKING BACK: GONZALES V. CARHART
"High Court Upholds Curb on Abortion"
The Washington Post

April 19, 2007
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court broke new ground
yesterday in upholding federal restrictions
on abortion, with President Bush's two
appointees joining a court majority that said
Congress was exercising its license to
"promote respect for life, including the life
of the unborn."
The court's 5 to 4 decision upholding the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act passed by
Congress in 2003 marked the first time
justices have agreed that a specific abortion
procedure could be banned. It was also the
first time since the landmark Roe v. Wade
decision of January 1973 that justices
approved an abortion restriction that did not
contain an exception for the health of the
woman. It does, however, provide an
exception to save the woman's life.
"The government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound
respect for the life within the woman,"
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote. He said
the ban on the controversial method for
ending a midterm pregnancy is valid
because other abortion procedures are still
available.
Kennedy was joined by Bush's appointeesChief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr.-and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Kennedy announced the decision before a
hushed chamber, and while his opinion did
not overturn Roe or the court's subsequent

decisions, yesterday's ruling marked an
unmistakable shift.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg acknowledged
as much moments later, when she solemnly
read a statement from the bench explaining
her dissent.
The majority opinion, she told a stone-silent
courtroom, "cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to chip away at
a right declared again and again by this
court-and with increasing comprehension
of its centrality to women's lives."
The federal law bans a procedure used in a
limited number of midterm abortions, but
the court's decision will probably have an
immediate effect on U.S. politics and
lawmaking.
The 2008 presidential candidates split along
party lines in their reaction-Democrats had
angry words for the court and Republicans
were generally supportive. Activists on both
sides of the issue predicted that the decision
will encourage antiabortion state legislatures
to pass laws not only adding new restrictions
but looking to challenge Roe itself.
Bush said in a statement that the decision
"affirms that the Constitution does not stand
in the way of the people's representatives
enacting laws reflecting the compassion and
humanity of America."
He added: "The Supreme Court's decision is
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an affirmation of the progress we have made
over the past six years in protecting human
dignity and upholding the sanctity of life."
The decision is especially significant
because the court had rejected in 2000 a
Nebraska law aimed at banning what
opponents call "partial birth" abortion,
because it lacked an exception for
preserving the health of the woman. That
five-member majority included all of
yesterday's dissenters, plus then-Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
With Alito taking her place and approving
the federal ban, the majority has shifted.
Antiabortion activists now see the makings
of a court they have longed for.

method most often used, in which the
woman is placed under anesthesia, her
cervix is dilated and the fetus is removed in
pieces.
But some physicians say that in certain
circumstances, it is better for a woman to
undergo intact dilation and evacuation,
which they say carries a lower risk of
bleeding, infections and permanent injury.
It involves partly delivering the fetus and
then crushing the skull to make removal
easier. It is this procedure that Congress
made a crime. Opponents say it is a form of
infanticide, because the fetus could be viable
at the time. It made doctors who perform
such surgery subject to up to two years in
prison.

"It is just a matter of time before the
infamous Roe v.

Wade . . . will also be

struck down by the court," predicted
Roberta Combs, president of the Christian
Coalition of America.
"The impact of Sandra Day O'Connor's
retirement is painfully clear," said Nancy
Northrup, president of the Center for
Reproductive Rights, adding: "It took just a
year for this new court to overturn three
decades of established constitutional law."
The ruling capped an aggressive campaign
on the part of antiabortion activists to outlaw
the procedure known as an "intact dilation
and evacuation."
As many as 90 percent of abortions are
performed within the first three months of
pregnancy, and in most cases a physician
vacuums out the embryonic tissue. Those
procedures are not affected by the federal
law.
Later in pregnancy, some type of surgery is
required. Dilation and evacuation is the

The law has never taken effect. Lower
courts, after conducting lengthy trials and
considering previous
Supreme
Court
decisions, declared it unconstitutional.
To write the opinion in his new court's most
important abortion decision to date, Roberts
chose Kennedy, who has been in the
majority in each of the court's 5 to 4
decisions this term.
Kennedy was in the majority that reaffirmed
the basic rights in Roe in 1992's Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pa. v. Casey. He
dissented in 2000's Stenberg v. Carhart,

which struck down Nebraska's law.
While opponents of the federal ban said it
was similar to Nebraska's law, Kennedy
went to lengths to show it "departs in
material ways." He said that it is specific
enough to instruct doctors on exactly which
procedures are allowed, and that it applies
only when a physician "deliberately and
intentionally"
performs
the
banned
procedure.
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The opinion left open the possibility that a
doctor or woman could bring a narrowly
tailored challenge to the law, a prospect that
abortion rights advocates discounted.
Kennedy wrote that the procedure is "laden
with the power to devalue human life."
In her stinging dissent, Ginsburg said the
court's "hostility to the right Roe and Casey
secured is not concealed."
She wrote that the answer to Kennedy's
concern that women would regret
uninformed decisions to undergo the
procedure is to require physicians to give
them more information.

right to make an autonomous choice. . . .
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions
about women's place in the family and
under the Constitution-ideas that have long
since been discredited," Ginsburg wrote.
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stephen G.
Breyer, David H. Souter and John Paul
Stevens, noted that the court is "differently
composed" than the last time it considered
abortion restrictions. She added: "A decision
so at odds with our jurisprudence should not
have staying power."
The combined cases are Gonzales v. Carhart
et al. and Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
FederationofAmerica.

"Instead, the court deprives women of the
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"Good May Yet Come"
National Review

April 24, 2007
Hadley Arkes
Justice Kennedy has given new meaning to
the aphorism that "anything worth doing ...
is worth doing badly." The decision

an "undue burden" on a woman seeking
abortion.

Wednesday in Gonzales v. Carhartseems to

Beneath the Surface

have set off chains of euphoria-and
alarm-in the land. The pro-lifers have
shown a joy that is surely out of scale with
the narrow, constricted opinion that sprang
from the mean nature of Justice Kennedy.
And the pro-choicers, wringing their hands,
seem not to have noticed that Kennedy has
so cabined the approval of this federal law
on partial-birth abortion that the "abortion
liberty" seems to have been placed safely
beyond challenge. As Kennedy was careful
to assure his audience, the abortionist who
goes merrily on his way dismembering a
child-or, as he put it, the one who
"disarticulates [a fetus] at the neck, in effect
decapitating it"-is safely insulated from
any danger of prosecution: The abortionist
simply needs to avoid that indelicate matter
of having a substantial part of the child
dangling outside the body of the pregnant
woman as he inserts a scissor into the skull
of the child or finds another way of killing
it.
Kennedy went out of his way to sound again
the themes in the Casey case of 1992, in
affirming Roe v. Wade. "We assume," he
said, "the following principles for the
purpose of this opinion"-and then went on
to list propositions that no one else among
his colleagues in the majority is likely to
accept. For example: that before the point of
"viability" a state may not prohibit a woman
from making a decision to "terminate her
pregnancy." Or that the state may not place

During the oral argument on the case in
November, the solicitor general, Paul
Clement, argued that the bill on partial-birth
abortion could be sustained without
challenging in any degree the holding in Roe
v. Wade. We took that as something he just
had to say, and on the surface it was true.
But what we sensed, beneath the surface,
was that a decision upholding the law would
mark the beginning of the end for Roe. The
judges would be saying, in effect, that they
were ready to start weighing seriously many
limited restrictions on abortion, emanating
from legislatures in the states. And in a
chain those measures would surely come,
step by step.
Now Justice Kennedy insists, in the same
way, that the bill does not diminish Roe v.
Wade, and we wonder whether we should
discount that flat assertion in the same way
we did Clement's. But Kennedy, in control
of the opinion, has acted precisely to
foreclose virtually all piecemeal challenges
to Roe. He has made it clear that the killing
of the unborn can proceed almost wholly
unchecked, as long as the grisly acts of
dismembering or poisoning are taking place
solely in the womb.
And yet, as he sought to mark off with
exquisite precision the narrow dimensions of
his judgments, he also took some
remarkable steps to keep Dr. Carhart and his
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friends from coming into federal court again
next week, with new rationales, which can
tie up the bill once again. It may be a narrow
decision, but Kennedy, to his credit, has
taken some decisive steps to insure that this
decision will stick.
Allowing for Restrictions
In a piece last January in First Things ("The
Kennedy Court") I anticipated that Kennedy
would try to resolve the case in the most
limited way by simply rejecting the
decisions in the lower courts to strike down
a law on abortion in a "facial challenge." In
most cases, a facial challenge will be
accepted only when there appear to be no
conceivable circumstances in which the law
could be constitutional. With laws on
abortion, however, the situation is inverted:
The federal judges have been willing to
enjoin the enforcement of these laws in
facial challenges if there is any conceivable
circumstance in which the law might be
unconstitutional. Kennedy has now made it
clear that this inversion of the law has been
ended, and that is no small point: It means
that laws on abortion will be allowed to
work, to have their effect; that they will not
be struck down flippantly on the basis of
airy speculations offered by people who
object to having abortions restricted. The
laws would not be challenged then unless
there is a concrete case of someone actually
denied an abortion that could clearly be
tested.
My own apprehension was that the Dr.
Carharts in the country, or the agents of
Planned Parenthood, would simply come
into court again with any of the rationales
that have worked in the past. Judges like
Richard Kopf in Nebraska have already
shown themselves altogether willing to
credit any argument that is offered by the
challengers. Most likely, I thought, the
charge would be heard again that the law is

fatally "vague." But Kennedy moved
decisively to foreclose those kinds of
challenges. He argued that there is nothing
vague about the definition of the partialbirth abortion. When the doctors who
perform this procedure are intending to
dilate the cervix and bring most of the body
of the child outside the birth canal, they
must know that they are intending this.
Kennedy also foreclosed the move to claim
the need for a "health exception" to the law.
The law already contained an exception for
the cases, exceedingly rare, when a woman's
life would be in danger. And if a partialbirth procedure did not seem "indicated,"
the federal court of appeals in New York
had noted that the abortion could take place
in the ways now common or conventional;
so there were other, safe methods still
available. The claim that partial-birth
abortions were sometimes the safer form of
abortion had been found, by Judge Casey in
New York, to be a claim wholly speculative
and theoretical, without any evidence
offered in support.
Kennedy confirmed what I had written last
January: that he was willing to accept an "as
applied" challenge to the law: A pregnant
woman with cancer might argue that it is
especially risky for her to have instruments
introduced into the womb. She might
contend then the partial-birth abortion would
be the safer method for her. But that kind of
case is not certain to arise, or arise very
soon. And Kennedy has been clear on the
point that the law itself does not have to be
overturned because it may not apply aptly in
all conceivable cases.
The Next Steps
Then what kind of "good" may spring from
a decision so limited? The decision in
Carhart reaffirms yet again Roe v. Wade,

but something else may be at work beneath
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the surface. There is a certain dynamism that
comes into play when legislators are allowed
to take hold of the matter again. About thirty
states had passed laws on partial-birth
abortion before they were invalidated in
Stenberg v. Carhart in 2000. The states can

now pass their own version of the federal
bill, just tracking the language of that bill.
That is all good practice. And once
legislators get used to legislating again,
other things may readily follow. Kennedy
pointed out that the Court in Casey had
upheld the requirements of informed
consent. The legislatures can now start
enacting those provisions again-most
notably, they may provide for the use of
sonograms to assure that the pregnant
woman has something more than a vague
impression of the child she is carrying. The
viewing of a sonogram could be required, or
it may simply be offered in the interest of
letting a woman know what she is choosing.
In India, the use of sonograms has
penetrated even poor areas, and brought the
beginnings of a demographic crisis: Families
anxious for sons have been altogether too
willing to abort female babies. And given
the sensibility of the time, the disposition of
the government in India has not been to ban
the killing of babies based on their gender,
but rather to forbid clinics to make the
information available. Of all things, we are
hearing denunciations of these multinational
capitalist firms, like General Electric, which
do such underhanded things as to produce
the equipment that gives people such
information about their unborn children.
The next plausible move, then, is to bring
back the scheme of banning any abortion
performed on the basis of the sex of the
child. My hunch is that that position, too,
would command a large level of support in
the public, comparable to the level of
support for banning partial-birth abortion,

and it too would recruit people who call
themselves "pro-choice."
But if legislators could take that modest
move of banning abortions on the basis of
sex, the public mind could be prepared for
reasoning about the next step: barring
abortions based on the disability of the child.
In surveys in the past, more than half of the
public were opposed to aborting a child if
the child was likely to be born deaf. The
opposition seemed to be invariant by the
period of gestation. My own reading was
that, if people thought it was wrong to kill
someone because of his deafness, they did
not think that the wrong varied with the age
of the victim.
Here the legislatures could invoke the body
of their laws dealing with discriminations
against the disabled. And then perhaps they
could get to the point of banning abortions
after the onset of a beating heart. One survey
recently found that about 62 percent of the
public would support that kind of restriction.
It is worth noticing, too, that in none of
these cases except that of the beating heart
would the legislation start offering
protections based on trimesters or the age of
the child. There would be no need to play
along, and confirm, the perverse fiction that
the child becomes more human somewhere
in this scale of age, or that it is legitimate to
kill smaller people with reasons less
compelling than the reasons we would need
in killing larger people.
The Effects of an Impulse

In the most curious way, then, a decision so
narrow, so begrudging and limited, may
invite a series of measures simple and
unthreatening, but the kinds of measures that
gather force with each move. We need to
remind ourselves that we have seen such
things before. We may recall, in that vein,
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the Emancipation Proclamation. It was
limited, as a war measure. For Lincoln did
not have the authority to strip people of what
was then their lawful property in slaves. The
Proclamation freed only those slaves held in
areas that were in rebellion against the
government. It did not cover the slaves held
in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri.

Carhart, was severely limited
and
diminished in its practical effects. But
rightly or wrongly, there may be a sense that
the decision opens the doors now; that it
invites legislators and political men and
women to deliver themselves from the reign
of judges, and set their hands to this task
once again.

And yet . . . it was understood instantly and

widely in the country that this measure had
an "anti-slavery impulse."
The decision on Wednesday, in Gonzales v.

Hadley Arkes is the Ney Professor of
Jurisprudence at Amherst College, and one
of the authors of the Born-Alive Infants'
ProtectionAct.
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"'Partial-Birth' Cases Test Abortion Rights' Limits"
USA Today

October 30, 2006
Joan Biskupic
NEW YORK-It was just after Mother's
Day in May 2003 when Ilene Jaroslaw,
about four months pregnant, learned that the
fetus she was carrying had a fatal spinal cord
and brain defect.
Jaroslaw, then a mother of two, says she was
devastated but decided immediately to have
an abortion. Because she wanted to have
another child-and because she had had two
previous cesarean-section deliveries and an
unrelated surgery on her uterus-she agreed
with her doctor's recommendation to
undergo a procedure that would do as little
damage as possible to the uterus.
"There was absolutely no hope at all," says
Jaroslaw, a 43-year-old lawyer in New York
City who talked with USA TODA Y about her
experience. "This baby was not going to
survive long."
For Jaroslaw, having what Congress and
critics of the procedure call a "partial-birth"
abortion was an intensely personal health
decision that led to a happier ending: In
2004, she got pregnant again and delivered a
healthy baby girl.
The episode also made Jaroslaw a symbol of
the ongoing debate over whether Congress'
effort to ban "partial-birth" abortion violates
a woman's right to end a pregnancy-a
question that goes before the Supreme Court
on Nov. 8. Under a federal law passed by
Congress in October 2003 and tied up in the
courts ever since, Jaroslaw could not legally
have undergone the procedure because her
life was not in danger.

the
for having
reasons
Jaroslaw's
procedure-to preserve her ability to have
more children by avoiding the hemorrhaging
and perforation of the uterus that can occur
with other abortion methods-would not
have cleared the legal hurdle set by
Congress.
That's partly why the pair of cases that come
before the Supreme Court next week are
widely viewed as a major test of efforts to
restrict abortion. The issue is not the
fundamental question of whether abortion
should be legal, first established by the
court's ruling in Roe v. Wade in 1973.
Instead, the cases test the Republican-led
Congress' power to limit the reach of that
ruling by restricting medical options for
women.
The law is called the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003. Lawyers for the two
challengers now before the Supreme Court,
Eve Gartner of Planned Parenthood and
Priscilla Smith of the Center for
Reproductive Rights, note that there is no
medical procedure known by that name and
contend that the phrase is needlessly
offensive and misleading.
After O'Connor

On a more technical level, the cases put on
exhibit dueling medical opinions over
whether certain second-trimester abortion
procedures are ever necessary.
For the court, the cases-Gonzales i.
PlannedParenthoodFederationofAmerica
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and Gonzales v. Carhart-represent the first
significant test of whether abortion rights in
America will change now that moderate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a key vote in
favor of such rights, has retired.

dismembering the fetus in the uterus by
using forceps and other instruments. In the
intact method, a doctor then suctions out the
fetus' brain to collapse the head and allow
delivery.

Six years ago, when the justices struck down
state bans on "partial-birth" abortions
because the laws did not include exceptions
for when a woman's health was at risk,
O'Connor cast the decisive fifth vote on the
ideologically divided, nine-member court.
Last term, she was replaced by Samuel
Alito, a more conservative judge who, as a
member of a lower court, voted for abortion
restrictions that O'Connor later rejected.

The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists has reported that such
methods increasingly are viewed as the
safest abortion procedures for the second
trimester of pregnancy, roughly the 13th to
26th weeks of gestation.

The federal ban-which is similar to the
state laws voided by the high court six years
ago-has been rejected by three sets of U.S.
district courts and appeals courts. The lower
courts said Congress' ban violates women's
rights to abortion because it lacks a health
exception and is too vaguely written.
The lower court judgments conflict with
Congress' assertion that "partial-birth"
procedures are never the best option to
preserve a woman's health.

Second-trimester procedures account for
about 11% of the estimated 1.3 million
abortions performed in the USA each year,
according to the Guttmacher Institute, a
research group that supports abortion rights.
It's unclear, however, how many of those
abortions are done with the intact D&E or
D&X methods because no one keeps a
precise count.
The Bush administration, in defending the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, has
argued in court papers that Congress had
solid grounds to believe that any procedure
in which a doctor "partially delivers a
(living) fetus intact . . . and then kills the

fetus" is never medically necessary.
"This is an excellent case to test the
direction of the court on abortion rights,"
Georgetown University law professor Randy
Barnett says.
Abortion rights groups such as Planned
Parenthood say Jaroslaw and thousands of
women like her personify the need to
preserve the second-trimester procedures
known in the medical community as "intact
dilation and evacuation" (or intact D&E)
and "dilation and extraction" (D&X).
The methods involve dilating a woman's
cervix to allow most of the fetus to emerge
into the vagina intact, rather than

The government is appealing a ruling by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in
a case begun by Planned Parenthood, and a
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
8th Circuit, in a case started by Nebraska
physician LeRoy Carhart.
"Resembles Infanticide"
U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement has told
the justices that the "gruesome" procedure
"resembles infanticide."
Clement has said Congress' ban is not
are
there
because
unconstitutional
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alternative methods of second-trimester
abortions that would remain legal. Those
include a standard D&E procedure in which
a doctor dismembers the fetus in the uterus,
and another method known as "induction,"
in which a woman is given drugs that cause
her to go into labor and deliver the fetus.
Groups filing briefs in support of the
administration
include the American
Association of Pro Life Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. The association argues that
such alternative methods are medically
appropriate even for women such as
Jaroslaw with uterine scarring from a prior
cesarean section or other uterine surgery.

fetuses with severe anomalies would benefit
from the intact D&E procedure.
"Even for women whose health condition is
not compromised, intact D&E is a
significantly safer method of abortion,"
Gartner says.
Clement acknowledges in his filings that
physicians disagree over the necessity for
the intact D&E and D&X methods.
However, he insists that the justices must
defer to Congress' finding that "there is
substantial evidence . . . that partial-birth

abortion is never" medically necessary.
"A Nightmare"

Elizabeth Shadigian, a physician affiliated
with the University of Michigan's medical
school who is president of the pro-life
group, says there is little evidence to suggest
that "partial-birth" methods are better in
preserving a woman's health.
"There is almost no data on it," Shadigian
says. "It's not good enough that someone
believes it's better. You have to prove it's
better." She said women should wait until
studies are done on "the long-term effects of
the procedure."
In court filings, Planned Parenthood counsel
Gartner says that if Congress' ban is allowed
to take effect, doctors would not be able to
give their patients the best medical care.
Physicians would be "chilled
from
continuing to provide these procedures,
(and) women's liberty will be infringed and
their right to choose abortion unduly
burdened," Gartner says.
She also notes that the records from the
cases now before the Supreme Court show
several instances in which women suffering
from serious medical conditions or carrying

Jaroslaw, a graduate of Harvard College and
of Georgetown Law School, says she came
forward to speak about her abortion because
"the issues aren't as simple as people think.
Nobody in advance of a diagnosis says, 'I
want that procedure.' What people want is
proper medical care."
Jaroslaw, a native of Flushing, N.Y.,
married a fellow lawyer, David, in 1992.
She gave birth to a boy in 1997 and a girl in
1999. She says the children were delivered
by cesarean section because she previously
had uterine fibroids and other gynecological
problems.
Jaroslaw says that when she became
pregnant in 2003, everything looked good in
early tests. "So we tell our families I'm
pregnant. We tell friends. A few weeks after
that, I tell people at work. I wasn't worried."
About 17 weeks into the pregnancy,
however, a sonogram showed that part of
her fetus' brain was missing. The diagnosis
was anencephaly, which is fatal.
Jaroslaw

says

she

and

her

husband
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considered abortion the only option. She
says she did not want to wait a full nine
months to deliver a child that would not
survive.
"The idea of being pregnant for so many
more months and having people ask about
the baby, it would have been a nightmare,"
Jaroslaw says. She was also concerned that
her children would be traumatized by having
their sibling be bom and die. She says she
talked with her rabbi, and he supported her
choice.
Jaroslaw says her desire for a third child led
her doctor to recommend that she have the
fetus removed intact, to avoid trauma to her
uterus. "When you've had so many cuts in
the uterus, you want as little instrumentation
and probing around as possible."
Coincidentally, she underwent the abortion
as Congress was debating its ban on
"partial-birth" abortion. "I asked my doctor
whether, if the bill passed, the procedure I
was about to have would be illegal,"
Jaroslaw says. "He said yes."
Bush signed the bill into law in November
2003.
"I'm a family person," Jaroslaw says. "I
don't think I'm unique in my situation,
except that I will talk about it. When I went
back to work, people opened up to me with
their own stories."
How Much Restriction?
So how might the Supreme Court-with
Alito and Chief Justice John Roberts, who
replaced the late William Rehnquist last
year-view the most recent attempt to
restrict abortion?

at a time when few Americans-15% in a
Gallup Poll in May-believe abortion
should be banned in all circumstances. That
poll, typical of nationwide surveys, found
that most Americans (53%) believe that
abortion should be legal but with
restrictions.
The high court generally has reflected that
sentiment since Roe v. Wade, upholding
abortion rights while opening the door to
limits. The current cases could provide a
hint of whether greater restrictions might be
imposed with the new justices on the bench.
However,
a veteran justice-Reagan
appointee Anthony Kennedy-is more likely
to be the key player.
In 2000, when the court voted 5-4 to strike
down state bans on "partial-birth" abortion
that lacked an exception for cases in which a
woman's health was at risk, the bench was
deeply divided. Kennedy, who had provided
a crucial fifth vote in 1992 when the justices
affirmed abortion rights, bitterly dissented in
2000. He said government should be free to
outlaw the "abhorrent" procedure and that
states had a legitimate "concern for the life
of the unborn and for the partially born."
This time, a big question will be whether
Kennedy, a frequent swing vote on the
court, still supports a ban on the procedure
without a health exception.
If he does, the court's reshaped conservative
wing-Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, along with newcomers Roberts and
Alito-could be positioned to uphold
Congress'
ban. Scalia and Thomas
consistently have voted against abortion
rights. Roberts' record as a lawyer in the
Reagan and first Bush administrations and
Alito's rulings as a lower court judge
suggest that they also are likely to take a
limited view of such rights.

The "partial-birth" cases arrive at the court
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LOOKDNG BACK: HEIN V. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION
"Justices Quash Suit over Funds for Faith Groups"
The Washington Post
June 26, 2007
William Branigin
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
federal taxpayers cannot challenge the
constitutionality of White House efforts to
help religious groups obtain government
funding for their social programs, handing a
victory to President Bush's faith-based
initiatives program.
In a 5 to 4 decision, the court blocked a
lawsuit by a Wisconsin-based group of
atheists and agnostics against the White
House
Office
of
Faith-Based
and
Community Initiatives. The court ruled that
the suit, by the Freedom From Religion
Foundation and three of its taxpaying
members, could not go forward because
ordinary taxpayers lack legal standing to
challenge executive branch expenditures.
The ruling reversed a January 2006 decision
in favor of the foundation by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 7th Circuit.
Liberal groups blasted the court's decision
in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation as a setback for the First
Amendment and a sop to the religious right,
while the White House and religious
conservatives hailed it as a major triumph
for Bush's program.
The foundation had complained that parts of
the program favored religious groups over
secular ones, violating the establishment
clause of the First Amendment, which says
in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."
The

administration

argued

that

the

foundation's taxpayer plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue because the faith-based
initiatives office was not specifically funded
by Congress.
In an opinion joined by Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote
that "the payment of taxes is generally not
enough to establish standing to challenge an
action taken by the federal government." If
it were, and every taxpayer could sue to
challenge any government expenditure, the
federal courts would be relegated to "general
complaint bureaus," he wrote.
Alito's opinion stopped short of repudiating
a 1968 Supreme Court ruling in Flast v.
Cohen, in which the court recognized a
narrow exception to the rule against federal
taxpayer standing in an establishment-clause
case.
While denouncing the decision, groups
supporting separation of church and state
took heart that only two justices favored
overturning Flast. This means that most
church-state lawsuits can proceed, they said.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas concurred in the judgment but held
that Flast should be overturned because it
has spawned "notoriously inconsistent"
rulings.
Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
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G. Breyer. Yesterday's decision "closes the
door on these taxpayers because the
Executive Branch, and not the Legislative

Branch, caused their injury," he wrote. "I
see no basis for this distinction in either
logic or precedent."
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"Court Hears Arguments Linking Right to Sue
and Spending on Religion"
The New York Times

March 1, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The question for the
Supreme Court on Wednesday was a
jurisdictional one: whether taxpayers who
object to the way the White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
spends its money can get into federal court
to make their case.
Whether the office or its programs actually
run afoul of the Constitution was not before
the justices.
But any notion that this jurisdictional
question was the sort of arcane, technical
issue that only a law professor could love
was quickly dispelled by the intensity of the
argument, one of the liveliest of the term.
The fast-paced hour ended with the clear
impression that the Roberts court will soon
put its own stamp on the law of taxpayer
standing, with potentially significant
implications for the relationship between
government and religion.
The real question by the end of the argument
was whether a majority would be content
simply to scale back a Warren court
precedent that allows taxpayers to challenge
the use of public money for religious
purposes or whether the court would
disavow the precedent altogether and keep
such suits out of federal court.
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement revealed
his hand slowly, bringing his argument to a
pinpoint landing at the precise close of a
three-minute rebuttal. If the justices could
not see their way to applying the precedent
narrowly, Mr. Clement said, the court

should simply overrule it. "If something has
to go in this area," he said, "I think it's an
easy choice."
Under either option the administration
advocated, the court would reject a suit that
the federal appeals court in Chicago
reinstated last year, a challenge to
conferences that Bush administration
officials have held to advise religious groups
on how to apply for federal grants as part of
the effort to bolster the role of such groups
in social service programs.
The plaintiff is the Freedom From Religion
Foundation Inc. of Madison, Wis., which
advocates strict separation of church and
state. In a complaint filed initially in 2004,
the organization argued that officials who
convened and addressed the conferences
used congressionally appropriated money in
a way that "violated the fundamental
principle of the separation of church and
state."
Under the ordinary doctrine of "standing,"
which defines who may bring a suit, people
who object to a government policy but who
cannot claim a concrete injury from that
policy have no right to sue. But in a 1968
decision, the court carved out an exception
for religion cases. The case, Flast v. Cohen,
gave taxpayers standing to challenge federal
laws that authorized expenditures for
purposes alleged to violate the First
Amendment
prohibition
against
the
"establishment" of religion.
The administration position in the case
argued on Wednesday, Hein v. Freedom
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From Religion FoundationInc., No. 06-157,

is that the Flast decision should be
understood to include two limitations. First,
Mr. Clement said, taxpayers should be
limited to
challenging Congressional
statutes, not executive branch programs like
that in this suit. Second, the solicitor general
argued, taxpayers should be able to
challenge only spending outside the
government, not internal spending like that
cited by the Freedom From Religion
Foundation.
Did that mean, Justice Antonin Scalia asked
Mr. Clement, taxpayers could challenge a
statute that gave money to outside groups to
build churches, but not one that directed the
government to build its own church?
It was a "horrible hypothetical," Mr.
Clement replied, but Justice Scalia had
understood him correctly: taxpayers should
not have standing to challenge "an internal
government church."
Andrew J. Pincus, representing the
foundation, told the court there was "no
basis for drawing the arbitrary lines that the
government suggests." The Flast decision
did not include such limitations, he said.
Mr. Clement was unruffled as the justices
tossed various hypothetical questions his
way. Could a taxpayer challenge a law that
commemorated the Pilgrims "by building a
government church at Plymouth Rock where
we will have the regular worship in the
Puritan religion?" Justice Stephen G. Breyer
asked.

particular sect. "Nobody could challenge
it?" he asked.
"There would not be taxpayer standing," Mr.
Clement replied.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. observed
that members of other denominations would
not need taxpayer standing and that as
victims of government discrimination, they
could sue under ordinary principles of
standing. This was one of the times the chief
justice intervened to make the point that in
practical application the government's
position was perhaps not as extreme as it
sounded.
His interventions in the other side's
argument seemed to have the opposite goal,
rejecting Mr. Pincus's effort to depict his
client's position as modest. When Mr.
Pincus said taxpayers should not be
permitted to challenge merely "incidental"
spending, the chief justice said that was no
real limitation because it would ensnare the
courts in deciding "whether the activity
you're challenging is incidental or not."
Mr. Pincus denied that this initial inquiry
would make much work for the courts. For
example, he began, "if someone's claim is
that people in the White House have five
meetings in the course of a year that they're
upset about-"
Chief Justice Roberts cut him off, saying,
"Well, then, five meetings isn't enough.
How many?"
"What about 10?" Justice Scalia offered.

"I would say no," Mr. Clement said.
"Twenty?" the chief justice asked.
Justice Breyer persisted, asking about a law
requiring the government to build churches
"all over America" dedicated to one

"We'll litigate it," Justice Scalia said. "We'll
figure out a number eventually, I'm sure."
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For Mr. Clement, the most helpful hand was
that of Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. As the
solicitor general batted back tricky
hypothetical questions, Justice Alito asked
him whether the lines he was drawing
"make a lot of sense in an abstract sense" or

were "the best that can be done" under
existing precedents.
"The latter, Justice Alito," Mr. Clement said,
evoking laughter. "I appreciate the
question."
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"Bagel Breakfast"
Slate

February 28, 2007
Dahlia Lithwick
Of all the crazy ironies in modem churchstate jurisprudence, none is more vexing
than the notion that some fundamentally
religious ideas and symbols have been so
completely drained by time or overuse of
religious significance that they are now
essentially secular. The word God on coins
and the Christmas in trees are oft-touted
examples. And at argument in this
morning's case, Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation, we discover that the

next casualty of lost religious symbolism is,
well, the bagel.
In 2001 President Bush established the
White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives, whose purpose was
to "level the playing field" between religious
and secular social-service providers. The
government hosted a bunch of conferences
that helped such religious groups compete
for federal grant money. The Freedom From
Religion
Foundation
likened
those
conferences to "revival meetings" and sued,
claiming that the government was using
taxpayer dollars to favor sectarian groups, in
violation of the First Amendment's bar on
state "establishment" of religion.
Now you may be thinking: "Hey, wait a
second. If being a taxpayer means I get to
sue the government for every lame thing it
does, there are some highways/health
clinics/wars I'd rather to go to court about."
To which my answer would be the
doctrinally important, if yawn-worthy, "You
don't have standing as a taxpayer to sue the
government over every little thing that
aggrieves you." Nevertheless, a narrow
exception has been carved out when the

state pushes religion. That you can sue over,
thanks to the 1968 Warren Court case Flast
v. Cohen, which allowed taxpayers to sue
the government for spending funds on
religion. Whether the atheists can squeeze
through this mouse hole and into court is the
only question today. No one has yet
determined whether Bush's faith-based
program in fact violated the Establishment
Clause.
The federal district court ruled against the
atheists. The 7thCircuit Court of Appeals, in
an opinion authored by the prodigious Judge
Richard Posner, determined that the
taxpayers had standing to sue. The
alternative, Posner said, could allow crazy
amounts of unchecked executive-branch
spending on religion.
Solicitor General Paul Clement represents
the Bush administration, and he has the
misfortune of being at the court on one of
Justice Antonin Scalia's all-time recordbreaking "laugh-episode" days. Scalia
appears to have forgotten that he is largely
on Clement's side in this fight. Perhaps
purely in the service of the laughter gods, he
gives the SG a pretty hard time.
Clement opens by explaining that the Flast
taxpayer exception is a narrow one that has
only been narrowed further by the cases that
followed. He claims that only if the
government gives funds directly to outside
religious groups could taxpayers sue.
Scalia asks why Congress can't pass a
statute authorizing the construction of a
church, if, as Clement insists, allowing the
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government to build a church itself would be
OK? Justice David Souter agrees that the
test should be a Madisonian one: Has the
state itself spent "thruppence" on religion?
He rolls the R's in thruppence, thus getting
as close as a New Englander gets to gleeful.
Justice Stephen Breyer offers a hypothetical
in which the Congress passes a statute
authorizing the building of a massive church
at Plymouth Rock. Does a California
taxpayer have standing to sue, he asks?
Clement says no; Breyer comes back with,
"I'm just trying to think of something even
more amazing than what I just thought of."
What if, he asks, all over America, in every
city, town, and hamlet, the government
builds Pilgrim churches? Chief Justice John
Roberts replies that any religious group that
felt excluded from that program would still
have standing to sue, but not "just because
he was paying taxes."
Justice Samuel Alito has to jump in to save
Clement when the Pilgrim hypo becomes
too silly. He asks whether the line Clement
is drawing "makes sense in an abstract sense
or whether this is just the best that can be
done with the body of precedent the court
has handed down in this area?" When
Clement grins, "The latter, Justice Alito,"
Scalia snaps back with, "Well why didn't
you say so? And here I was trying to make
sense of what you're saying!"
When most of the justices are treating the
key precedent as a punch line, it's a good
clue they are preparing to pull the plug.
Breyer tries to defend the Flast exception
with the rationale that people become "real
upset when they see other religions
receiving government money to build a
church." Which prompts Scalia to recall that
he's actually on Clement's side after all. He
purrs, "So getting upset is now a
constitutionally valid basis on which to
bring lawsuits?" Breyer looks annoyed.

Andrew J. Pincus is representing the
Wisconsin-based Freedom From Religion
Foundation, and the laugh episodes only
ramp up on his beat. Chief Justice Roberts
opens with a query as to why taxpayers can't
sue the court's marshal for standing up at
each argument session and "saying 'God
save the court."' Alito asks Pincus to show
him how striking down the administration's
faith-based program would reduce anyone's
tax rates. Then Scalia asks whether spending
federal tax dollars on Air Force One violates
the constitution if the president travels in it
to attend a church service.
Justice Anthony Kennedy performs some
feat of acrobatic refraining by claiming this
is all a speech issue somehow. He does
make it clear where he ultimately stands,
however, when he suggests that it's "unduly
intrusive" for the courts to "tell the president
he can't talk to specific groups about better
using their talents."
Pincus tries to lay out a clear test: Is the sum
the government spends on religion
identifiable and more than incidental? But
Alito, Scalia, and Roberts just keep poking
him with the crazy hypos. Which eventually
leads Scalia (who is on some kind of
comedic crack today) to wonder whether
there would be standing for taxpayers to
challenge a presidential directive that would
only fund the bagels for evangelical prayer
breakfasts. Cross talk. Laughter. Then
Scalia, with only a hint of an accent,
wonders if there is taxpayer standing
because, after all, "What could be worse
than not buying bagels for the Jewish prayer
breakfast?"
Pincus sits down.
Now, I could watch Paul Clement do twominute rebuttals until the cows come home.
He's just that good. And this morning is no
exception. By the time he sits down, he
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seems to have convinced a majority of the
court that there's no harm in obliterating the
taxpayer exception for religion cases
because suits can still be filed on other
grounds. And that if the court has to put a
torch to Flast in order to preserve the
constitutional well-being of the rest of the

universe, well, hey. Some court watchers
expect this to be a close case. It didn't look
close today. But the enduring lesson of Hein
may just be that the law is so confusing that
it's unclear whether the constitutional
violation is the hypothetical prayer
breakfasts or just the hypothetical bagels.
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LOOKING BACK: RUMSFELD V. FAIR
"Court Upholds Military Recruiting Law"
USA Today
March 7, 2006
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON-The U.S. government
can withhold funds from universities that
protest the Pentagon's ban on gay men and
lesbians by denying military recruiters
access to campuses and students, the
Supreme Court ruled Monday.
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice
John Roberts, the court rejected arguments
from a group of law schools that claimed a
federal law that allows the government to
withhold funding in such situations violates
colleges' First Amendment rights of free
speech and free association.
known as the Solomon
The law,
Amendment for its original sponsor in 1994,
U.S. Rep. Gerald Solomon, R-N.Y., allows
the U.S. government to deny funding to
colleges that do not give military recruiters
the same access and campus privileges that
are given to other recruiters.
Most law schools that host recruiters insist
that they sign a statement saying they do not
discriminate based on sexual orientation.
The law school consortium that brought the
case, the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, said requiring schools to
accept military recruiters undermined their
opposition to bias and forced them to adopt
a message they oppose. The military's
"don't ask, don't tell" policy bars anyone
who reveals his or her homosexuality from
serving in the armed forces.
The case was not a test of the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy. It drew attention in part

because it became part of the national debate
over gay civil rights and arrived at the court
as the Pentagon was becoming increasingly
aggressive in its wartime recruiting.
The American Association of University
Professors, the American Civil Liberties
Union and several universities filed briefs
urging the justices to uphold a lower-court
ruling that said the Solomon Amendment
wrongly compelled schools to send, and
subsidize, a message of discrimination.
In his first major opinion since becoming
chief justice last fall, Roberts wrote,
"Accommodating the military's message
does not affect the law schools' speech,
because the schools are not speaking when
they host interviews
and recruiting
receptions."
Roberts said the basic communications
required of colleges were bulletin board
notices and e-mails. The chief justice said
they hardly could be compared to the kind of
"compelled" government speech that has
been invalidated through the years, such as a
West
Virginia
law
that
required
schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance and to salute the American flag,
or a New Hampshire law that ordered the
state motto-"Live Free or Die"-to be on
license plates.
Joshua Rosenkranz, who represented the law
schools challenging the law, said he did not
expect universities to decline federal funds
so they could block military recruiters.
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However, he said he expects faculty
members and students will accelerate their
public opposition to "don't ask, don't tell."

across. You are going to see banners over
military interview rooms and signs that say,
'Danger: Discriminating recruiters inside."'

"Schools are not going to
money," Rosenkranz said,
billions in college funding are
there are other ways to get

New Justice Samuel Alito did not participate
in the case; he had not yet joined the court
when the case was heard in December.

give up the
noting that
at stake. "But
the message
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"Law Schools Battle U.S. in High Court
Argument over Military Recruiters"
Trial

February 1, 2006
Allison Torres Burtka
Law schools that refuse to assist military
recruiters based on antidiscrimination
principles say they should not be denied
federal funding under the so-called Solomon
Amendment for doing so. The Supreme
Court recently heard oral argument on
whether the statute unconstitutionally
conditions funds on schools' waiving their
First Amendment rights. (Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,

No. 04-1152 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2005).)
The Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR), a coalition of 36 law
schools, filed suit to challenge the Solomon
Amendment in2003. The Third Circuit ruled
in favor of FAIR the next year, reversing a
lower court's decision.
Most law schools have long-held policies
against assisting discriminatory employers,
including the military because of its refusal
to enlist openly gay men and women. Most
schools allowed military recruiters on
campus but did not help them by, for
example, posting bulletins, disseminating
literature, and making appointments for
them.
"This is about law schools with a wellestablished policy saying that they don't
want to be a party in any way to
discrimination against their students," said
Erwin Chemerinsky, a Duke University law
professor and one of the plaintiffs named in
the case.
Enacted in 1994, the Solomon Amendment
initially allowed Department of Defense

funds to be withheld from law schools that
barred military recruiters. It was later
expanded to include funds from other
federal agencies and those given to the
parent university as well as the law school.
After September 11, 2001, law schools were
required to provide recruiters not just access
but access that is "at least equal in quality
and scope" to what they provide other
employers. Most schools threatened with
losing federal funds have since reversed
their policies.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, a New York City
lawyer who argued the case for FAIR, said
the case involves two messages: the
military's message that "Uncle Sam doesn't
want you [if you're openly homosexual]"
and the law schools' message that they
"don't abet those who discriminate."
Rosenkranz said the Solomon Amendment,
by forcing schools to advance the military's
message, compels speech and violates their
freedom to associate. It also infringes on
their right to advance their own message
against discrimination, he said.
At oral argument, Solicitor General Paul
Clement, who argued the case for the
government, said the Solomon Amendment
gives the military "equal opportunity to
recruit from the same pool as other
employers."
But the military demanded not simply equal
treatment but "exceptional treatment-a
demand to be the only discriminatory
employer that a law school will assist,"
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FAIR said in its brief to the Supreme Court.
Rosenkranz noted that under the Solomon
Amendment, the government regulates
speech in ways that advance only the
government's message, which constitutes
viewpoint discrimination.
At oral argument, the Court considered the
practical meaning of "equal access." Justice
John Paul Stevens asked Clement about a
situation in which a law school gives
military recruiters equal access but uses
undergraduate facilities rather than law
school facilities, to send a "separate but
equal" message. Clement said such
treatment is not equal in scope.
Justice Anthony Kennedy asked Clement
whether the statute allows a school to
organize a protest aimed at the recruiters.
Clement said yes; it provides the right to
equal access but not the right to be free of
protest.
Clement noted that law schools could deny
recruiters access for other reasons, such as
the war in Iraq-not just because of
discrimination against homosexuals. Justice
David Souter said that, regardless of the law
school's motive for barring recruiters, the
question of compelled speech-"forcing
them to underwrite your speech, forcing
them to change their message"-remains.
Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. remarked that
no one thinks law schools speak for the
recruiters on campus, so the military's
message is unlikely to be attributed to them.
Clement suggested that a ruling in FAIR's
threaten
actually
might
favor
antidiscrimination protections. Exploring
that point, Justice Stephen Breyer asked
Rosenkranz whether Bob Jones University,
which opposes racial mixing, would have

the same right as law schools to protect its
message and receive federal funding.
Rosenkranz responded that there is "an
enormous
difference
between
antidiscrimination laws and the Solomon
Amendment" and that acts of discrimination
are not entitled to First Amendment
protection.
The decision also could affect the No Child
Left Behind Act, which contains a provision
requiring high schools to provide students'
names and contact information to military
recruiters, said Kent Greenfield, a Boston
College Law School professor and president
of FAIR. "Like the Solomon Amendment,
the No Child Left Behind Act conditions
federal funds on schools' willingness to
assist military recruiters," he noted.
If the Solomon Amendment is upheld,
Chemerinsky said, law schools that agree to
provide equal access may print statements to
distribute to students explaining why they
accommodate
military recruiters
and
condemning the military's policies.
FAIR expressed concern about the
government's ability to condition federal
funding on waiving First Amendment
protections on a broader scale. "That's really
what this case is about," Chemerinsky said.
"Can the government use its tremendous
coercive power to force people to give up
their constitutional rights?"
The decision "could have a devastating
effect on the role of the academy,"
Rosenkranz said. "The government's theory
is that as soon as a school accepts the
government's money, it has no First
Amendment right to decline a request from
any government agency to disseminate its
messages."
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Greenfield agreed. "We all receive federal
benefits of some kind: Social Security,
welfare, mortgage deductions, student
loans," he said. "If the government can
condition those benefits on the recipients'

agreement to not exercise First Amendment
rights, then only those who do not need the
government at all could speak out against
it."
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"Wisdom of Solomon Redux"
New York Sun
December 8, 2005
New York Sun
argument that the Article I issue ought to be
enough on its own to settle the case.

The best piece of news to come out of
Tuesday's Supreme Court oral argument on
Rumsfeld v. FAIR is the surmise, based on
the justices' questioning, that the court will
roundly reject the argument of law schools
who want to receive federal money while
blocking on-campus military recruiting.
Constitutionalists can also smile because of
the logic that the justices might use to reach
their conclusion. The universities argued
that the case hinges on the First
Amendment, but government lawyers asked
the court to look beyond the free speech
clause to other important parts of the
constitution and it sounds like at least some
justices are doing so.

If the point about raising and supporting an
army does figure prominently in the court's
ruling, it will be a victory for those who still
credit such quaint notions as separated and
delegated powers. Rumsfeld is about
whether Congress will be able to exercise its
own judgment about how to fulfill its duties,
or whether instead the courts will force the
legislative branch's hand by manufacturing
"rights" where none exist. Universities
undeniably have a right to free speech, for
example, but not the right to require the
government to pay for their speech.

The government argued in its brief
defending the law that, as much as any
question
of the
universities'
First
Amendment rights to object to the military's
"don't
ask,
don't tell"
policy on
homosexuality, the court should also
constitutional
Congress's
consider
responsibility, enumerated in Article I, to
"raise and support" a military for the
common defense. "To meet that challenge,"
the acting solicitor general, Paul Clement,
wrote in a government brief, "Congress has
long required the armed forces to 'conduct
intensive recruiting campaigns' to encourage
military enlistments." Therefore, any First
Amendment interest-if there even is onemust be balanced against Congress's
responsibility to carry out its constitutional
obligation as it sees fit. The Great Scalia
suggested to Mr. Clement during the oral

This case is but another one in a long string
of cases that have sought to secure a "right"
to government money in many areas. One of
the lawyers for the universities, Joshua
Rosenkranz, assisted in another such case in
the late 1990s when he was head of the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University. In Velazquez v. Legal Services
Corp., the center argued against a law
prohibiting federally funded legal aid
lawyers from using taxpayers' money to sue
to overturn welfare reform enacted by the
taxpayers' elected representatives. In that
case, the Supreme Court ultimately sided
with legal aid; Velazquez and Rumsfeld are
not truly analogous, however, so the court
will not have to overturn its own precedent
to rule correctly in this case. It will be
encouraging if the justices decide to credit
legislative judgment.
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"Solomon Amendment Likely to Survive"
SCOTUSblog
December 6, 2005
Lyle Denniston
Congress' demand that law schools give

walk into the room at a jobs or career fair.

military recruiters equal access to their
students, despite the military's policy of
barring homosexuals from service, appeared
to have survived quite easily its
constitutional test in the Supreme Court on
Tuesday, at least if oral argument reflects
the Justices' actual leanings. Aside from
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and, possibly,
Justice David H. Souter, the so-called
"Solomon Amendment" appeared to draw
no serious opposition from the bench.

Clement, in fact, was so expansive about the
kind of protests he said the Solomon
Amendment would not block that Justices
Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy
voiced some concern that this might actually
obstruct the military's chances of any
successful recruiting. The Solicitor General,
however, did not yield, saying that military
recruiters "were not afraid to confront
speech" in opposition to their efforts.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., made it
clear in several instances that he sees the
case as solely one in which the law schools
can pursue their desire to exclude the
military's recruiters simply by giving up
federal funds. Other Justices, while making
somewhat more nuanced comments, seemed
to be troubled by the prospect that a major
First Amendment ruling in favor of the law
schools would open the way for individuals
to resist obeying all kinds of lawsincluding federal anti-discrimination lawsby claiming their refusal to obey was a
matter of their beliefs or conscience.
And, with some concessions by Solicitor
General Paul D. Clement, some of the
Day
Sandra
Justices-especially
O'Connor-appeared to be satisfied that the
law schools can get across their antidiscrimination message even while allowing
military recruiters on campus and giving
them equal access. Clement went quite far in
saying that the Solomon Amendment would
permit university and law school officials to
engage in robust protests against military
recruiters-including jeering when they

The counsel for the law schools, New York
attorney Joshua E. Rosenkranz, made
reasonably well most of the points to be
made on his side of the case, but to no
apparent avail. And, by accepting somewhat
extreme hypotheticals about extensions of
his First Amendment protest argument,
Rosenkranz opened the way for Clement, on
rebuttal, to stress that there was "no limit to
their argument" so that "more is at issue
here than the exclusion of homosexuals."
The Court should be worried, Clement said,
about law schools next objecting to military
recruiters on a wide array of other
grounds-objections to the military's
exclusion of women from combat positions
that are the route to leadership, opposition to
the war in Iraq, or to the war in Afghanistan.
And, he said, "we have to worry about this
coming back in the context of Title VI and

IX."
It was no surprise that the Solomon
Amendment's most avid supporter on the
Court was Justice Scalia. He mildly scolded
Clement for basing much of his argument on
Congress' power to attach strings to federal
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funds' receipt, and not on Congress' power
"to raise and support armies." Recruiting
officers on college campuses, Scalia
suggested, was a constitutionally endowed
activity of the military. "We have said the
judicial deference [to Congress] is at its
apogee when Congress acts to raise and
support armies. That's precisely what we

have here," Scalia said.
But Justice Kennedy was also equally
fervent in his support of the Solomon
Amendment, as he openly fretted that
"resistance to any statute could be justified
as expressive speech."

667

LOOKING BA CK: CHENEY V. U.S. DICTRICT COURT
"Court Lets Cheney Avoid Disclosure"
Los Angeles Times
June 25, 2004
David G. Savage
In a victory for the White House, the
Supreme Court[, in Cheney v. U.S. District
Court,] set aside a judge's order Thursday
that would have required Vice President
Dick Cheney to turn over documents that
would show whether industry lobbyists had
met secretly with his energy policy task
force.
The 7-2 decision says that the president and
his closest advisors are usually entitled to
shield their meetings and messages from
prying outsiders. And rarely, if ever, is a
judge authorized to force the White House
to disclose information to those who seek it
through a private lawsuit, the high court
said.
The justices sent the dispute back to the U.S.
Court of Appeals here, advising its judges to
give more heed to the "weighty separationof-powers objections" voiced by the Bush
administration. That alone will take many
months and will put off a further ruling until
after the presidential election in November.
Environmentalists have alleged that energy
lobbyists wrote parts of Cheney's national
energy policy early in 2001, and have
accused
Cheney-a
former
energy
executive-of meeting privately with
industry leaders, including then-Enron
Chairman Kenneth L. Lay. The vice
president has denied the charges, but his
office also has refused to disclose exactly
who met with the task force.
When

Judicial

Watch,

a

conservative

watchdog group in Washington, and the
liberal Sierra Club sued to get the
information, the case became a high-stakes
test of the boundaries of an administration's
right to conduct business behind closed
doors. On Thursday, the administration's
lawyers won most of what they sought from
the Supreme Court, which itself operates
behind a veil of secrecy.
presidential
The Constitution "affords
the greatest protection
confidentiality
consistent with the fair administration of
justice," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote
in Cheney vs. U.S. District Court. Judges
must keep in mind "the paramount necessity
of protecting the executive branch from
vexatious litigation," he added.
The high court cited only two cases that
proved to be exceptions to this rule of White
House secrecy.
In the first, President Nixon was forced to
turn over secret tapes of Oval Office
conversations because he was caught up in
the criminal investigation that grew out of
the Watergate break-in. When a person's
guilt or innocence is at stake, the courts need
all "the relevant evidence," the justices said
Thursday, referring back to the unanimous
ruling in U.S. vs. Nixon.
More recently, when President Clinton was
sued by Paula Jones, her lawyers won a
court order requiring the president to turn
over information and submit to an interview.
That order was upheld unanimously by the
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high court in 1997 on the grounds that the
lawsuit involved Clinton's private life, not
his conduct as the president.
The Cheney case fell into neither category.
The president and the vice president were
not caught up in a criminal investigation.
And the lawsuit seeking information on
Cheney's energy policy task force involved
the official business of the White House, not
the private lives of the top officials.
In such cases, judges should be wary of
requiring the president or vice president to
turn over documents, Kennedy said.
"Special considerations control when the
executive branch's interests in maintaining
the autonomy of its office and safeguarding
the confidentiality of its communications are
implicated," he said.
Lest the lower court judges miss the point,
he closed by warning that "all courts should
be mindful of the burdens imposed on the
executive branch in any future proceedings."
President Bush welcomed Thursday's
ruling. "We believe the president should be
able to receive candid and unvarnished
advice from staff and advisors. It's an
important principle," White House Press
Secretary Scott McClellan said.
A spokesman for Sen. John F. Kerry (DMass.), Bush's presumed Democratic
presidential challenger, countered that the
administration should have released the
information on its own. "The Nixon legacy
of secrecy is alive and well in the Bush
White House," Kerry spokesman Phil Singer
said.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer signed on
to Kennedy's opinion.

During the oral argument, Stevens and
Breyer questioned the underlying basis for
the lawsuit. The two groups that sued
Cheney accused him of violating the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, which requires
outside advisory boards to open their
meetings to the public. But Stevens
wondered why that law was even triggered,
since the decision makers in Cheney's task
force were government officials, not
outsiders.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Clarence
Thomas and Antonin Scalia said they would
have gone further and thrown out the
judge's original order, rather than requiring
the appeals court to reconsider the case.
Thomas said the district court "clearly
exceeded its authority" by ordering the
disclosure of documents. Scalia joined
Thomas' opinion and did not offer one of his
own.
Scalia's role in the case had drawn extra
attention because of his friendship with
Cheney. In early January, three weeks after
the court agreed to take up Cheney's appeal,
Scalia flew to Louisiana with the vice
president aboard a small government jet to
go duck hunting.
When their trip came to light, Sierra Club
lawyers urged Scalia to withdraw from the
case, arguing that he could not be impartial.
Scalia refused, saying the dispute involved
the office of the vice president, not Cheney
personally. In the end, Scalia's vote in favor
of Cheney's position did not affect the
outcome.
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David H.
Souter dissented in Thursday's decision.
They said the appeals court handled the
matter correctly.
Despite the setback, lawyers for the Sierra
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Club found something to like in the ruling.
"We didn't get all we wanted, but they
didn't get what they wanted either-which
was to have the case thrown out," said Alex
Levinson, deputy legal director for the group
in San Francisco. "This keeps the public in
the dark, but it keeps the case alive. We are
unlikely to get anything more before the
election."
The case has highlighted the legal barrier
that shields the White House when it wants
to protect its confidentiality. The Freedom
of Information Act permits the public to
seek data contained in the files of
government agencies, but it does not apply
to the White House.
Congress can demand information from the
White House, but only if lawmakers are
determined to press the issue. The House
and Senate, controlled by Republicans, have
not issued subpoenas for information in this
case.
In seeking information on the Cheney task
force, the General Accounting Office, the
congressional watchdog agency, filed its
first-ever lawsuit. The case came before
U.S. District Judge John D. Bates, a new
Bush appointee. He ruled against the GAO,
and the agency dropped its suit.
But the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch had
more success when they came before U.S.

District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, a Clinton
appointee. Lawyers for the two groups
claimed in their suit that Cheney had
violated the Federal Advisory Committee
Act by meeting in private with outside
lobbyists.
Sullivan said he could not decide whether
Cheney had violated the law without
knowing who had met with or submitted
recommendations to his task force. He then
issued an order requiring the vice president's
office to turn over documents to answer
these questions.
Cheney refused and took his case to the U.S.
Court of Appeals. That court's randomly
chosen three-judge panel included two
Democratic appointees and one Republican.
In a 2-1 ruling, the appeals court panel
upheld Sullivan's order.
Judge David S. Tatel, a Clinton appointee,
wrote the court's opinion and pointed out
that the Federal Advisory Committee Act
had been applied by the same court when
then-First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton led
a healthcare task force early in the Clinton
administration.
Last fall, U.S. Solicitor Gen. Theodore B.
Olson appealed the case to the Supreme
Court, saying it would "violate fundamental
principles of separation of powers" if the
vice president were forced to turn over the
internal documents.
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"High Court to Hear Cheney Secrecy Case"
United Press International
December 15, 2003
Michael Kirkland
The Supreme Court of the United States
agreed Monday to hear a case involving
Vice President Dick Cheney, an action that
may save the vice president from a contempt
citation-at least for now.
Cheney is asking the justices to help keep
meetings of the National Energy Policy
Development Group confidential, despite
lower-court rulings in a case brought by two
public interest groups.
At issue is whether Cheney allowed private
energy lobbyists and high-profile campaign
contributors to participate in the work of the
group, and if so, whether that information
should be made public.
Cheney, through the Justice Department, has
asked the Supreme Court to review a judge's
order in the case, even though it has not
come to trial.
The Supreme Court should hear the case
sometime this spring and hand down a
decision before July.
The policy group was established by
President George W. Bush as one of the first
acts of his administration. The president
ordered it to "develop a national energy
policy designed to help the private sector,
and as necessary the appropriate federal,
state and local governments, promote
dependable, affordable and environmentally
sound production and distribution of
energy."
The executive order said the group was to
consist of the vice president, as chairman;

the secretaries of Treasury, Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation and
Energy; the director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency; the
Environmental
of the
administrator
Protection Agency; and the deputy chief of
staff for economic policy and deputy chief
of staff for policy, both assistants to the
president.
Bush also authorized Cheney to invite the
secretary of State, the chairman of the
Federal Regulatory Commission and "as
appropriate, other officers of the federal
government."
The policy group issued a public report in
May 2001 that encouraged the development
of energy supplies and public conservation.
The report also contained a public list of
said
those who the administration
participated in the policy group meetingsminus private sector advisers. In accordance
with Bush's instructions, those on the list
were all members of the federal government.
At that point, the General Accounting
Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
tried to make the records of the policy group
public. But when its legal action failed, the
GAO dropped the attempt.
However, a conservative, Washington-based
legal advocacy group, Judicial Watch,
continued its own suit in federal court in
Washington against the policy group, its
members and several private individuals,
alleging that the defendants had failed to
comply with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
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FACA requires the public disclosure of all
advisory committee reports, records and
documents, but does not apply to those
groups composed solely of "federal
officials."
In its suit, Judicial Watch contended that in
addition to members of the federal
government, a number private individualssuch as then-Enron President and Chairman
Kenneth Lay and GOP figures Haley
Barbour and Marc Racicot, acting as energy
lobbyists-"regularly attended and fully
participated" in the group's meetings held
behind closed doors, and were in fact
members of the group.
As part of its argument, Judicial Watch cited
a Washington appeals court precedent that
said if private citizens' "involvement and
role are functionally indistinguishable from
those of the other members," then the FACA
exemption does not apply.
Later, the Sierra Club, one of the nation's
best-known environmental lobby groups,
filed a nearly identical suit and the cases
were combined.
When Judicial Watch announced it was
continuing its suit, despite the GAO, the
chairman and general
organization's
counsel, Larry Klayman, issued a statement
blasting the Bush administration.
In pre-trial proceedings, a federal judge
ruled against Cheney and the national policy
group, saying they must produce its
documents to the plaintiffs before a trial
could begin.
A federal appeals court panel ruled 2-1 to
uphold the judge, noting that the White
House was not claiming "executive
privilege." The split panel also rejected an
attempt by Cheney to dismiss his name from

the case, saying it did not have jurisdiction
over that particular matter until a final ruling
by the lower court.
Since George Washington's time, executive
privilege has been claimed by presidents to
withhold information from the legislative or
judicial branches of the government, mainly
information about confidential advice from
presidential advisers.
In a petition filed by the Justice Department
on behalf of Cheney and the group, U.S.
Solicitor General Theodore Olson told the
Supreme Court that the combined cases
"present fundamental separation-of-powers
questions arising from the (judge's) orders
compelling the vice president and others to
comply with broad discovery requests by
private parties seeking information about the
process by which the president received
advice on important national policy matters
from his closest advisers."
Olson said the lower court's orders "would
subject the president to intrusive and
distracting discovery every time he seeks
advice from his closest advisers," the
petition said. "They would open the way for
judicial supervision of the internal executive
branch deliberations."
"Where, as here, the separation-of-powers
arguments do not take the form of-and are
logically antecedent to-a privilege claim, it
serves no purpose to require the president or
vice president to assert privilege claims
before filing an interlocutory appeal," the
petition said.
Given the lower-court rulings, the "only way
that the vice president can obtain appellate
review of his constitutional objections to
improper discovery"-the forced revealing
of documents before trial-"would be to
refuse to comply with any discovery, . . .
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suffer the indignity of a contempt citation
and appeal the order holding him in
contempt," the petition said. "Such an
approach is clearly inconsistent with
(Supreme Court precedent), not to mention
the separation of powers established by the
Constitution."

reject the case, Judicial Watch said Cheney
and the policy group "have made repeated
attempts to transform the actual issues
before the court of appeals into ones of
urgent constitutional concern. As the court
of appeals correctly held, however, no such
issues exist."

In its own brief asking the high court to
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HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PROMOTED ITS AGENDA
THROUGH JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
"Bush's Conservatism to Live Long in the U.S. Courts"
USA Today
March 14, 2008
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON-Within weeks of George
W. Bush's inauguration, he revealed a
systematic, aggressive and tightly controlled
approach to making lifetime appointments to
the federal bench.
The new president ejected the American Bar
Association from the screening process,
ending its half-century role of reviewing
candidates' credentials before a nomination.
Bush turned to lawyers who had been on
Ronald Reagan's judicial selection team to
help seek out prominent conservative
thinkers. All indications were that Bush was
trying to
emulate
Reagan,
whose
conservative mark on the bench has been
deep and enduring.
Now, as Bush enters the last months of his
presidency, he has come close to
accomplishing his goal. He is likely to end
up with fewer total judicial appointments
than this two-term predecessors, Reagan
(1981-89) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001). Yet
Bush has appointed conservatives to lifetime
posts with the potential to affect the law in
America for decades.
"I think that what he has done on judges is
his major triumph," says political science
professor Sheldon Goldman at the
University of Massachusetts Amherst, who
has been tracking judges since the 1960s.
"In almost every other area, domestic policy
and foreign policy, there have been failures.
But with judges, it's a major success story."

Bush has made key appointments to:
*the U.S. Supreme Court. John Roberts, 53,
and Samuel Alito, 57, are the youngest of
the nine justices, consistently conservative
and were in the Reagan administration.
* the prominent U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, regarded as
a steppingstone to the Supreme Court.
Janice Rogers Brown, 58; Brett Kavanaugh,
43; Thomas Griffith, 53; and, before he was
elevated, Roberts. Perhaps the most
controversial was Brown, who as a judge on
the California Supreme Court earned a
reputation as a bold advocate of property
rights and an opponent of affirmative action.
Bush also solidified GOP majorities on other
appeals courts, including on the 5th Circuit,
covering Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana.
Bush appointed Priscilla Owen, 53, a former
Texas Supreme Court justice and longtime
friend of former Bush advisers Karl Rove
and Harriet Miers. He also appointed
Charles Pickering on a temporary basis.
Pickering and Owen faced strong resistance
by Senate Democrats. After 14 senators
brokered a bipartisan deal in 2005, Bush
finally won a lifetime seat for Owen-four
years after she was first nominated.
Abortion rights advocates had vehemently
opposed her, partly because she had
dissented from a state court ruling giving
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judges great latitude to grant a teen's request
for an abortion without notifying her
parents.

face to the conservatives who have been
building up a conservative legal movement
for the last 20 years," he said on MSNBC at
the time and referred to "all kinds of people

Advocates on both sides say Bush's legacy
of judicial appointments will be farreaching.

now on the federal bench . . . who have

worked out consistent philosophies of
sticking with the original principles of the
Constitution..

.

. (A)11 of those people have

"He made significant strides in cementing
the modem court-packing legacy begun by
Ronald Reagan," says Nan Aron of the
liberal Alliance for Justice. "So many
circuits, whose decisions affect tens of
thousands of people, now have Republicanappointed majorities." Aron termed Bush
appointees, as a group, "hostile to individual
rights."

been overlooked."

Conservatives counter that Bush's judges
are rightly more restrained on social policy
dilemmas. Leonard Leo, executive vice
president of the conservative Federalist
Society, says Roberts and Alito "may well
prove to be significant additions to the
court's bloc of proponents for judicial
restraint."

Reagan made four appointments to the high
court, including the first female justice,
O'Connor, and William Rehnquist, whom
he elevated to chief justice in 1986.

Bush had some stumbles and setbacks. He
first nominated then-White House counsel
Miers to succeed Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Miers' name was withdrawn
when several in Bush's own conservative
ranks, including former appeals court judge
Robert Bork, criticized her. Bork called the
choice "a disaster on every level."
Bork's complaint about Miers spoke to the
longtime effort by right-wing advocates to
alter the courts: "It's kind of a slap in the

When Reagan campaigned for president in
1980, he said judges were usurping the role
of legislators in social policy issues. His
appointments narrowly construed individual
rights and retreated from involvement in
local problems such as school desegregation,
prison crowding and the environment.

Rehnquist, who died in 2005, and O'Connor
are gone. But Reagan appointees Antonin
Scalia, 72, and Anthony Kennedy, 71, are in
their third decade and show no signs of
retiring. Reagan tried to appoint Bork in
1987, but the Senate, then controlled by
Democrats, rejected him, 58-42.
"President Bush might not get the total
number of appointees that Reagan got," says
Barbara Perry, a political science professor
at Sweet Briar College, "but in a way he
one-ups Reagan with Roberts, who could
serve as chief justice longer than Rehnquist,
and with Alito, who is much more
conservative than O'Connor."
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"Conservative Courts Likely Bush Legacy"
Los Angeles Times

January 2, 2008
David Savage
After nearly seven years in the White House,
President Bush has named 294 judges to the
federal courts, giving Republican appointees
a solid majority of the seats, including a
60%-to-40% edge over Democrats on the
influential U.S. appeals courts.
The rightward shift on the federal bench is
likely to prove a lasting legacy of the Bush
presidency, since many of these judgesincluding his
two
Supreme
Court
appointees-may serve for two more
decades.
And despite the Republicans' loss of control
of the Senate, 40 of Bush's judges won
confirmation this year, more than in the
previous three years when Republicans held
the majority.
"The progress we have made this year . . . is

sometimes lost amid the partisan sniping
over
a
handful
of
controversial
nominations," said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (DVt.), chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
in a year-end statement.
This progress is not altogether welcomed by
liberal activists, who have been frustrated in
their efforts to block more of Bush's
nominees.
"Some of the appeals courts will be quite far
to the right for a generation to come. So why
is the Senate rushing to confirm as many of
these terrible nominees as possible?" asked
Simon Heller, a lawyer for the Alliance for
Justice, a liberal advocacy group.
He gives the Republicans more credit than

the Democrats for adhering to the party line.
"Republican senators have voted in lock step
to confirm every judge that Bush has
nominated. The Democrats have often
broken ranks," he said.
Conservatives tend to agree on that point.
They say the ideological makeup of the
courts has grown into a major issue on the
right, and it has brought Republicans
social
are
they
whether
together,
conservatives, economic conservatives or
small-government libertarians.
"This issue unites the base," said Curt
Levey, executive director of the Committee
for Justice, a group that lobbies for Bush's
judicial nominees. "It serves as a stand-in
for the culture wars: religion, abortion, gay
marriage and the coddling of criminals."
Nothing irritates conservatives more, he
said, than having unelected judges decide
politically charged issues that some believe
should be left to voters and legislators.
"Conservatives tend to blame judges for the
left's success in the culture war," Levey
said.
While
Republicans
find
themselves
somewhat divided heading into the election
year, Bush is widely praised for his record
of pressing for conservative judges.
"From Day One, President Bush made the
judiciary a top priority, and he fought very
hard for his nominees," said Washington
attorney Bradford Berenson, who worked in
the White House counsel's office in Bush's
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first term. "He was less willing to
compromise than President Clinton. As a
result, in raw numbers, he may end with
somewhat fewer judges than Clinton had."

judges have made it harder for plaintiffs to
sue or to win damages if they prevail. "That
is the mind-set. They are bent on denying
justice to ordinary Americans," she said.

In his eight years in office, Clinton named
367 judges, according to the Federal Judicial
Center. When he left office in 2001,
Democratic appointees had a slight majority
among trial judges and on the courts of
appeal.

Berenson, the former Bush administration
lawyer, said conservatives and liberal judges
differ mostly on their willingness to strike
down laws.

Among the 12 regional appeals courts, all
but one are closely split or have a
Republican majority. The 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals-which covers Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington-is
viewed as the last bastion of liberalism, with
16
Democratic
appointees
and
11
Republicans. So far, Bush has named seven
judges to the 9th Circuit, but he will not
match Clinton's total of 14.
Does it make a difference whether a judge
was appointed by Bush or Clinton?
Legal activists who closely follow the courts
are convinced it does make a difference in a
significant number of cases. "If you could
pick only one thing, look at whether a case
goes before a jury. The Bush judges vote to
keep cases away from juries," said Judith E.
Schaeffer, legal director for People for the
American Way, a liberal advocacy group in
Washington.
In job-discrimination suits, for example, the
employee who is the plaintiff typically
wants his or her case heard by the jury. The
or
business
a
employer-usually,
corporation-wants the dispute decided or
dismissed by a judge, she said.
Schaeffer said her organization has looked
closely at such cases and found that Bush's

"Liberals tend to celebrate judicial power;
conservatives tend to be suspicious of it," he
said. "Boiled down to its essence,
conservatives want the judiciary to play a
smaller role in our society. They want more
room for democratic self-government. That
means a conservative judiciary will defer to
the executive branch on matters like the war
on terrorism. And they will be more inclined
to defer to the legislature on issues like
abortion."
He cited the example of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act that Congress passed in
2003. In the past, the Supreme Court had
struck down similar state bans, but last term,
thanks to Bush appointee Justice Samuel A.
Alito Jr., the federal law was upheld, 5-4.
In the year ahead, liberal activists will be
playing defense. They hope to block as
many Bush nominees as possible from
winning confirmation to the lifetime seats on
the appeals courts. And since the Supreme
Court's two oldest justices-John Paul
Stevens, 87, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 74are its strongest liberals, they are hoping a
Democrat will win the White House in
November.
In the party caucuses and primaries, the
issue of judges hardly raises a ripple, but
that will change in the months ahead,
activists say.
"Once the Republicans and the Democrats
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have selected their candidates, they will start
talking about the courts as a major rallying
issue," said Jay Sekulow, counsel for the
conservative American Center for Law and

Justice. "Look at the Supreme Court today,
and you can say the next president will
decide its future for the rest of our lives."
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"Roberts, Alito Help Define New Supreme Court"
MSNBC.com
June 18, 2007
Tom Curry
WASHINGTON-Iraq remains chaotic and
immigration overhaul faces an uncertain
fate.
But if President Bush wants to sing the old
tune, "They can't take that away from me"
he can turn to the Supreme Court where his
appointees Chief Justice John Roberts and
Associate Justice Samuel Alito sit.
As the high court nears the end of its 20062007 term, the impact of Bush's appointees
is becoming clearer.
In high profile-decisions, Roberts and Alito
have bolstered the conservative wing, which
includes Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas and occasionally Justice
Anthony Kennedy.
Former Reagan administration Justice
Department official Doug Kmiec, who is
professor of constitutional law at Pepperdine
University, said, "The headline of the term
so far" is that "Anthony Kennedy in the
presence of John Roberts and Sam Alito has
rejoined the Reagan judicial philosophy."
(President Reagan nominated Kennedy to
the court in 1987.)
Roberts-Kennedy Alignment

"Justice Kennedy and the chief justice are
thinking along similar lines," Kmiec said. "I
don't think that's an accident. I believe it is
a conscious result of the respect the new
Chief Justice has given Justice Kennedy and
the simple fact that they like each other."
He added that when Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, whom Alito replaced, was on the

court, "Kennedy was largely in conversation
with her. She was the one with whom he
would bargain over terminology. In her
absence, Justice Kennedy, of course, has
been pursued by both sides of the court, but
in virtually every case, Justice Kennedy has
discovered that he is more in affinity with
the Roberts-Alito side of legal thought."
Marcia Greenberger, the co-president of the
National Women's Law Center, which
opposed the Alito and Roberts nominations,
lamented O'Connor's retirement.
"In the past, O'Connor often made the
majority and Kennedy was part of the
dissent, so we have clearly seen a shift to the
right, in areas from criminal law to privacy
rights for women," she said. "Roberts and
Alito have reliably and consistently been on
the conservative end with Scalia and
Thomas, and that was not the case with
O'Connor. This was our great concern
(during their confirmation hearings)."
Another opponent of the Alito and Roberts
nominations, Nan Aron of the Alliance for
Justice, said, "on the hot-button issues so
far, Justice Alito and Roberts almost always
join each other and almost always side with
Justices Scalia and Thomas to form what's
become the court's new hard-right flank."
Not all Controversial Decisions

Not all of the Supreme Court's decisions
this year have been headline-making or
ideologically charged.
Of the 64 decisions for the 2006-2007 term
which the court has handed down as of
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Monday, nearly one-quarter
unanimous.

have been

Another seven were brief, unsigned
summary decisions in which there was no
dissent.
So far, there have been seven 5-to-4
decisions in which the conservative justices
have united to prevail over the more liberal
minority of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens.
And of course, Roberts and Alito haven't
always been on the winning side: They were
both on the losing end of April's
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection

Agency ruling, written by Stevens, that said
the EPA has the authority to decide whether
greenhouse gases from new cars contribute
to climate change.
But several of the 5-to-4 decisions in which
Roberts and Alito were in the majority have
been on politically explosive topics:
Abortion: In April, the court, in a ruling
written by Kennedy, upheld a federal law
banning a specific abortion procedure, called
"intact dilation and evacuation" or "partialbirth abortion." The justices said the statute
was not invalid on its face, but could be
challenged in specific cases in which a
woman could show it would violate her
rights under the court's previous abortion
rulings, such as Roe v. Wade.

Alleged sex discrimination: Last month, the
court, in a decision called Ledbetter v.
Goodyear, written by Alito, ruled that a
woman who'd alleged sex discrimination in
pay had missed the deadline for filing her
claims.
Death penalty: Last month in upholding the

death sentence of a man convicted of murder
in Washington State, the court, in a ruling
written by Kennedy, said that trial judges
could exclude potential jurors who voiced
qualms about capital punishment.
"The biggest effect of the Roberts and Alito
for O'Connor and Rehnquist swap has been
to make Justice Kennedy, rather than Justice
O'Connor, the swing vote that decides most
of the big, contentious issues before the
Court," said Curt Levey, the executive
director of the Committee for Justice, a
group which supported the Roberts and
Alito nominations.
The crucial cases, he said, are those in which
O'Connor and Kennedy would have voted
differently.
"By far, the most dramatic example of that
difference is the partial-birth abortion
decision, where Kennedy voted to uphold
what O'Connor would have very likely
struck down," said Levey. "An equally
dramatic example will likely be provided in
the next couple of weeks, when the court
rules on the Seattle and Louisville K-12
race-based admissions cases."
Based on their votes in the 2003 University
of Michigan racial preferences cases, Levey
said, Kennedy would likely vote against
using race in assigning students to schools,
and "O'Connor probably would have
upheld" the school assignment plan.
Also, because "O'Connor had a liberal
streak when it came to women's issues, she
probably would have voted with the four
liberal justices in Ledbetter v. Goodyear,"
Levey said.
Greenberger
said
the
recent
pay
discrimination and abortion rulings "strike at
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the very heart of women's autonomy,
integrity, and ability to be full citizens in
this country.

. .

. Women's long-established

rights, rights to bodily integrity and privacy,
are unraveling. And that is a cause of
enormous alarm."
But Ed Whelan, a former law clerk to
Justice Scalia and a former official in the
Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel under Bush, dismissed the preoccupation with the shift from O'Connor's
views to Alito's.
"I don't think Alito has some sort of
obligation to mimic O'Connor any more
than Justice Ginsburg had an obligation to
mimic Justice (Byron) White," whom she
replaced in 1993. On abortion, White
dissented from the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling
which legalized abortion, while Ginsburg
supports it.
"We sure hope that Justice Alito's
replacement of O'Connor is going to
improve the court," Whelan said. "I think it
has, but there's room for a lot more
improvement."

Bush Effect on Appeals Courts

While Bush may not get a chance to attempt
more "improvement" by appointing another
justice to the high court, he has named 49
judges to the courts of appeals. And that's
significant because many cases never reach
the Supreme Court.
With 13 appeals court vacancies, Bush is in
the midst of standoff with the Democraticcontrolled Senate Judiciary Committee over
the nomination of Leslie Southwick to fill a
vacancy on the Fifth Circuit.
Aron's group has accused Southwick of
being too partial to business interests and
voting "consistently against consumers and
workers."
So far Southwick hasn't been able to get a
vote on the Senate floor.
For both Southwick and the president who
nominated him, the clock is ticking toward
the end of the Bush era for the federal
judiciary.

681

"The Difference Alito Makes"
Dorf on Law Blog

June 5, 2007
Michael Dorf
For those of us waiting to see what effect the
replacement of Justice O'Connor with
Justice Alito would have on the Supreme
Court, the last couple months have begun to
provide some concrete evidence.
First, there was the Court's decision in
Gonzales v. Carhart,which upheld a federal

law banning the abortion procedure known
as "intact dilation and evacuation." When
the Court struck down a similar Nebraska
law in 2000, Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurrence in which she stated that the law
was invalid because it did not include an
exception to protect the life or health of the
pregnant woman. The federal law did
contain an exception to protect the woman's
life, but not her health, so it seems likely
O'Connor would have voted to strike it
down. Alito voted to uphold the law, and
since the decision was 5-4, his vote in the
case was decisive.
Second, the Court ruled 5-4 in Schriro v.
Landrigan that a federal district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying a habeas
hearing to a death row inmate who claimed
his lawyer had failed to present mitigating
evidence at his sentencing trial. Alito joined
the majority, and while it is not certain how
O'Connor would have voted, there is some
evidence suggesting the outcome might have
been different if she were on the Court. Two
years earlier, while Alito was on the Third
Circuit, he rejected an inmate's claim that
his lawyer's failure to investigate possible
mitigating evidence violated his right to
effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme
Court overturned that ruling 5-4 in Rompilla
v. Beard, with O'Connor joining the

majority. Admittedly, the issue in Schriro
was different than the issue in Rompilla-it
focused on whether the inmate made a
sufficient claim of prejudice to justify a
hearing, not on whether the lawyer's failure
to introduce mitigating evidence fell below
objective standards of reasonableness. But
given this history-and O'Connor's recent
statements of concern about the quality of
representation in capital cases-it is at least
arguable that her replacement with Alito
made a difference in Schriro.
Third, the Court ruled 5-4 in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. that Title

VII permits employees to challenge pay
disparities only if they filed a formal
complaint with a federal agency within 180
days after their pay was set. The decision
was written by Alito, and some
commentators have argued that O'Connor
would have voted the other way, given the
implications of the ruling for women in the
workplace. At the very least, it seems likely
that O'Connor would have blunted the effect
of the ruling with a fuzzy standard leaving
open the possibility of challenges in some
circumstances after the 180-day period.
Finally, the Court ruled 5-4 yesterday in
Uttecht v. Brown against a death row inmate
who claimed his trial judge erred by
excluding a juror who expressed uneasiness
with the death penalty but also said he
would consider it in an appropriate case.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion-which
Alito joined-said federal courts should
show special deference to trial judges in
such cases because they are "in a superior
position to observe the demeanor and
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qualifications of the potential juror." It is
unclear how O'Connor would have ruled in
this case. During her early years on the
bench, she wrote a number of opinions that
made it harder for death row inmates (and
other prisoners)
to
challenge their
convictions and sentences. But in recent
years, she has expressed concerns about the
death penalty and the fairness of its
application. It is arguable, though not
certain, that she would have voted in the
inmate's favor, which would have changed
the outcome in the case.

These are just four recent examples in which
the replacement of O'Connor with Alito
may have affected a Court decision and the
shape of its doctrine.

. .

. It might be a useful

exercise to compile a list of these cases over
the next few years as a way of
demonstrating the significance of Supreme
Court appointments. Alito and O'Connor are
not all that far apart on the political
spectrum, so if his replacement of her has a
significant effect, one can only imagine
what the replacement of, say, Justice
Stevens with a Bush appointee would mean.
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"Conservatives Cheer Court Nominee"
Los Angeles Times

November 1, 2005
Warren Vieth
Energizing his conservative supporters,
President Bush on Monday named Samuel
A. Alito Jr., a federal appeals court judge
with a 15-year record on the bench, to
replace retiring Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Alito was immediately embraced by
Republicans who had parted company with
Bush over the ill-fated nomination of White
House Counsel Harriet E. Miers, who
withdrew last week after it became clear that
her prospects for confirmation were shaky.
"This moves the court to a more
conservative tilt, no doubt about it," said Jay
Sekulow, chief counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice, a Christian legal
foundation, and a key White House advisor
on judicial appointments. "Justice O'Connor
was the swing vote on a lot of cases, and she
sometimes swung in the other direction."
But Bush's choice of a candidate with a
more certain conservative philosophy set the
stage for a confrontation with Senate
Democrats, who fear that Alito will move
the high court further to the right on key
issues-particularly abortion rights.
"We need to be careful here," said Sen.
Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), a member of
the Judiciary Committee, which screens
judicial candidates. "This is a nominee who
could shift the balance of the court, and thus
the laws of the nation, for decades to come."
Bush, who introduced Alito during a brief

morning ceremony in the White House
residential quarters, said he chose the 55year-old jurist because his record indicated
that he shared the president's view of the
''proper role" of federal judges.
"He understands that judges are to interpret
the laws, not to impose their preferences or
priorities on the people," Bush said.
Alito, who worked as a Justice Department
lawyer and a U.S. attorney before being
named to the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1990, promised Bush that, if
the
he would interpret
confirmed,
Constitution and laws "with care and
restraint, always keeping in mind the limited
role that the courts play in our constitutional
system."
One antiabortion group, Operation Rescue,
predicted that Alito's confirmation would
put the high court "on the fast track to
derailing Roe v. Wade as the law of the
land," referring to the landmark 1973
decision that affirmed a woman's right to
choose abortion.
But legal scholars and court observers said it
was not clear how Alito might rule if a case
that could overturn Roe vs. Wade came
before the high court-or whether a majority
of the nine justices would vote to overturn if
Alito chose to do so.
At the same time, it appeared to be clear that
the addition of Alito would give the high
court a more conservative cast than it has
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had with O'Connor, a centrist who
sometimes sided with the court's liberal
justices.
Some legal analysts said that Alito was in
the mold of justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, who anchor the Supreme
Court's conservative wing. He has even
been called "Scalito," a reference to Alito
and Scalia's Italian American heritage as
well as their similar legal philosophies.
But others said they perceived Alito as more
akin to Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
who was confirmed in late September to
replace the late William H. Rehnquist.
Roberts is regarded as a consistent
conservative, but not as ideological as Scalia
or Thomas.
Alito's nomination represents a sharp course
change in the White House political strategy
for replacing O'Connor, who announced in
July that she planned to retire. Bush's first
choice for the seat was Roberts, but he was
moved to become chief justice when
Rehnquist died in early September. In
nominating Miers, the president chose a
close friend and political ally with no
judicial experience, wagering that social
conservatives and other elements of his
political base would trust his judgment. It
proved a bad bet.
In naming Alito, White House advisors said,
Bush reverted to the same game plan that led
to the choice of Roberts: He chose from a
short list of experienced jurists who had
been blessed in advance by conservative
candidate
and picked the
activists
considered most likely to squeak through a
divided Senate.
Bush rejected entreaties by conservatives
and liberals alike to appoint a woman to
replace O'Connor. If Alito is confirmed,

Ruth Bader Ginsburg will be the lone female
justice.
Among those who had urged the president to
pick a woman were his wife, Laura, and
O'Connor, the first woman to serve on the
court.
"The president always considers a diverse
group of potential nominees; he looks at
people from all backgrounds and all walks
of life," White House Press Secretary Scott
McClellan said Monday.
In the end, however, Alito was "the person
who he believes is the best one to fill this
vacancy at this time," McClellan said.
Bush initially interviewed Alito in July
about a possible Supreme Court nomination,
McClellan said, shortly after O'Connor
announced her intention to retire. After
Miers
withdrew
her
name
from
consideration, Bush called Alito on Friday
and raised the possibility again.
The decision was settled by the time Bush
headed for his Camp David retreat Friday
afternoon, McClellan said. Alito met with
the president in the Oval Office at 7 a.m.
Monday and formally accepted the offer.
His wife, Martha-Ann Bomgardner, and
children Laura, 17, and Philip, 19, joined
them 20 minutes later. The nomination was
announced at 8 a.m.
On Capitol Hill, Bush's decision was
roundly praised by Senate Republicans but
met with a mixed response from Democrats.
Some denounced Alito as an unfit
replacement for O'Connor; others said they
would reserve judgment until more was
known about his judicial record.
California's two senators, both Democrats,
reflected the competing sentiments. Sen.
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Barbara Boxer said she believed the
nomination was "aimed at appeasing the
most right-wing elements of the president's
political base," while Sen. Dianne Feinstein
said she hoped "people on both sides would
hold their fire, allow the Judiciary
Committee to do its work and not take a
position until that work is completed."
Although a contentious confirmation battle
seemed certain, it was not clear whether
Democrats would be willing to block Alito's
confirmation by using their ability to
filibuster or engage in extended debate.
Doing so could prompt Republicans to
approve a parliamentary rule change barring
in judicial
use of the filibuster
confirmations, a possibility sometimes
called the "nuclear option."
Members of the "Gang of 14," a bipartisan
group of senators whose votes have been
pivotal on previous judicial nominations,
advised a more cautious approach.
"Judge Alito needs to have a fair and
thorough hearing, and we should withhold
judgment until that process unfolds," said
Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.), a member of the
group, which helped avert a showdown over
filibusters this year.
Although Alito's writings will be thoroughly
dissected in the Senate to discern his
positions on a range of issues, perhaps no
subject will receive closer scrutiny than his
limited record on abortion rights.
In one appeals court case, Alito was the lone
dissenter in a ruling that struck down a
Pennsylvania law requiring married women
to notify their husbands before getting an
abortion. But his dissenting opinion did not
directly address the issues decided in Roe vs.

Even so, the prospect that Alito might
replace O'Connor energized antiabortion
groups and rattled abortion rights advocates.
Kate Michelman, who headed NARAL ProChoice America from 1985 to 2004, called
Alito's nomination "the greatest threat to
women's fundamental rights and liberties in
more than three decades."
Michelman cited her own experience during
the pre-Roe era, when she discovered she
was pregnant after her husband abandoned
her and their three young children. She
applied for and received permission to get a
legal "therapeutic" abortion, but only after
obtaining her husband's consent.
"Roe v. Wade emancipated women from the
humiliation I endured," Michelman said.
"Judge Samuel Alito voted to return us to
it."
The son of an Italian immigrant, Alito grew
up in the suburbs of Trenton, N.J.,
graduating from Princeton University and
Yale Law School. He worked in the U.S.
solicitor general's office during the Reagan
administration, arguing 12 cases before the
Supreme Court, then became a deputy
assistant attorney general in the Justice
Department.
In 1987, Reagan appointed Alito as U.S.
attorney for New Jersey. Three years later,
President George H.W. Bush selected him to
sit on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals,
which is based in Philadelphia. The Senate
approved both nominations by unanimous
consent, a favorable portent cited Monday
by the president and his allies.
During his 15 years on the 3rd Circuit, Alito
has participated in thousands of appeals and

Wade.

686

written hundreds of opinions, providing
political friends and foes with plenty of
documented
evidence
of his legal
philosophy and judicial temperament.
One of the main criticisms of Miers was that

she had no judicial experience, making it
difficult to determine how she might
interpret the Constitution. In introducing
Alito, Bush noted pointedly that he had
more judicial experience than any Supreme
Court nominee in more than 70 years.

687

